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Abstract
This thesis consists of three empirical essays on issues relating to the analysis
of the link between education and the labour market in East Africa. The first
essay investigates whether returns to schooling differ according to the choice
of the measure of earnings and the different periods in which workers are paid
(daily, weekly, and monthly). Using comparable data from the Living Standards
Measurement Study (LSMS) for Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda, and accounting
for endogeneity using Gaussian Copula and Heckman selection models, we show
that pooling/aggregating earnings to different common measures produce different
estimates of returns to education. Estimating separately for each pay period, the
analysis also reveals that returns to education differ significantly. The analysis
suggests that estimating returns separately for different periods is more reliable
than pooling.
The second essay employs Recentered Influence Function (RIF) Regressions
to examine the distributional effect of education on earnings in East Africa. It
investigates how the distributional effect of education on earnings differs according
to the different periods in which workers are paid, using the same dataset as the
first essay. Results show that, in all three countries, there is a significant difference
in the distribution of earnings between pay periods, and thus the role of education
in explaining earnings inequality differs across the pay periods. Generally, the
effect is more substantial for workers reporting monthly earnings than their daily
and weekly counterparts. Like for the first essay, the second essay also reiterates
the need to estimate for each period separately for more reliable results.
The third essay examines whether the welfare difference between youth and
adult headed households between 2001 and 2018 is attributable to differences in
educational attainment following Universal Primary Education (UPE). The RIF
decomposition method applied to the household budget survey (HBS) data for
2001 and 2018 reveals that the increase in youth educational attainment between
2001 and 2018 significantly explain the difference in welfare between the 2001
and 2018 youth cohorts. The findings also show that differences in educational
attainment are significant factors explaining differences in welfare between youth
and adults in each year. We find no evidence that the difference in welfare between
the youth and adults and between youth in 2001 and their 2018 counterparts can
be attributed to the difference in returns to education.
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The importance of understanding and correctly measuring the rate of returns to
education cannot be overemphasised. Since the seminal works of Becker (1964) and
Mincer (1974) numerous studies have estimated returns to education, including for
Africa (relevant literature is reviewed in each chapter). Various approaches have
been adopted to address endogeneity of education with unobserved ability and
sample selection biases—see Card (1999, 2001). Other issues include heterogeneity
of returns across the earnings distribution and groups of workers. However, little
to no attention has been focused on whether the worker’s pay period matters
in estimating returns to education, which is important in many African labour
markets, as well as the distributional effects of education on earnings, and this
thesis aims to explore these issues for East Africa.
Workers usually get paid over different pay periods depending on the type
and duration of employment/work. Many surveys collecting information on the
labour market then design their questionnaires with that in mind, and the World
Bank’s Living Standards and Measurement Study (LSMS) is no different. In East
Africa, there are three main1 pay periods over which workers report their earnings:
daily, weekly, and monthly. Studies on returns to education usually pool the pay
periods together by converting the earnings to a common period such as hourly,
daily, or monthly. However, as the pay periods may indicate different labour
markets, it is not clear how pooling the pay periods impacts the estimates of
returns to education, the effect of education on the distribution of earnings, and
gender wage gaps. Unlike previous studies, this thesis, therefore, examines whether
1Others are hourly, fortnightly, quarterly, semi-annually and annually, but relatively few
workers.
1
alternative ways of converting the reported wages to a common unit/measure lead
to different estimates; and analyse each pay period separately to examine whether
the estimates differ by pay period.
The Malawi Integrated Household Surveys (IHS), the Tanzania National Panel
Surveys (TNPS), and the Uganda National Panel Surveys (UNPS), which are part
of the LSMS for Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda, respectively, provide comparable
labour market data across the countries and this thesis takes advantage of that.
Chapter 2 describes the surveys and data, limiting the focus to the surveys
conducted between 2008 and 2017. This chapter aims to show how the variables
of interest are extracted or computed, what adjustments are warranted and how
the final sample is constructed from the raw data. Using the available information
from the surveys, the reported earnings are converted to three different units: daily
(hereafter DailyC), monthly (hereafter MonthlyC) and to annualised but expressed
per month (hereafter MonthlyA)
The first empirical essay (Chapter 3) focuses on investigating whether, when
pay periods are pooled, the estimates of returns to education varies depending
on the choice of the common unit (i.e., DailyC, MonthlyC and MonthlyA); and
whether the relationship between education and earnings varies across workers
reporting earnings daily, weekly or monthly. These questions have not been
addressed in the literature. If the different common units lead to different estimates
then it implies that estimates from studies using different common units are not
directly comparable. Furthermore, the common method of pooling the pay periods
together may lead to biased estimates if the pay periods indicate segmented labour
markets (Fichtenbaum, 2006).
In this Chapter, different specifications and estimation strategies are employed
to test robustness. In terms of specification of the earnings function, both the
completed years of schooling (with a quadratic term to capture non-linearity in
education) and levels of education (with dummies for primary, secondary, and
higher education and incomplete primary as the base group) are used. In terms
2
of estimation, beginning with OLS as a baseline, the analysis employs Gaussian
Copula (GC) estimation method by Park and Gupta (2012) to address the
well-known endogeneity concerns from omitted variable bias. GC is an instrument
free method that can recover the estimate of an endogenous variable by directly
modelling the correlation between the endogenous regressor and the error term in
the regression using copula functions. Considering its flexibility and reliance on less
restrictive assumptions, GC is preferred to other instrument free methods, given
the lack of comparable variables across the countries to be used as instruments
for education or ability. The analysis employs the Heckman model (Heckman,
1979) to account for concerns from sample selection bias. The omitted variable
and selection biases are simultaneously addressed by modelling the endogenous
education within the sample selection model (Heckman with Gaussian Copula
(HGC)).
A challenge with the GC model is that when the endogenous variable is discrete
(like in our case2), and thus its cumulative distribution function (CDF) is a step
function, it tends to produce shaky3 estimates. As a robustness check, however,
bootstrap aggregating (bagging) is employed in both GC and HGC regressions,
whereby the model is estimated many times and coefficients averaged.
Malawi has a unique labour market structure, with a disproportionately large
proportion of the labour force in rural areas primarily participating in agriculture
and in off-own-farm short time (mainly piece rate) jobs famously locally known as
ganyu. This group is excluded from the primary analysis and analysed separately
as an extension to the chapter. Similar estimation methods to the primary analysis
are employed in ganyu.
Chapter 4 extends the analysis in Chapter 3 to investigate the distributional
effects of education on earnings. The novelty of this chapter is that even though
some previous studies in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have addressed this, no study
2Education (in years) is theoretically continuous but usually recorded as discrete (positive
integers) in surveys.
3But the estimates normally differ only very slightly.
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has investigated while taking into consideration the pay period of the worker, i.e.,
if and how the effect of education on the distribution of earnings and gender wage
gaps varies according to workers’ pay period. Specifically, the chapter examines,
for each pay period, the effects a change in the distribution of education in the
population has on the earnings distribution. It then further investigates how such
a change in the distribution of education would affect the earnings gap between
the high and the low earning workers. Finally, the chapter investigates the extent
to which gender differences in educational attainment and in returns to education
contribute to the gender earnings and inequality gaps in the three countries. As
an extension, the analysis is also employed for ganyu labour in Malawi.
The analyses in Chapter 4 are based on Recentered Influence Function (RIF)
regression and decomposition methods (Firpo et al., 2009, 2018), among the most
recent econometric tools for analysing the effects of a change in the distribution of
a variable on any statistic of interest (Rios-Avila, 2020b). The superiority of the
methods over alternative strategies is, among others, its ability to compute many
measures of earnings inequality to suit the purpose, such as interquantile share
ratios of earnings, interquantile range and variance of earnings.
Chapter 5 focuses on a slightly different matter but within the returns to
education literature. It investigates how the increased participation in education
in Tanzania following the re-introduction of Universal Primary Education (UPE)
in 2001 contributed to increased earnings and welfare. It is expected that the
youth aged 15 – 35 years in 2018 would have more education than the older
(adult) cohorts since it is the cohort that mainly benefited from the programme.
However, what is not known is whether the increase in education significantly
increased earnings and welfare; and whether the increase in education changed the
relationship between education and earnings (that is, whether returns to education
increased/decreased over this period).
The chapter, therefore, seeks to explore how much of the welfare differences
between youth-headed households in 2001 (not affected by UPE) and 2018
4
(benefited from UPE) can be attributable to differences in educational attainment
and returns to education between the two cohorts, using household budget survey
data for 2001 and 2018. The chapter employs the same estimation strategy
employed in Chapter 4—reweighted RIF decomposition—to decompose the welfare
differences between the cohorts (welfare proxied by household consumption
expenditure per adult equivalent relative to the national poverty line).
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Chapter 2
The Living Standards Measurement Study in East
Africa
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 The Living Standards Measurement Study
The datasets for the analysis of the Eastern Africa labour market come from
the Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) Household Survey, a World
Bank program aimed at facilitating the design and implementation of multi-topic
household surveys in developing countries (World Bank, 2020a). Through this
program, since 1980, the World Bank in collaboration with country statistical
offices, have been conducting numerous nationally1 representative household
surveys in developing countries. The surveys collect information on a wide range of
topics including but not limited to employment and labour market participation;
education (access and attainment); healthcare use and access; poverty; and housing
and utilities (World Bank, 2020a).
Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda remain the main beneficiaries of the LSMS
program in the Eastern Africa region. Four cross-section surveys, the Integrated
Household Survey (IHS), and a three-wave panel study, the Integrated Household
Panel Survey (IHPS)2, are available for Malawi between 1997 and 20173. Tanzania
has the largest number of surveys in the region conducted between 1991 and
1LSMS have also conducted a few surveys which are not nationally representative e.g. Human
Resource Development Survey (HRDS) the Measuring Living Standards in Cities (MLSC)
surveyand the Kagera Health and Development Survey (KHDS)
2IHPS is a subset of the large IHS with a longitudinal/panel dimension
3Most recently LSMS have been conducting the Malawi High-Frequency Phone Survey
COVID-19 (HFPS COVID-19) on monthly basis.
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20164. Two of the surveys are cross-section: the Human Resource Development
Survey (HRDS) 1993 and the Measuring Living Standards in Cities (MLSC)
survey. Two are longitudinal studies: the Kagera Health and Development Survey
(KHDS) (three waves), and the Tanzania National Panel Survey (TNPS) (detailed
discussion to follow). Lastly, there are seven5 available surveys for Uganda, namely
the National Panel Surveys (UNPS). IHS, TNPS, and UNPS have been conducted
relatively more frequently than the other available household surveys, making
themselves among the primary sources of labour market statistics in the region.
We limit the scope of our study to Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda and
the period from 2008 through 2017. IHS, TNPS, and UNPS used similar
questionnaires, thereby allowing comparability across the countries. In that regard,
we find them more suitable for our study and therefore use them as our main source
of data for our analyses. Figure 2.1 is the map of Africa showing the geographical
location of the counties whose data are used in our analyses.
2.1.2 Malawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS)
IHS is a series of extensive household surveys conducted every five6 years in
Malawi. The first IHS, was conducted in 1997/98 and is commonly referred to
as IHS1, the second in 2004/05 (IHS2), the third in 2010/11 (IHS3), and IHS4
in 2016/17 (National Statistical Office, 2020). A portion of IHS3 sample was
selected to be re-interviewed in 2013, and 2016 (integrated into IHS4) thereby
forming a longitudinal survey panel study (IHPS). However, because the number
of enumeration areas for the IHPS 2016 was reduced to 102 out of 204 of the
baseline enumeration areas in IHPS 2010, the sample lost representativeness at
the regional and urban/rural levels although maintained representativeness at the
national level. Also, the reduction of the enumeration areas by half led to fewer
observations with positive wage earnings. For that reason, we prefer to use IHS
instead of IHPS, and therefore unlike for the other countries, the Malawi data do
4Recent addition is Tanzania National Panel Survey 2019-2020 (not included in the analysis)
5Latest are UNPS 2018/19 and UNPS 2019/2020 (not included in the analysis).
6Except the most recent – the Fifth IHS (IHS5) conducted after 3 years
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Figure 2.1: Map of Africa Showing Geographical Location of the Study Countries
not have a panel dimension.
As stated earlier, our analyses focus on the 2008 -2017 period, and therefore
we use IHS3 conducted from March 2010 to March 2011 and IHS4 that was
conducted from April 2016 to April 2017. Both surveys are based on a two-step
stratified sampling from the 2008 Malawi Population and Housing Census (PHC).
The samples are representative at the national, regional, and urban/rural levels.
The first two rows of Table 2.1 show the distribution of the study population by
survey years for Malawi.
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2.1.3 Tanzania National Panel Survey (TNPS)
Five waves of TNPS are currently available and four are used in this study. The
first wave was conducted from October 2008 to September 2009, the second from
October 2010 to September 2011, the third from October 2012 to November 2013,
and the fourth from October 2014 to January 2016. The panel was refreshed in the
fourth round. Consequently, the fourth wave included only 784 households (out of
the 4,036 households interviewed) that were present in the previous rounds (URT,
2017). The surveys for all four waves are based on a two-step stratified sampling.
The first three waves sampling are based on the 2002 Tanzania PHC while the
fourth is based on the 2012 Tanzania PHC. The samples are representative at the
national, regional, and urban/rural levels. The distribution of the study population
by survey rounds for Tanzania is shown in rows 2 - 6 of Table 2.1.
2.1.4 Uganda National Panel Survey (UNPS)
We use five of the seven available waves of the UNPS. The first wave, conducted
as a follow-up survey of 3,123 households that had been visited by the Uganda
National Household Survey (UNHS) in 2005-06, was conducted from September
2009 to August 2010; the second from October 2010 to September 2011, the third
from November 2011 to November 2012, the fourth from September 2013 to August
2014 and the fifth from March 2015 to March 2016. After following up the surveyed
households in three consecutive waves, UNPS panel replaces some household by
new ones. Since, like for Tanzania, the survey is intended to trace households
and not individuals, the panel of individuals in the labour force is small (this is
explained later in the chapter). The last five rows of Table 2.1 show the distribution
of the study population by survey rounds for Uganda.
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Table 2.1: Distribution of Study Population by Country
Country Survey Year Households Individuals
Malawi 2010/11 12,271 56,409
Malawi 2016/17 12,447 53,885
Tanzania 2008/09 3,265 16,709
Tanzania 2010/11 3,846 20,559
Tanzania 2012/13 5,010 25,412
Tanzania 2014/15 4,036 21,027
Uganda 2009/10 2,607 17,511
Uganda 2010/11 2,564 18,810
Uganda 2011/12 2,356 16,139
Uganda 2013/14 3,118 17,495
Uganda 2015/16 3,300 16,748
Source: Respective IHS, TNPS and UNPS reports.
2.2 Data Management
2.2.1 Data Cleaning
The LSMS data are accessible and freely downloadable from the websites of the
World Bank7 and the countries’ statistical offices. After obtaining the required
survey data, we proceeded to data cleaning and construction and preparation of
the variables for our analysis. One of the common issues with survey data is
missing data for some variables caused by, among others, non-response during
the survey. For Tanzania and Uganda where we had some panel dimension, as
a first step, we utilised information from the other survey waves or other survey
questions to deduce the possible missing information. For instance, we replaced
the missing data on education by the education level reported in the other waves;
or the previous year’s grade for those who were in school in the year preceding the
survey year. In the second step, we imputed the missing data by replacing them
by median values (computed by gender, location, age group and pay period). The
variables that required some imputations due to missing values included hours
(and days for Uganda) worked in the last seven days, usual working weeks in a
7These versions of the data were downloaded on 10th May 2019 from
http://surveys.worldbank.org/lsms
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month and months in a year. The potential problem with this approach is that the
imputation may introduce bias on the mean and variance of the affected variables.
Furthermore, some questions were only asked in some rounds of the survey.
For instance, while the last three waves of TNPS collected information on the
number of weeks per month and the number of months each individual usually
worked in the job during the last 12 months, the first wave did not. For the
first wave, we imputed the missing data by replacing them by the median values
(again computed by gender, location, age group and pay period). As the median
values were obtained within the sample, they may be less prone to outliers. This
helped in keeping the first wave in our analysis, however, like stated earlier, it may
introduce some bias to the final result. We understand that there are alternative
imputation methods that could have been used in this case, but we do not pursuit
them here. See Appendix 2B for the number of cases imputed for each country.
Another issue was that we identified inaccurate information for some variables
such as changes of the time-invariant individual characteristics (e.g. gender
and year of birth) across surveys, inconsistencies in the reported/recorded
education, and outlier wages. For the time-invariant variables, we corrected these
inconsistencies as follows: firstly, for those observed three or more times (Tanzania
and Uganda) we took the value occurring most times to be the correct one.
Secondly, for those observed multiple times but no value was reported more than
the other, we took the one reported during their first survey as the correct value
(this is an arbitrary assumption though as we could have as well treated them as
different individuals). We also used information from the other survey questions
and from other waves (for Tanzania and Uganda) to correct the inconsistencies
in education for those with contradicting years of schooling. We then deleted all
individuals whom we could not infer their education either from the other waves
or from the other survey questions.
For TNPS, some of the reported wages were either too high or too low such
that they could not feasibly reflect the pay periods. Cross-examination across
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waves also revealed that these wages were different from those reported in the
other waves. We concluded that there might be errors in recording the pay period
or the wages (such as errors due to addition/omission of zeros). We, therefore,
adjusted (116 cases out of 14,444 individuals with valid values of wages) through
the utilisation of information on wages and pay periods from other waves of the
survey. See Appendix 2A for all correction and adjustments made to key variables.
2.2.2 Construction of Earnings Variables
The surveys collected information about individuals wage earnings and the
frequency of payment. The payment periods for Malawi were daily, weekly,
and monthly; for Tanzania hourly, daily, weekly, fortnightly, monthly, quarterly,
semi-annually, and annually; and for Uganda hourly, daily, weekly, and
monthly. Note that the payment periods may not necessarily imply the same
period/duration of employment, i.e., being paid daily or weekly does not always
mean that employment last only for a day or a week. Each of the conversion
methods is discussed below.
2.2.2.1 Aggregating to Daily earnings (DailyC)
Wages were converted to daily wages as follows:
(a) Hourly to daily (Tanzania and Uganda)
The hourly wage multiplied by the number of hours assuming nine (9)
working hours a day.
(b) Weekly to daily
Weekly wage divided by the total number of days worked per week (unless
otherwise stated in the survey, days were inferred from the total weekly
hours).
(c) Fortnightly to daily (Tanzania)
Fortnightly wage divided by two and then divided by the total number of
days worked per week.
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(d) Monthly to daily
Monthly wage divided by 22 (assuming those earning monthly wage worked
22 days in any month).
(e) Quarterly
Quarterly wage divided by 66 (since assumption 22 working days in any
month).
(f) Semi-annual
Semi-annual wage divided by 132 working days.
(g) Annual
Annual wage divided by 264 working days.
2.2.2.2 Aggregating to Monthly Earnings (MonthlyC)
Monthly wages were constructed from the reported wages as follows:
(a) Hourly to monthly (Tanzania and Uganda)
Total number of hours worked over the last seven (7) days multiplied by
hourly wage and number of weeks worked in the job in a typical month8.
(b) Daily to monthly
For Uganda, the number of days the individual worked over the last seven
days was available from the data. For Malawi and Tanzania, since the
number of days was not available, we used the total number of hours in a
week to infer days. Assuming nine (9) working hours per days, we obtained
the proxy for days by dividing the total hours by nine. We then constructed
the monthly wage as a product of the daily wage, days worked, and the
number of weeks worked per month.
(c) Weekly to monthly
Weekly wage multiplied by the number of weeks worked per month
8As stated earlier, TNPS (except for the first wave) asked how many weeks per month did
the individual usually work in the job during the last 12 months. For the first wave we replaced
it by the median values of the sample for each pay period.
13
(d) Fortnightly to monthly (Tanzania)
Fortnightly wage multiplied by two (2).
(e) Quarterly to monthly (Tanzania)
Quarterly wage divided by three (3).
(f) Semi-annually to monthly (Tanzania)
Semi-annual wage divided by six (6).
(g) Annually to monthly
Annual wage divided by 12.
2.2.2.3 Aggregating to Annualised Earnings (MonthlyA)
Lastly, the reported wages were annualised as follows:
(a) Hourly to annual (Tanzania and Uganda)
The product of hourly wage and hours per week, weeks per month and
months worked over the last 12 months.
(b) Daily to annual
The product of daily wage and days per week, weeks per month, and months
worked over the last 12 months.
(c) Weekly to annual
The product of weekly wage, weeks worked per month and months worked
over the last 12 months.
(d) Fortnightly to annual (Tanzania)
Fortnight wage divided by two then multiplied by weeks worked per month
and months worked over the last 12 months.
(e) Monthly to annual
Monthly wage multiplied by the number of months worked over the last 12
months.
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(f) Quarterly to annual
Quarterly wage divided by three, then multiplied by the number of months
worked over the last 12 months.
(g) Semi-annually to annual
Semi-annual wage divided by six, multiplied by the number of months worked
over the last 12 months.
Note: we express the annualised wages monthly by dividing by 12, which gives
the average monthly earnings from over the last 12 months. This may not be
identical to our constructed measure MonthlyC (except for those paid monthly
who worked 12 months last year). After the construction of our wage/earnings
variables, we observed a small number of cases with very low and very high
MonthlyA, likely errors in recording the wage or variables used to construct the
aggregated wages. We then resorted to trimming the bottom and top one percent
of MonthlyA to get rid of the outliers.
2.2.3 Construction of Explanatory Variables
2.2.3.1 Years and Levels of Education
In all three countries, each grade requires a year to complete. The IHS, TNPS and
UNPS used a closed-ended question to capture the highest grade completed by each
member of the household. Therefore, we utilised the information on the grades
completed to calculate the respondent’s years of schooling assuming that each
additional grade corresponds to an additional year of schooling. Note, however,
that there was no information on the number of years the individual took to
complete their highest grade. Hence, the calculation of years of schooling assumed
no repetitions or skipping of grades.
Primary education is compulsory in all three countries, and it runs for eight
years in Malawi and seven years in Tanzania9 and Uganda. In Malawi, secondary
9Before 1969 primary education in Tanzania ran for eight years. An education reform act
in late 1960s eliminated the 8th grade thereby reducing the primary school years from eight to
seven. We used individuals’ years of birth to infer whether the individual obtained seven or eight
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education lasts for four years and until 2015 consisted of two sets of two years.
The first two years lead to the Junior Certificate of Education (JCE) (which
was abolished in 2015) and the second two years to the Malawi Certificate of
Secondary Education (MCSE). Admission to (non-university) technical college
education such as diplomas in vocational training including nursing, primary
teacher training and agriculture requires a minimum of JCE and run for two,
three or four years. Admission to university requires the MCSE, with a minimum
of three years required to earn a university degree.
In Tanzania and Uganda, secondary education consists of six years in two levels:
ordinary level (O-level) and advanced level (A-level) which run for four and two
years, respectively. Diploma education is two years for those enrolled after A-level
and three or four years for those enrolled after O-level (in our analysis, we use
three years for those enrolled after O-level). University education is three to five
years, depending on the programme of study. Note that individuals can enrol in
technical/vocational education after completing primary or secondary education.
This form of education can take less than a year to more than two years. For
simplicity, in our calculation, we assume this level does not constitute an additional
year of schooling10.
Since the surveys reported the highest grade of schooling completed (for each
level of education) assigning individuals into dummy variables for the highest
completed levels was straight forward. Accordingly, we constructed the following
dummy variables:
(a) noeduc: educational dummy, 1 if incomplete primary school education and
0 otherwise.
(b) primary: educational dummy, 1 if completed primary school education and
0 otherwise.
years of primary schooling. We assumed all individuals who completed eight years of primary
education started school at age seven and were born before 1956. Any error or misreporting of the
birth year would then affect years of schooling, especially those with post-secondary education.
10In Tanzania and Uganda a total of 724 and 404 wage employees had vocational education of
unspecified duration, accounting for 6.5% and 8.7% of the samples respectively.
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(c) secondary: educational dummy, 1 if completed ordinary/advanced secondary
school education and 0 otherwise.
(d) higher: educational dummy, 1 if completed diploma/university education
and 0 otherwise.
2.2.3.2 Other Explanatory Variables and Exclusion Restrictions
(a) age: After correcting the inconsistencies in the year of birth11, we calculated
age as the difference between the survey year, and the year of birth (taking
into consideration the month of birth).
(b) female: The variable female is a gender dummy = 1 for females and 0
otherwise.
(c) rural: The variable rural is a location dummy = 1 for rural areas and 0 for
urban. It was readily available in the datasets.
(d) panel: Tanzania and Uganda only, panel is a dummy variable = 1 for the
individuals observed multiple times and 0 otherwise.
(e) year: Malawi only, year is a dummy variable = 1 if the year of the survey is
2016 and 0 if 2010.
(f) married: The survey question for marital status consisted of seven responses:
monogamous married, polygamous married, living together, separated,
divorced, never married, and widow(er). We made a dummy variable =
1 if married or living together and 0 otherwise.
(g) kids5: It is the proportion of children aged five and under in the household
calculated as the ratio of the number of children aged five years and younger
to the total number of household members.
11For TNPS the year of birth was not available in the fourth wave, instead, we calculated it
from the age of the respondents.
17
(h) kids14: It is the proportion of children aged 6 to 14 years of age in the
household calculated as the ratio of children aged between 6 and 14 years
inclusively to the total number of household members.
2.2.4 Characteristics of the Wage Sample
2.2.4.1 Final Samples
After cleaning the data, we remained with samples of labour force of 45,494, for
Malawi, 38,857 for Tanzania and 29,188 for Uganda. Of these samples 5,81612,
11,215, and 4,631 individuals had valid values of earnings for Malawi, Tanzania
and Uganda, respectively on which we focus our analysis. As mentioned earlier,
the samples for Tanzania and Uganda have some individuals who were surveyed
more than once. Therefore, the 11,215 observations for Tanzania consist of a total
of 8,210 individuals of which 6,016 were surveyed only once, 1,458 twice, 661 three
times and 75 four times. Likewise, the 4,631 observations for Uganda consist of a
total of 2,491 individuals of which 1,929 were surveyed once, 704 twice, 207 three
times, 98 four times and 58 five times. Thus, although the TNPS and UNPS were
intended as panels, due to attrition and refreshing very few individuals (only 27%
for TNPS and 23% for UNPS) are observed at least twice in the sample. As a
result, as explained earlier, in our analyses we include a variable for individuals
with repeat observations but otherwise pool and treat observations as independent.
We treat ganyu separately because it is a specific (segmented) labour market,
and the measure of earnings (as explained in section 2.3.2) is different to other
labour. It is not correct that this is equivalent to the informal sector; non-ganyu
workers are in formal and informal segments of the market and, as for Uganda
and Tanzania, the distinction of pay periods provided in the data does not clearly
correspond to occupation or formal/informal distinctions. The survey questions
were framed as follows: (non- ganyu): In the last 12 months, did you work as an
12Not including off-own-farm labour (ganyu), this category of labour is covered in a separate
section. Ganyu is treated separately because it is a specific (segmented) labour market, and the
measure of earnings (as will be explained later in this chapter) is different.
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employee for a wage, salary, commission, or any payment in kind: including doing
paid apprenticeship, domestic work or paid farm work, excluding ganyu, even if
only for one hour? (Ganyu): In the last 12 months, did you engage in casual,
parttime or ganyu labour, even if only for one hour? The questions were also
asked for the last 7 days.
2.2.4.2 Shares of Workers that do not Work Full Periods
In each of the payment periods, there are categories of workers that did not work
full periods. For instance, workers reporting monthly earnings that did not work
all 12 months last year; workers reporting weekly earnings that did not work for
four weeks (a full month) last month or that did not work for 48 weeks last year;
and workers reporting daily earnings that did not work the whole week, month or
full-year over. Table 2.2 shows the share of workers that work full period. Table
2.2 shows that the share of workers that work full periods is higher for workers
reporting monthly earnings compared to those reporting daily and weekly earnings,
suggesting the presence of a larger number of casual workers in daily and weekly
compared to monthly earners. Also, the second panel of Table 2.2 shows that in
Tanzania the shares of daily and weekly workers that work over the whole year is
substantially lower than other countries, indicating that these categories constitute
large shares of seasonal workers that only work some weeks or months in a year.
2.2.4.3 Description of Employment Type and Labour Market
Characteristics
Table 2.3 shows, for each county and pay period, the employer of the primary job.
As expected, the private sector (not necessarily equivalent to formal) dominates
employment in all countries. Compared to Tanzania and Uganda, the proportion of
workers employed by the government and paid daily and weekly is relatively high in
Malawi due to the exclusion of ganyu workers. For Malawi and Uganda, the private
sector could be broken down into private enterprise and private household (the
latter are likely to be informal, but the former may not all be formal). Table 2.3
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Table 2.2: Shares of Workers that Work Full Periods (Percentage)
Daily Weekly Monthly Pooled
Malawi
Five or more days a week 43.62 61.15 66.66 65.35
Four weeks a month 91.44 94.51 97.66 97.15
Twelve months a year 47.35 45.55 57.04 55.6
Observations 182 505 5,129 5,816
Tanzania
Five or more days a week 33.55 41.73 87.01 55.52
Four weeks a month 39.72 38.41 95.25 60.08
Twelve months a year 15.09 13.29 51.18 27.89
Observations 3,738 1,929 4,830 11,215
Uganda
Five or more days a week 67.03 68.33 87.3 79.5
Four weeks a month 78.68 75.22 93.35 86.8
Twelve months a year 54.38 57.41 58.85 57.48
Observations 1,262 589 2,765 4,631
Source: Author’s computations from IHS, TNPS and UNPS. Note: off-own-farm (ganyu)
labour excluded for Malawi. Distribution adjusted by survey weights.
shows a decline in the share of workers employed by households as the pay period
increases from daily to monthly, with the most substantial decline in Uganda.
Table 2.4 shows the proportion of workers with a job contract in each pay
period. As ganyu are excluded for Malawi, consistent with the large proportion of
daily and weekly workers employed in the government sector (Table 2.3), Table 2.4
shows that the proportion of workers with a job contract is significantly greater
than in Tanzania and Uganda. Only about 2% of the workers paid daily and
weekly in Tanzania have a job contract compared to 46% of workers paid monthly.
For Uganda, 3% and 13% of daily and weekly paid workers respectively have a
job contract compared to 52% of workers paid monthly. In both countries, on this
definition about half of monthly paid workers are informal. The small proportion
of workers paid daily and weekly who have a job contract clearly implies a high
degree of informality in daily and weekly samples in the two countries.
Employment duration (permanent, fixed term or temporary) is described in
Table 2.5. Again, given exclusion of ganyu, Malawi has a significantly higher
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Table 2.3: The Distribution of Workers by Employer (% shares)
Country & Employer Daily Weekly Monthly Pooled
Malawi
Government 29.19 41.41 33.03 33.95
Private enterprise 26.04 48.31 35.32 36.27
Private household 37.63 35.85 33.95 34.26
Other 7.14 3.32 6.05 5.83
Observations 182 505 5,129 5,816
‘Full’ sample 182 505 5,129 5,816
Tanzania
Government 1.46 1.8 22.3 9.43
Private 96.25 95.56 71.09 86.6
Other 2.29 2.64 6.61 3.97
Observations 2,453 1,217 2,823 6,859
‘Full’ sample 3,738 1,929 4,830 11,215
Uganda
Government 0.56 5.26 30.63 19.11
Private enterprise 45.99 44.51 42.64 43.72
Private household 52.72 45.93 21.62 33.34
Other 0.74 4.31 5.11 3.83
Observations 1,259 589 2,760 4,623
‘Full’ sample 1,262 598 2,765 4,631
Source: Author’s computations from IHS, TNPS and UNPS. Note: off-own-farm (ganyu)
labour excluded for Malawi. Distribution adjusted by survey weights.
Table 2.4: proportion of workers with a job contract (%)
Daily Weekly Monthly Pooled
Malawi
Contract 34.64 41.41 33.03 33.95
Observations 134 284 2,237 2,655
‘Full’ sample 182 505 5,129 5,816
Tanzania
Contract 2.23 2.24 45.7 18.55
Observations 2,453 1,217 2,823 6,859
‘Full’ sample 3,738 1,929 4,830 11,215
Uganda
Contract 2.61 12.71 51.62 33.16
Observations 1,259 589 2,760 4,623
‘Full’ sample 1,262 598 2,765 4,631
Source: Author’s computations from IHS, TNPS and UNPS. Note: off-own-farm (ganyu)
labour excluded for Malawi. Distribution adjusted by survey weights.
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proportion of permanent employees paid daily and weekly compared to Tanzania
and Uganda. The small share of permanent employees paid daily and weekly for
Tanzania and Uganda indicates that these pay periods comprise large shares of
informal paid employment. Surprisingly, many workers paid monthly in Malawi
consider themselves to have permanent employment, although they do not have a
job contract. Nonetheless, this clearly indicates that, even for Malawi, we cannot
treat the monthly sample as equivalent to the formal sector.
Table 2.5: Employment Duration (% shares)
Country & Employer Daily Weekly Monthly Pooled
Malawi
Permanent 54.54 38.51 65.47 62.23
Fixed>year 4.67 12.97 7.12 7.6
Temporary/freelance 40.8 48.52 27.41 30.17
Observations 129 276 2,151 2,556
‘Full’ sample 182 505 5,129 5,816
Tanzania
Permanent 0.39 0.35 20.92 8.37
Fixed>year 6.44 4.29 22.1 12.12
Temporary/freelance 93.17 95.35 56.98 79.05
Observations 1,114 630 1,550 3,475
‘Full’ sample 3,738 1,929 4,830 11,215
Uganda
Permanent 0.36 3.85 25.31 15.68
Fixed>year 8.84 14.03 7.81 8.93
Temporary/freelance 90.8 82.13 66.88 75.39
Observations 1,258 589 2,757 4,619
‘Full’ sample 1,262 598 2,765 4,631
Source: Author’s computations from IHS, TNPS and UNPS. Note: off-own-farm (ganyu)
labour excluded for Malawi. Distribution adjusted by survey weights.
Table 2.6 shows the share of workers enrolled in pension schemes by country
and pay period. Again, consistent with the previous results, Malawi has a
substantially higher proportion of workers enrolled in a pension scheme than
Tanzania and Uganda (about 32% compared to 13-15%). However, the enrolment
rate significantly differs across the pay periods. In Malawi, workers paid daily
have the highest rate, while in Tanzania and Uganda the workers paid monthly
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have the highest enrolment rate. Compared to Malawi, workers paid daily and
weekly in Tanzania and Uganda have a substantially lower enrolment rate with
daily workers exhibiting the lowest rate. As enrolment in a pension scheme is
usually associated with formal employment, it appears that there are significant
shares of formal employment paid daily and weekly in Malawi but not in Tanzania
and Uganda. With at most one-third of the workers paid monthly in all three
countries enrolled in a pension, Table 2.6 reiterates that being paid monthly does
not necessarily imply having formal employment.
Table 2.6: Proportion (%) of Workers Enrolled in a Pension Scheme
Daily Weekly Monthly Pooled
Malawi
Enrolled 36.07 19.5 33.82 32.49
Observations 134 284 2,237 2,655
‘Full’ sample 182 505 5,129 5,816
Tanzania
Enrolled 1.06 1.19 31.69 13.06
Observations 1,114 630 1,550 3,475
‘Full’ sample 3,738 1,929 4,830 11,215
Uganda
Enrolled 0.73 4.92 24.41 15.4
Observations 1,254 587 2,750 4,606
‘Full’ sample 1,262 598 2,765 4,631
Source: Author’s computations from IHS, TNPS and UNPS. Note: off-own-farm (ganyu)
labour excluded for Malawi. Distribution adjusted by survey weights.
Classification of workers by occupation is shown in Table 2.7. Agriculture,
livestock keeping, forestry, fishing and hunting remain the dominant occupations
for workers paid daily and weekly in Tanzania and Uganda, accounting for more
than half of the samples.
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Table 2.7: General Occupation of Workers (%)
Daily Weekly Monthly Pooled
Malawi
Professional & Technical 30.5 8.93 20.61 19.81
Service Workers 26.94 29.81 30.97 30.72
Agriculture, forestry, fishing & hunting 12.96 23.69 9.82 11.27
Other 29.6 37.57 38.6 38.2
Observations 181 504 5,127 5,812
‘Full’ sample 182 505 5,129 5,816
Tanzania
Professional & Technical 12.68 10.76 27.58 18.41
Service Workers 5.35 4.11 22.43 11.35
Agriculture, forestry, fishing & hunting 55.73 58.62 10.27 39.08
Other 26.24 26.51 39.72 31.16
Observations 3,738 1,929 4,830 11,215
‘Full’ sample 3,738 1,929 4,830 11,215
Uganda
Professional & Technical 1.87 8.06 43.34 27.85
Service Workers 17.32 28.62 8.19 8.43
Agriculture, forestry, fishing & hunting 65.16 51.02 9.63 14.28
Other 15.65 12.3 38.84 49.44
Observations 1,143 541 2,668 4,367
‘Full’ sample 1,262 598 2,765 4,631
Source: Author’s computations from IHS, TNPS and UNPS. Note: off-own-farm (ganyu)
labour excluded for Malawi. Distribution adjusted by survey weights.
In addition, monthly paid workers constitute the largest proportion of
professional and technical occupations in the two countries, suggesting that
attractive employment of this category of workers are more likely to last longer and
pay monthly. In Malawi, on the other hand, professional and technical occupations
account for the largest share of workers paid daily (consistent with relatively high
earnings, see Table 2.10), while service workers account for the largest share of
workers paid weekly and monthly. As ganyu workers are excluded, it is not
surprising that Malawi has a smaller proportion of workers in agriculture and
related compared to Tanzania and Uganda.
Table 2.8 shows the industry in which the worker is employed. Community,
social and personal services account for the most employment in Malawi, whereas
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in Tanzania and Uganda, agriculture and related account for the most employment.
In all three countries, the share of monthly paid workers in agriculture and related
is substantially smaller than for daily and weekly. The small share of monthly
paid workers in this industry is more pronounced in Tanzania than in the other
two countries.
Table 2.8: Industry of the Employment (Employer’s Business) (%)
Daily Weekly Monthly Pooled
Malawi
Agriculture, forestry, fishing & hunting 12.75 19.07 5.70 7.20
Manufacturing 15.80 20.62 17.19 17.48
Education 14.06 2.10 6.67 6.47
Community, Social & Personal Services 32.04 30.64 40.50 39.29
Other 25.35 27.57 29.94 29.56
Observations 168 473 4,913 5,554
‘Full’ sample 182 505 5,129 5,816
Tanzania
Agriculture, forestry, fishing & hunting 62.29 65.98 12.36 44.42
Manufacturing 4.29 4.37 5.70 4.73
Education 0.60 1.09 11.98 4.94
Community, Social & Personal Services 1.83 1.28 6.33 3.45
Other 30.99 27.28 63.63 42.46
Observations 3,214 1,701 4,040 9,508
‘Full’ sample 3,738 1,929 4,830 11,215
Uganda
Agriculture, forestry, fishing & hunting 28.18 34.01 14.20 20.68
Manufacturing 5.82 7.18 6.07 6.13
Education 0.12 3.27 29.04 17.80
Community, Social & Personal Services 12.14 11.53 8.08 9.77
Other 53.74 44.01 42.61 45.62
Observations 1,228 567 2,695 4,505
‘Full’ sample 1,262 598 2,765 4,631
Source: Author’s computations from IHS, TNPS and UNPS. Note: off-own-farm (ganyu)
labour excluded for Malawi. Distribution adjusted by survey weights.
Table 2.9 show the proportion of workers whose occupations can be considered
as white-collar jobs. While the survey questionnaire included the relevant question
for Tanzania, unfortunately, the responses were not published with the data; hence,
the comparison is only for Malawi and Uganda. About 26% of daily paid workers
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in Malawi have a white-collar job, which is in line with earlier results that showed
that the daily sample constitutes a relatively larger proportion of professional
and technical workers and workers with a job contract. In Uganda, on the other
hand, a minimal share (less than 1%) of workers paid daily have a white-collar
job compared to 36% of the workers paid monthly. Although the monthly samples
constitute a relatively large share of workers in a white-collar job, blue-collar jobs
still dominate.
Table 2.9: Proportion (%) of workers in White-collar jobs
Daily Weekly Monthly Pooled
Malawi
White collar 25.57 5.63 19.41 18.28
Observations 182 505 5,129 5,816
‘Full’ sample 182 505 5,129 5,816
Uganda
White collar 0.38 5.81 35.95 22.29
Observations 1,258 584 2,744 4,601
‘Full’ sample 1,262 598 2,765 4,631
Source: Author’s computations from IHS and UNPS. Note: off-own-farm (ganyu) labour
excluded for Malawi. Distribution adjusted by survey weights.
Table 2.10 shows the distribution of earnings for workers with various levels of
education in each pay period. Because workers with similar levels of education are
paid differently depending on their pay period, this suggests that the pay periods
indicate different segments of the labour markets.
2.2.4.4 Distribution of Earnings and other Variables by Payment
Period
Table 2.11 shows the distribution of earnings by payment period using our three
measures of earnings. We present the earnings in both US dollars $US and
local currency units (LCU). The columns for monthly and annualised are directly
comparable since both present earnings per month (calculated in different ways).
For the earnings in the daily column to be comparable to the other columns, they
need to be multiplied by a factor of 22 (since the assumption is 22 working days
26
Table 2.10: The distribution of earnings for workers with various levels of education
(%)
Daily Weekly Monthly Pooled
Malawi
No education 163.28 119.73 89.61 96.93
Primary 126.51 144.31 141.07 140.98
Secondary 239.81 344.11 247.88 251.53
Higher 407.98 806.97 692.81 687.67
Observations 182 505 5,129 5,816
Tanzania
No education 24.21 16.95 37.49 25.61
Primary 45.24 38.36 78.79 54.56
Secondary 84.95 87.79 197.24 171.89
Higher 0.00 0.00 370.71 371.46
Observations 3,738 1,929 4,830 11,215
Uganda
No education 58.56 50.56 41.29 50.1
Primary 88.98 85.53 84.08 85.95
Secondary 134.07 95.61 108.18 112.15
Higher 118.72 158.48 202.06 196.86
Observations 1,262 589 2,765 4,631
Source: Author’s computations from IHS, TNPS and UNPS. Note: off-own-farm (ganyu)
labour excluded for Malawi. Distribution adjusted by survey weights.
in any month).
Table 2.11 shows that DailyC and MonthlyC give larger average monthly
earnings compared to MonthlyA. Importantly, DailyC will overestimate monthly
earnings because it does not consider the number of days the worker worked in
a week, and the number of weeks worked in a month. Table 2.11 shows that
regardless of the measures of earning used, the earnings differ by payment period.
Nonetheless, regarding which period has the highest/lowest earnings, it depends
on the measure of earnings used.
Table 2.12 shows the distribution of the explanatory variables to be used in
the wage equation. For Tanzania and Uganda, the variable ‘panel’ shows the
proportion of workers with repeated (panel) observations. The small proportion
(45%) for Tanzania is explained by the fact that the last round of the survey
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was a refresh wave. There are a few issues that could potentially affect our
results. Workers paid monthly have more education than their daily and weekly
counterparts in all three countries. In Tanzania, there are no workers with higher
education reporting earnings daily or weekly. In Malawi, only 12% of the workers
reporting daily earnings and 4% of those reporting weekly earnings have higher
education, while in Uganda 3% and 8% of the workers reporting daily and weekly
earnings respectively have higher education. Overall, workers in Malawi have
more years of schooling on average compared to their Tanzania and Uganda
counterparts.
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Table 2.11: Distribution of Earnings by Different Earnings Measures ($US and LCU)
Country Obs. $ daily $ monthly $ annualised LCU daily LCU monthly LCU annualised
& Period Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Malawi
Daily 182 18.77 21.60 258.16 318.11 206.42 251.48 2,650.15 3,049.41 36,443.80 44,907.13 29,140.24 35,501.37
Weekly 503 22.10 50.94 223.54 309.10 174.26 289.04 3,120.01 7,190.90 31,557.13 43,635.62 24,599.68 40,804.40
Monthly 5,129 12.59 18.01 264.82 377.90 226.84 339.20 1,777.72 2,542.08 37,384.43 53,347.49 32,022.80 47,884.38
Pooled 5,816 13.72 23.62 260.58 370.04 221.04 332.38 1,937.44 3,334.45 36,786.58 52,237.98 31,204.69 46,921.56
Tanzania
Daily 3,738 5.18 5.50 59.08 100.24 32.54 85.08 6,587.81 7,664.81 78,580.79 133,314.68 43,283.94 113,156.05
Weekly 1,929 4.95 5.76 60.98 100.97 32.30 84.51 6,287.49 7,481.10 81,109.67 134,287.74 42,962.47 112,393.41
Monthly 4,830 6.82 8.02 150.02 176.51 123.90 161.28 9,069.55 10,670.72 199,530.00 234,755.77 164,793.41 214,501.08
Pooled 11,215 6.00 7.55 98.14 147.47 69.10 126.88 7,973.95 10,045.83 130,519.70 196,133.61 91,905.45 168,748.00
Uganda
Daily 1,262 4.64 5.00 91.47 109.51 78.92 103.44 9,429.51 10,159.08 185,739.05 222,364.60 160,242.78 210,038.33
Weekly 589 5.53 8.06 91.60 122.62 76.34 109.07 11,221.61 16,358.95 185,987.04 248,982.52 155,016.12 221,470.95
Monthly 2,765 5.88 6.71 129.33 147.56 114.19 139.02 11,936.67 13,618.94 262,606.79 299,616.72 231,865.71 282,275.95
Pooled 4,631 5.53 6.74 114.11 136.35 99.66 127.84 11,227.57 13,688.05 231,705.66 276,867.30 202,361.64 259,583.03
Source: Author’s computations from IHS, TNPS and UNPS. Note: Earnings in $ are accounted for inflation using exchange rates in 2009
(1$= 141.17 Malawi Kwacha; 1$ = 1330 Tsh; and 1$= 2030.49 UGX). Off-own-farm (ganyu) labour excluded for Malawi. Distribution adjusted by
survey weights.
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Table 2.12: Summary Statistics for the Explanatory Variables
Country & Sample Obs. sch age weeks primary secondary higher female rural panel year
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD % % % % % %
Malawi
Daily 182 9.03 4.51 36.8 10.2 36.75 13.99 20 29 12 26 67 NA 74
Weekly 505 7.15 3.91 34.94 10.35 35.51 14.71 24 10 4 30 66 NA 53
Monthly 5,129 9.26 4.12 35.85 10.71 39.63 12.69 26 24 14 25 49 NA 50
Pooled 5,816 9.05 4.16 35.79 10.66 39.13 13.01 26 23 13 25 52 NA 51
Ganyu 16,528 4.77 3.52 33.42 11.89 15.64 12.66 14 2 0 51 92 NA 64
Tanzania
Daily 3,738 5.26 3.21 33.14 11.92 15.32 15.39 57 4 0 40 78 25 NA
Week 1,929 5.28 3.24 33.64 12.08 13.62 15.16 56 5 0 36 82 19 NA
Monthly 4,830 8.16 3.69 33.34 11.89 34.95 16 51 27 7 38 53 41 NA
Pooled 11,215 6.35 3.67 33.37 11.93 22.1 18.38 55 13 3 38 70 45 NA
Uganda
Daily 1,262 6.35 3.53 30.99 10.84 36.04 14.57 34 11 3 20 64 39 NA
Weekly 589 6.97 3.81 32.77 11.44 35.27 14.87 32 12 8 29 72 15 NA
Monthly 2,765 9.85 4.39 34.71 11.06 39.38 12.45 29 16 31 37 56 56 NA
Pooled 4,631 8.51 4.41 33.46 11.18 37.89 13.54 31 14 20 31 61 57 NA
Source: Author’s computations from IHS, TNPS and UNPS. The last two columns show % observed multiple times for Tanzania and Uganda (panel)
and % in 2016 for Malawi (year) respectively. Distribution adjusted by survey weights
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2.3 Off-own-farm Labour (Ganyu) in Malawi
2.3.1 Introduction
Malawi is one of the poorest countries in the world, with 70% of its population
below the international poverty line in 2016 (World Bank, 2020b). Compared
to other neighbouring countries, a very high proportion (84% as of 2018) of its
population of about 18 million13 resides in rural areas, and about 73% of the
labour force is employed in agriculture (National Statistical Office, 2019) (National
Statistical Office, 2019). In addition, Malawi experiences only one rainy season in a
year which affects agricultural productivity as most farmers own small scale farms
which depend heavily on rainfall. Because of low productivity in agriculture, many
households are unable to sustain their livelihood through own production alone
necessitating extra income that is obtained through off-own-farm casual labour
(Bryceson, 2006).
Short time off-own-farm labour in Malawi is commonly referred to as ganyu14.
Although traditionally the term applied to rural farm activities, its definition
extends to include both farm and off-farm tasks in which labour is usually hired
for a short time, mainly daily and weekly. This kind of labour (hereafter ganyu)
is mainly piece rate, including labour for farm tasks (such as, planting, weeding,
ridging, and harvesting) and non-agricultural tasks like building houses, fetching
water, and helping in construction. There are various kinds of ganyu such as
non-wage ganyu (Chipere) whereby neighbours or relatives work for each other
without pay; ganyu during food shortages where households supply their labour
in exchange for food; non-agricultural ganyu where short time labour is supplied
to non-agricultural activities; and cross-border ganyu where short time labour is
supplied to neighbouring countries especially by households close to the border
with Mozambique (Whiteside, 2000). In the IHS the in-kind ganyu payments were
13According to the 2018 Malawi Population and Housing Census (PHC), Malawi had a
population of 17,563,749 in 2018.
14Ganyu is a Chichewa word meaning hire or part-time job.
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converted to an equivalent cash amount, and therefore in this study, we treat all
the types of ganyu labour payments as cash wages/earnings.
Due to its unique labour market structure, with a disproportionately large
proportion of the labour force in rural areas primarily participating in agriculture,
the IHS has a separate section in its household questionnaire to collect information
on ganyu labour. Since the kind of activities carried out by ganyu workers varies
by location and season of the year, the frequency individuals participate in ganyu
may range from a day to a year. In that regard, the survey collected information
on all individuals who participated in ganyu labour even if just for a single day
over the last 12 months. It is worth noting, however, that ganyu labour supply is
likely to be underreported because it is stigmatised: some individuals perceive it
as an admission of poverty and thus shameful to divulge(Whiteside, 2000).
2.3.2 Ganyu Labour in Our Labour Force Sample
After the initial data cleaning, we remained with a total of 17,849 individuals
who participated in ganyu labour over the last 12 months. Out of this total, 847
individuals did both ganyu and other wage employment activities (27 in daily,
120 in weekly, and 700 in monthly). To simplify the analysis, for those who did
both, we incorporated them into their primary wage employment by adding their
ganyu earnings to their wage earnings and then exclude them from the ganyu
sample. After excluding those who did both ganyu and other wage employment
activities, we opted to trim off the bottom and top 1% as a way of getting rid of
the outliers. The final sample consists of 16,528 individuals who participated only
in ganyu labour as their primary source of labour earnings. This sample suggests
that ganyu workers accounted for 79.3% of all earners in 2016 compared to 70%
in 2010 implying an increase of 13.3%15 over the survey period.
Figure 2.2 shows the spatial distribution of the sample across the surveys. As
expected, a disproportionately large proportion of ganyu workers reside in rural
areas (91.7% rural vs 8.3% urban), and the distribution has remained relatively
15Figures are adjusted using survey weights throughout this section.
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stable over the survey years (91.0% rural vs 9.0% urban in 2010; and 92.1% rural
vs 7.9% urban in 2016). However, as mentioned earlier, there were relatively more
ganyu workers in 2016 than 2010 (63.4% of the ganyu workers are from 2016 survey,
and 36.6% are from the 2010 survey). Figure 2.3 shows further desegregation by
regions of residence. The Northern region accounts for the smallest share of ganyu
workers in all years. This is not surprising as the region is less populated than the
other regions. The Southern region accounts for the largest proportion of ganyu
workers in 2010 while the Central region accounts for the largest proportion of
ganyu workers in 2016.
Figure 2.2: Distribution of Ganyu Workers by Location of Residence
Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of ganyu workers by gender and survey year.
Generally, there is no significant difference between male and female participation
in ganyu labour (50.7% male compared to 49.3% female) although the gender
balance reversed over the survey years (50.5% vs 49.5% in 2010 and 51.4% vs
48.6% in 2016).
In terms of educational attainment, about 21% of ganyu workers had never gone
to school, and less than 1% had more than secondary education (more than 12
years of education). Figure 2.5 shows the distribution of ganyu workers by years
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of Ganyu Workers by Region of Residence
Figure 2.4: Distribution of Ganyu Workers by Gender and Survey Year
of education. Generally, more schooling reduces the likelihood of participating
in ganyu labour. Nonetheless, Figure 2.6 shows that in terms of ganyu labour
supply, as measured by the number of days participated in ganyu over the past
12 months, education does not matter. Figure 2.7 shows the relationship between
34
education and ganyu earnings (using the MonthlyA). As expected, more education
is associated with more earnings. It is important to note, however, that because
there are very few individuals with more than secondary education in the sample,
the relationship for those with more than 12 years of education may be imprecise,
which may explain the unusually high level of earnings for those with 16 years of
education.
Figure 2.5: Distribution of Ganyu Workers by Education Attainment
Figure 2.8 shows the association between annual ganyu labour supply and
monthly per capita income. High ganyu labour supply is associated with
low-income household members and vice versa. This is consistent with the
assertion that ganyu is supplied more for survival than for earning wage income. As
stated earlier, the kind of activities carried out by ganyu workers varies by location
and season, thereby determining the individuals’ total ganyu labour supply in a
year. We thus also show the share of ganyu workers that supplied their labour for
five days a week, four weeks a month and for all months over the last 12 months.
Table 2.13 shows the share of ganyu workers that supplied their labour for a full
period. Only about 10% of the ganyu workers reported supplying ganyu labour for
12 months in the year before the survey. This suggests that ganyu labour might be
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Figure 2.6: Ganyu Labour Supply by Education Attainment
Figure 2.7: Education and Ganyu Earnings
mainly supplied to meet short time livelihood needs, especially the period between
the harvesting seasons.
Table 2.14 shows the distribution of ganyu earnings by the different earnings
measures discussed earlier. In the surveys, ganyu earnings were measured daily,
36
Figure 2.8: Association between Income and Ganyu Labour Supply
Table 2.13: Shares of Ganyu Workers that Worked Full Periods
Percent
Five or more days a week 40.25
Four weeks a month 36.62
Twelve months a year 10.5
Observations 16,528
Source: Authors’ Computation from IHS 2010, 2016
that is the average payment per day in cash or in-kind that the individual received
for the days they supplied ganyu labour over the last 12 months. The daily wages
were then converted to monthly by first converting them to weekly multiplying
them by the number of days they supplied ganyu labour per week, and then to
monthly by multiplying again by the number of weeks per month worked in ganyu.
The annualised ganyu earnings were obtained by multiplying the monthly ganyu
earnings by the number of months worked in ganyu over the last 12 months and
then expressed in monthly basis by dividing by 12. Due to the nature of ganyu
labour supply, it should be expected that converting to daily or monthly would
very likely overestimate ganyu earnings because ganyu workers rarely work for
the whole week or month. Figure 2.9 shows a kernel distribution of earnings
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corresponding to Table 2.14. We observe a more complicated distribution when
the actual reported daily wages are used, and more smooth distribution when
annualised earnings are used.
Table 2.14: Distribution of Ganyu Earnings ($US and LCU)
lPeriod & Unit Obs. Daily Monthly Annualised
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
$ 16,528 5.76 6.93 69.41 101.72 33.76 53.52
LCU 16,528 812.51 977.83 9797.99 14,360.21 4,766.48 7,555.73
Source: Author’s computations from IHS. Earnings in $ are in constant 2009 exchange rate (1$=
141.17 Malawi Kwacha)
Figure 2.9: Distribution of Ganyu Earnings by Different Earnings Measures
Table 2.15 shows the average (raw) earnings and education attainment by
gender (Panel A) and location of residence (Panel B). The first three columns
of Table 2.15 show the differences in earnings using the three measures of
earnings while the last shows the corresponding difference for education attainment
(measured by completed years of schooling). Regardless of the measure of earnings,
males in ganyu labour are better paid than females, and urban workers are better
paid than their rural counterparts. However, assuming a multiplication factor of
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22 for the first column to be comparable to the next two columns, aggregating
to daily gives a larger gap compared to aggregating to monthly or annualised. In
terms of education endowment, males and urban ganyu workers have more years
of schooling than their female and rural counterparts.
Table 2.15: Gender Differences in Earnings and Education Attainment
Earnings Measure ($) Education (years)
Daily Monthly Annualised
A. Gender
Male 6.61 85.04 45.12 5.51
Female 4.89 53.8 22.48 4.06
Difference 1.72 31.24 22.64 1.45
Obs. Male 8,344 8,344 8,344 8,344
Obs. Female 8,285 8,285 8,285 8,285
Obs. Total 16,629 16,629 16,629 16,629
B. Location
Urban 8.08 114.55 65.45 6.56
Rural 5.53 65.11 30.77 4.61
Difference 2.82 49.44 34.68 1.95
Obs. Urban 1,285 1,285 1,285 1,285
Obs. Rural 15,344 15,344 15,344 15,344
Obs. Total 16,629 16,629 16,629 16,629
Note: Differences significant at 1% level.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we provided a detailed description of the dataset and variables
to be used in the analyses for the next two emperical chapters. The description
focused on the survey data cleaning, extraction of key variables from the surveys,
construction of the variables for analysis, and how we arrived at the final samples.
It is worth noting that the available information on occupation and the
employment industry reveals that pay periods do not correspond to a particular
occupation/industry but a range of different occupations/industries. To the
extent that the pay period may indicate different labour markets, labour market
analyses by pay period may help to capture labour market segmentation that
cannot otherwise be identified in the data. For example, while there is complete
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information on the pay period, data on formality is incomplete. We do not include
these various indicators of job type as variables in the analysis because there are
typically significant numbers of missing observations for at least one country. We
showed that not all workers paid monthly are white-collar, and whilst it may be
the case that almost all workers paid daily or weekly in Tanzania and Uganda can
be considered informal, not all monthly are formal.
In addition, we provide a detailed description of the off-own-farm casual labour
market (ganyu), a peculiar source of labour earnings in Malawi. The reason to treat
ganyu separately is that it is a specific (segmented) labour market, and the measure
of earnings is different to other labour. In addition, the screening questions in the
questionnaire employed to extract labour market information were different and
less detailed for the ganyu labour. We acknowledge that the exclusion of ganyu
workers from Malawi’s sample makes the data less comparable to the other two.
Nonetheless, the samples represent the ‘standard’ labour force and focus of the





Appendix 2A: Correction and Adjustments Made to
Key Variables
The following corrections and adjustments were made to key variables utilizing
information from other waves, other survey questions or both. Note that the
corrections and adjustments were made to the initial samples (containing all
survey individuals) so the number of cases with corrections/adjustments may be
significantly lower in the final samples.
Tanzania
Age: 4,855 cases with inconsistencies corrected using information from other waves.
Sex : 244 cases with inconsistencies corrected using information from other waves.
Education:
• 968 cases with inconsistencies in education when education was lower than
previous survey(s) were corrected.
• 66 cases with missing schooling replaced by values using information from
other education variables.
• 171 cases of individuals born after 1956 with eight instead of seven years of
primary school level of education were corrected.
Earnings : 116 adjustments were made to wages (99 cases to reported pay periods
and 17 errors caused by additional/omission of zeros 116)
Uganda
Age: 3683 cases with inconsistencies corrected using information from other waves.
Sex : 141 cases with inconsistencies in sex corrected using information from other
waves.
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Education: 3420 cases with missing values of education replaced by highest
education grades from other waves.
Appendix 2B: Imputation of Time Normally
Worked
Note that the median values used for imputation in all cases were computed by
gender, location (rural vs urban), age group (15-35 (youth) vs 36-65 (adults) and
pay period.
Malawi
• The period of time the reported salaries cover: (91 cases replaced by 1)
• Number of hours worked last 7 days (3 cases)
• Number of months worked in the last 12 months (17 cases)
• Number of weeks worked in the last 12 months (2 cases)
• The number of days worked in ganyu for ganyu workers (38 cases)
• Number of weeks in ganyu (26 case)
Tanzania
• Some reported 0 hours in 12 months, assumed error in recording and replaced
by median values (63)
• Some reported 0 months in 12 months, assumed error in recording and replace
by median values (198 cases)
• Some reported 0 weeks in 12 months, assumed error in recording and replace
by median values (35)
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• Missing values of number of months in 12 months replaced by median (30)
• Missing values of number of weeks in the last 22 months (34 cases)
• Wave 1 does not have information on days, weeks or months worked over
the last 12 months, but the correlation between hours worked last week and
typical number of hours in a week over past 12 months is high (0.86) so we
use hours last week to proxy working hours in any week. For those reporting
0 hours over the last week, we replaced by median values (175 cases). The
total number of hours in a week were then used to calculate the number of
days (assuming 9 hours a day)
• Weeks worked in a month and over the last 12 months, and the number of
months worked over the last 12 months for wave 1 were then imputed by the
corresponding medians from the other waves.
Uganda
• The number of weeks worked last month and over the last 12 months was
missing in the 2009 survey, so we imputed them using medians values from
the other waves.
• The number of months worked over the last 12 months for those with missing
values (67 cases)




Does the Pay Period Matter in Estimating Returns
to Schooling? Evidence from East Africa
3.1 Introduction
It is important to understand the rate of returns to education because it is one
of the significant determinants of willingness to invest in education. Part of the
justification for public investment in education is that it adds to human capital,
skills, and productivity; this should generate a social benefit in addition to the
private benefit of increased earnings by more productive workers. People will
be willing to pay for education if it increases their earnings (Borjas, 2016) and
parents’ willingness to invest resources in their children’s education depends on
how they value future benefits that the children will get after acquiring education
(Schultz, 2004). In developing countries expected returns to education may also be
an important determinant of child labour—high returns increase school attendance
and tend to reduce the likelihood of child labour (Kuepié and Nordman, 2016).
Most studies on returns to education over the past five decades have
concentrated on developed countries (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2018, 2004).
Nonetheless, there is an emerging body of literature estimating returns to
education in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries, including Malawi, Tanzania
and Uganda, with a broad consensus that since around 2000 returns to secondary
education have exceeded those of primary education. While coefficient estimates
vary, returns are increasing with the level of education (and generally also with
years of education). Given limitations in the data, there are weaknesses in the
existing evidence. This essay addresses some of these.
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Studies on returns to education are mainly based on nationally representative
surveys conducted by government statistical agencies and in some cases on surveys
by private researchers. These surveys usually collect data on earnings by different
pay periods (typically daily, weekly and monthly) which often reflects the type
of employment. Most studies then measure earnings by converting these to a
common period, normally hourly or monthly (see for example Nikolov and Jimi
(2018), Mishra and Smyth (2015), Peet et al. (2015), and Serneels et al. (2017)).
For instance, daily and weekly rates are converted to monthly rates by multiplying
by a factor of 22 or 4, respectively. A concern of this approach is the possible
introduction of measurement errors into the data (e.g., a person paid daily may
not work 5 or 6 days each week), leading to inaccurate estimates on the returns
to education. Measurement error which might arise because of conversion of the
reported earnings to a common period leads to less efficient estimates of returns
to education (Bound et al., 1994; Pischke, 1995). In addition, Card (2001) shows
that using different measures of earnings yields different estimates of returns to
education. However, we view pay period as indicating segmented labour markets
not otherwise identified in the data. As explained in Chapter 2 (see descriptive
in Table 2.10), workers with the same level of education earn different wages
depending on their pay periods. Example, workers with secondary and higher
education in Malawi earn higher if they work and get paid weekly. To the extent
that the pay period may indicate different labour markets, pooling across pay
periods leads to biased estimates of the rate of return to education (Fichtenbaum,
2006).
This essay analyses returns to education in Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda by
answering two key questions. Firstly, when earnings are aggregated to a common
unit, do different units give different estimates of returns to schooling? Secondly,
does the pay period matter in estimating returns to schooling in East Africa?
Benefiting from relatively large and recent nationally representative datasets,
this essay tests the unexplored hypotheses that estimates of returns to schooling
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depend on (i.e., vary according to) the period of measurement of the earnings
and that different conversions may lead to different estimates. To the best of our
knowledge, there have been no studies on Africa which have explored this issue.
Given the absence of good and comparable instruments for education in the three
countries to account for selection and endogeneity, we estimate returns by applying
the Gaussian Copula (GC) instrument free method proposed in Park and Gupta
(2012), combined with Heckman model for selection into employment categories.
Our findings suggest that returns to education differ by pay period and that
pooling the periods together may lead to imprecise estimates. Specifically, in
Malawi the returns for workers paid daily are the highest, followed by monthly
and then weekly. In Tanzania, the returns for workers paid weekly are not only
the highest but also increase at a higher rate than for the other pay periods.
In Uganda, returns are highest for weekly earners followed by monthly and then
daily. Our results also show that pooling/aggregating earnings to different common
measures produces different returns and that estimates are generally closer to those
from the pay period that constitutes the largest proportion of the sample. In this
regard, our analysis suggests that estimating returns separately for workers paid
over different periods is more reliable than pooling.
As explained earlier in Chapter 2, due to its unique labour market structure,
with a disproportionately large proportion of the labour force in rural areas
primarily participating in agriculture and or ganyu, we chose to analyse this
group separately. The findings reveal that, generally, converting ganyu earnings
to monthly yields larger estimates with larger standard errors than converting to
daily or annualised suggesting that converting ganyu earnings to monthly gives
less efficient estimates of returns to education.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 provides an
overview of the related literature. Section 3.3 describes the employed empirical
methodology, followed by Section 3.4 on data and description. Section 3.5 presents
the results and discussions, and Section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 Literature Review
Analysis of the relationship between education and earnings goes back to 1960s
after the seminal works of Schultz (1961) and Becker (1964). In his theory of
investment in human capital, Becker (1964) assumed that education raises earnings
and productivity and that individuals choose the level of education that maximises
the expected present value of their lifetime earnings net of costs for acquiring
such levels of education. This theoretical analysis almost immediately triggered
many empirical examinations with a debate about the true effect of education on
earnings. The increase in earnings associated with an additional year of education
is known as private returns to education or simply returns to education.
Mincer (1974), based on the human capital investment theory, developed a
model for analysing the effect of education on wage earnings called the human
capital earnings function (or Mincer wage function). This approach models the
logarithm of wage earnings as a linear function of an individual’s years of schooling,
experience and experience squared. That is:
logW = a+ bS + cE + dE2 + ε (3.1)
Where W is wage earnings, S is years of schooling completed, E is labour market
experience, a, b,c and d are parameters, and ε is an error term. Since its
formulation, this model has become the standard model for analysing returns to
education, with many studies extending it to include more variables that affect
wage earnings such as gender, race and work-related characteristics (Card, 1999,
2001; Patrinos and Psacharopoulos, 2010; Peet et al., 2015).
As an alternative, some studies employ a non-parametric (full discounting)
method to estimate returns to education (see for example Heckman et al. (2006),
Heckman et al. (2008), Heckman and Vytlacil (2007, 2005)). This method is
relatively data demanding, which limits its applicability, especially in developing
countries such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In that regard, it is beyond
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the scope of this section to describe the literature on this approach in detail.
One of the challenges with the Mincer model is how to estimate the causal
effect of education on earnings with the endogeneity of education given unobserved
ability. The consensus in the literature is that without controlling for individual
ability, OLS on 3.1 gives inconsistent estimates (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005;
Wooldridge, 2010). Economists have adopted various methods to address this
problem. The most widely used solution for addressing this issue is to use
instrumental variables (IV) based on either two-stage least squares (2SLS) or a
control function (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009; Card, 1999, 2001). The method
requires an additional variable (instrument) that affects an individual’s education
but is not correlated with their wage. Studies have employed different instruments,
most frequently family background characteristics such as parental education,
parents’ occupation and spouse education; and school system features such as
proximity to school, tuition fees, quality of the school, and (change in) compulsory
schooling laws in minimum years of basic education (Card, 2001). To a large
extent, the choice of instrument is dictated by availability of data.
Card (2001) reviewed 11 studies from developed countries conducted between
1990 and 2000 that relied on IV as the source of exogenous variation in education
to obtain identification. Although in theory OLS estimates should be larger than
their IV counterparts, that is, ability should bias the returns upwards (Card, 1999),
the review concluded that estimates of returns to education from IV are larger than
those from OLS. Similar conclusions were reached in a global review of literature
on returns to education (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004, 2018). However, one
of the critical limitations of the IV approach is that it is difficult to find variables
that can generate exogenous variation in education in the study population.
An alternative solution is using instrument free methods, that is, methods
which do not require any external instruments. They include latent instrumental
variables (Ebbes et al., 2005); methods that use heteroscedasticity to obtain
identification (Farré et al., 2013; Klein and Vella, 2009, 2010; Lewbel, 2012); and
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Gaussian Copula (Park and Gupta, 2012). These methods are particularly useful
when there are no (good) instruments in the data, for example, when a researcher
uses survey data collected for other purposes and hence appropriate instruments
have not been included in the questionnaire. To date, these methods have not yet
been widely applied in the returns to education literature.
Ebbes et al. (2005) developed the Latent Instrumental Variables (LIV)
method, which provides a means of obtaining consistent estimates in the presence
of endogeneity without relying on external instruments. In this model, the
instruments are unobserved and therefore estimated from the data. The model
is also capable of testing if the regressor is correlated with the error term using
the Hausman test. To demonstrate the superiority of the LIV approach over
the traditional IV approaches, the study compared the estimates of returns
to education from the two approaches using three datasets: the US National
Longitudinal Survey of Young Men (NLSY), Brabant data and the University
of Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). In all datasets, the LIV
approach found upward bias of OLS estimates of around 7% (close to 10% from
studies of twins) while the IV approach gave different sizes of the bias for each
dataset.
Klein and Vella (2009) formulated an IV free strategy and used it to
estimate the causal effect of education on wages by utilising the presence of
heteroscedasticity in the data to obtain identification. Their model consists of
two non-parametric equations one for (the determinants of) education and the
other for (the determinants of) wage. All determinants of education are used
as regressors in the wage equation and the causal effect then obtained through
heteroscedasticity (Klein and Vella, 2009). Applying the model to a sample of
Australian workers from the 2001 Household Income and Labour Dynamics in
Australia (HILDA), the strategy estimated returns at 10% compared to 6% for
OLS.
Building on Klein and Vella (2009, 2010), Farré et al. (2013) formulated
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a parametric approach for estimating returns to education with endogenous
education in the absence of internal instrumental variables. Applying the method
to a subsample of American youth from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
1979, they estimated returns at 11.2% compared to 6.8% for OLS.
Lewbel (2012) introduced another instrument free method that utilises the
presence of heteroscedasticity in the data to restrict the correlation between the
regressors and the (product of the) errors in the regression model. Mishra and
Smyth (2015) employed this method to estimate returns to schooling in China
using two datasets: matched worker-firm data from Minhang Shanghai and the
China Household Finance Survey (CHFS) 2011. For the first dataset, estimated
returns to education were 7.4% using OLS and 25.7% using the Lewbel method.
For the second dataset, the returns were estimated at 8.6% for OLS, 18.9%
for traditional IV, 12.9% for Lewbel and 19.1% for Lewbel + traditional IV.
In studies using heteroscedasticity-type instruments, OLS appeared to bias the
returns downwards.
Another key challenge with the Mincer model is how to deal with sample
selection bias. Sample selection arises because wages are observed only for
individuals in wage employment who report positive values of wage during data
collection. The wages of the wage earners might not reflect the wages of the
non-wage income earners (for example, the unemployed, self-employed, agricultural
workers) had they worked in wage employment. If the exclusion of these individuals
from the analysis is not random, without controlling for how individuals select into
wage employment the OLS estimator will give inconsistent estimates (Cameron
and Trivedi, 2005; Heckman, 1979; Verbeek, 2004). The standard solution for this
problem is to use the Heckman Two-step Sample Selection Model formulated by
Heckman (1979). The model recovers consistent estimates by running OLS in two
steps where the exclusion from the sample is modelled as an omitted variable. A
detailed discussion of the method is provided in section 3.
While the debate on the issues/challenges in estimating the true causal effect
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of education on earnings remains, in the last few years many studies have emerged
on developing countries including SSA. In a recent review of global literature
on returns to education, Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2018) document that in
developing countries returns to an extra year of schooling averages about 9.2%
compared to 8% in developed countries. These studies, however, widely differ in
terms of methods (including OLS, traditional IV, propensity scores matching, and
Heckman sample selection models) and data (such as nationally representative,
regional or sectoral level data) making it difficult to directly compare the estimates
of returns across countries and studies (see Appendix 3A. for the detailed analysis
of selected studies on developing countries).
Within the IV and or sample selection literature in the developing countries,
recent contributions include Nikolov and Jimi (2018), Kuepié and Nordman (2016),
Wang (2013) and Aslam et al. (2012). Nikolov and Jimi (2018) used data from
the 2014 Integrated Labour Force Survey (ILFS) and estimated returns to an
extra year of schooling in Tanzania at 7% using the quarter of birth as an IV.
Kuepié and Nordman (2016) employed a control function based IV approach
(father’s education and occupation/professional status as instruments) in their
study on returns to education in two cities of the Republic of Congo. Data for
the analysis came from the Employment and Informal Sector Survey (EESIC)
2009. They found that primary education had no effect on earnings in either
of the cities, while returns for lower secondary, upper secondary and higher
education were respectively 9%, 5% and 12% for Brazzaville and 9%, 14% and
13% for Pointe-Noire. In a study on China, Wang (2013) used data from the
urban sample of the China Household Income Project (CHIP) 1995 and 2002 to
examine the pattern of returns over time. The study employed family background
characteristics (parental and spouse education) as instruments for education
and found that returns increased over the two survey periods regardless of the
instrument used. However, though the difference was small, returns seemed to be
higher when parental education was used as an IV relative to spouse education.
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Aslam et al. (2012) used data from the Purposive Household Survey in Punjab and
the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan 2006 -2007 and found that
an extra year of schooling increased males’ earnings by about 10% while education
had no significant effect on female’s earnings. For more details on recent studies
based on IV strategy in developing countries see Appendix 3A.
Another strand of literature on returns to education in developing countries
is the one that focuses on examining the possible heterogeneity in returns to
education along the earning distribution and across groups of workers (such as
gender, sector of employment and location). CHuang and Lai (2017) examined
returns to education in Taiwan between 1978 and 2003 using data from Taiwan’s
1978-2003 Manpower Utilization Survey. Quantile regression results showed that
returns increased from 5.5% in 1978 to 8.2% in 2003 with an average of 6.5% The
returns were high at the low end of the earnings distribution and vice versa. A
similar study by Stefani and Biderman (2009) on Brazil used data from Brazil
National Household Survey (BNHS) 1988 and 1996 to examine the evolution of
returns to education. The study also employed a quantile regression approach
to analyse the pattern of returns to education along the earnings distribution and
found that returns were heterogeneous across race, gender and earning distribution,
ranging from 6% to 32%. Furthermore, Girma and Kedir (2005) used Household
panel data for Ethiopia’s seven major cities, 1994, 1995, and 1997 to examine
returns across time and earnings distribution. Using the same methodology, they
found that returns differed across the earning distribution: highest (20%) at 25th
quantile and lowest at 90th quantile (9%).
As far as heterogeneity across groups is concerned, the typical finding (like for
developed countries) is that females have higher returns to education compared
to males (Nikolov and Jimi, 2018; Peet et al., 2015; Salisbury, 2016; Schultz,
2004); public sector employees have higher returns than their private counterparts
(Lassibille and Tan, 2005); rural workers have higher returns than urban workers
and wage employees have higher returns than the self-employed and agricultural
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workers (Al-Samarrai and Reilly, 2008).
A rather unique study is by Serneels et al. (2017), which examined whether
the type of questionnaire used in collecting individuals’ labour market information
matters in estimating returns to education in Tanzania. By using both short
and detailed questionnaires, the study found that returns differed by the survey
instrument: short module questionnaires led to biased estimates compared to
detailed questionnaires. After controlling for endogeneity due to unobserved ability
and selection by using a control function, Heckman and Heckman-Hotz methods,
the estimated returns ranged 20-21% for men and 32-49% for women for a year
of post-primary school if short modules were used. For the detailed modules, no
effects of schooling on wage were found for men, while returns for women were
between 29% and 50%.
Whilst much effort has been put in addressing issues like endogeneity of
education in estimating returns to education, heterogeneity of returns across the
earnings distribution and groups of workers, little to no attention has been focused
on whether the pay period matters in estimating returns to education. What
is evident in all the previous studies is the conventional method of aggregating
earnings to a common period such as hourly, daily, monthly or annual earnings.
However, what is not clear is the impact this has on their findings. In this essay,
we demonstrate that the relationship between earnings and education may vary
across workers reporting wage earnings over different periods. We argue that the
precision of converting the reported wages to the universal unit may be plagued by
errors and assumptions made by the researcher, leading to inaccurate/inefficient
estimates of the returns. In fact, different common measures may give different
estimates of returns to education. Unlike previous studies, this essay considers
the implication of alternative ways of converting the reported wages to a common




Recent studies on Tanzania (as discussed in section 2) show increasing returns
with levels of education (convex schooling-earning function). We adopt the Mincer
equation with quadratic schooling from Söderbom et al. (2014) to ascertain the
possible convexity in returns. Thus, our empirical model is specified as follows:
Yit = α1Sit + α2S
2
it + βXit + µit (3.2)
Where Y is the log of earnings, S is individual’s years of schooling, S2 schooling
squared, X is a vector (containing a constant) of individual characteristics (age
in years and its square, gender, location, log of weeks worked and a dummy
variable for individuals observed more than once), i and t index individual and
time respectively and µ is a standard error term. The parameters of interest are
α1 and α2. The sign of α2 tells us about the shape of the earning function: positive
implies convexity, negative implies concavity, and zero implies linearity.
Since the rates of return to schooling may differ by level of education, we
also use an alternative specification that uses dummies for completed levels of
education to estimate returns to each level of education. Three levels are used
for this purpose: primary, secondary and higher (including tertiary non-university
(post-secondary diploma) and university). Because we have very few observations
with higher than secondary education, we merge the two post-secondary education
levels into one group. The following specification is used for this purpose:
Yit = δeducit + γXit + εit (3.3)
Where educ is a vector of dummies for the levels of education with “less than
primary education (no education hereafter)” as the reference category, X is as
defined earlier, and ε an error term. The returns associated with each level of
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education with respect to the reference category is given by the vector δ. The






Where r is the return per year, δl− δm is the difference in returns between the two
levels and Sl − Sm the difference in years of schooling between the levels.
In our specifications, we use age and its square in place of experience and
its square for two main reasons. Firstly, the surveys did not explicitly ask the
years of experience the individual spent in the current job. Therefore, defining
experience as age less years of schooling less school starting age as commonly
defined in the literature might result in accumulation of errors, especially if there
were measurement errors in age, years of schooling and/or school starting age.
Furthermore, we would have missing values for those who did not report their
school starting age, or otherwise choose an arbitrary starting age. Secondly, if
schooling happens to be endogenous due to, among other reasons, unobserved
ability, by construction experience would also be endogenous. To avoid these
issues, we use age as a proxy for experience in our analysis.
While most workers in the sample are paid monthly, significant shares report
earnings daily and weekly (also fortnightly, quarterly for Tanzania). The standard
method is to convert/aggregate all wages into a common period such as monthly
wage or annualised wage (then expressed in monthly) earnings and use their log as
the dependent variable. Having constructed construct three common measures for
wages as described in Chapter 2, we begin by examining whether these different
conversions give different estimates of returns to education. In the next step, we
use one of the common measures and estimate the returns to education for each
of the three main pay periods (daily, weekly and monthly) separately to examine
if the estimates vary by pay period.
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3.3.2 OLS Estimation
As a baseline estimation, we estimate (3.2) and (3.2) using OLS. According to
the literature it is well known, however, that OLS will give inconsistent estimates
of α1, α2 and δ because of omitted variables, measurement errors or if there is
sample selection bias. A typical example is when these variables are correlated
with the residuals in (3.2) and (3.2) due to the presence of other factors that
are associated with higher education and higher wages but are not included in
the models, such as when more educated individuals possess other unobservable
characteristics, such as high ability, which are associated with higher wages.
Estimating (3.2) and (3.2) using OLS without controlling for ability will lead
to inconsistent estimates (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). Furthermore, without
controlling for how individuals select into wage employment, OLS will also give
biased estimates.
3.3.3 Gaussian Copula Estimation
One of the standard solutions to recovering consistent estimates for (3.2) and
(3.2) is using instrumental variables. Several studies, as discussed in the literature
section, have employed different instruments for education in estimating returns to
schooling. Frequently used instruments include family background characteristics
such as parental education, parents’ occupation and spouse education; and school
system features such as proximity to school, tuition fees, quality of the school, and
(change in) compulsory schooling laws in minimum years of basic education (Card,
2001). To a large extent, the choice of instruments is dictated by the availability
of data, and almost every instrument is subject to debate.
LSMS being a general household survey, only family background characteristics
were available for us to use as instruments for education. We tried two instruments
from the data, but they did not meet the requirements1 for a good instrument
(i.e., turned to be weak and failed to meet the overidentification restriction).
1Results for IV estimation not included but are available upon request.
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Whereas parental education variables were weak, household average education
(which combines parental education, siblings education and spouse education)
failed overidentification test.
Another solution is to use instrument free methods (which do not require
external instruments) reviewed in section 3.2 above. Heteroscedasticity based
methods are good candidates, however, these methods are only suitable when
there is one endogenous regressor whilst in our case there are three (potential)
endogenous regressors (S, S2 and the log of number of weeks worked in the
last 12 months). We therefore employ the Gaussian Copula (GC) method as
it can be easily extended to include more than one endogenous regressor. The
GC approach models the correlation between the suspected endogenous variable
and the error term by using copulas2. By including the copula term(s) of the
endogenous regressor(s) as additional regressor(s) in the regression model, this
method recovers the estimates of the endogenous regressor(s) which are free from
endogeneity (Park and Gupta, 2012).
Significance of the copula terms in the GC regression implies critical
endogeneity; otherwise, OLS results are consistent. Furthermore, the sign of
the copula terms shows the direction of the correlation between the endogenous
variables and the errors. However, although the model can recover the true effect
of the endogenous regressors, it does not tell anything about the source of the
endogeneity (Hult et al., 2018). It is noteworthy that the method is not suitable
when the endogenous regressor is binary (Park and Gupta, 2012). Consequently,
we cannot use GC with the more flexible Mincer specification (3.3) that uses
dummies for education levels to estimate returns to the levels of education. Instead,
we rely on quadratic schooling in (3.2) to infer whether higher levels of education
have higher returns than lower levels or not. We do, however, report the results
for the levels of education corrected for selection bias.
Following Park and Gupta (2012) and Rutz and Watson (2019), our model is
2Cherubini et al. (2004) defines Copulas as “functions that enable us to express a joint
probability distribution as a function of the marginal ones”
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derived as follows: recall (3.2) where both (S and S2 are endogenous (we omit the
individual and time indices (subscripts it) for mathematical convenience).
Y = α1S + α2S
2 + βX + µ (3.5)



















Where S∗ = Φ−1(F1(S)) and S2∗ = Φ−1(F2(S2)) are GC functions; F1(.) and
F2(.) are cumulative distribution functions for S and S2 respectively; ρ12 is the
correlation between S and S2; ρµ1 the correlation between S and µ; and ρµ2 the






















































Where σ2µ is the variance of the error term. Combining (3.5) and (3.6) we get
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Y = α1S + α2S












Equation (3.7) is a linear regression model with the error term given by its last
three component. The model disaggregates the endogenous regressors into two
components; one is the part not correlated with the error term (S and S2) and
the other is the part which is correlated with the error term (S∗ and S2∗). By
including the copula functions as additional regressors, OLS on model (3.7) gives













Equation (3.7) can be rewritten as:
Y = α1S + α2S
2 + βX + θ1S
∗ + θ2S
2∗ + ξ (3.8)
Given the discrete nature of our endogenous regressors, the distribution functions
F1(.) and F2(.) are step functions lying between two values, such that:
F (t− 1) < Ut < F (t)
for any discrete endogenous regressor t; where Ut follows uniform distribution on
[0,1]. It follows, therefore, that:
Φ−1(F1(S−1)) < S∗ < Φ−1(F1(S)); and Φ−1(F2(S2−1)) < S2∗ < Φ−1(F2(S2)).
Since F1(.) and F2(.) are estimable from the data, model (3.8) can be estimated
using OLS.
Equation (3.8) can also be extended to include more endogenous regressors.
For example, because the number of weeks worked in the last 12 months may be
endogenous due to a bidirectional relationship between total annual earnings and
the number of weeks worked, we include the variable “W” (for log weeks) when
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using annualised wages. In this case, our empirical model then becomes
Y = α1S + α2S
2 + α3W + βX + θ1S
∗ + θ2S
2∗ + θ3W
∗ + ξ (3.9)
3.3.4 Heckman Selection Model
We also control for possible bias from non-random missingness in earnings data
and selection into periods of employment. Some individuals in our dataset do not
have values of wage, either because they were unemployed, self-employed at the
time of survey or did not respond. As we cannot guarantee that exclusion of these
individuals from our sample and analysis is random, our OLS estimator is likely
to give inconsistent estimates due to sample selection bias (Cameron and Trivedi,
2005; Verbeek, 2004). The study, therefore, employs Heckman (1979) selection
correction method to deal with selection bias.
It is worth noting that pay period is not exogenous as it is an outcome which
itself might be the result of education. Higher educated individuals are more likely
to have monthly-paid jobs . This might create a selection problem when estimating
separately for each pay period, addressed by estimating selection equations into
each pay period. Note that we use a different Heckman selection equation for
each period, each one representing selection into that pay period. An alternative
approach is to use a multinomial probit model, but we leave that open for future
research. Because we want to correct the selection bias after controlling for other
sources of endogeneity, we include GC terms in the two-step Heckman selection
model. In the first stage (equation (3.9)) we estimate the probit model for selection
into periods of payment and paid employment, the regressors being the exogenous
variables, GC terms and exclusion restrictions:
P = ϑ1S + ϑ2S
2 + Ψ1X + Ψ2Σ + φ1S
∗ + φ2S
2∗ + e (3.10)
Where P is the probability of participating in paid employment, Σ is the vector
of exclusion characteristics (dummy for the household head (head), marital status
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(married), the proportion of children under 5 (kids5), and proportion of children
between 6 and 14 years (kids14) in the household). P is defined as follows:
P =

1 if Y ≥ 0
0 if Y = .
(3.11)
We obtain the inverse mills ratio (λ) from (3.10) and then include it as a regressor
in the estimation of (3.8) and (3.9) (again omitting individual and time indices
for convenience). That is, the selection corrected equation for (3.8) and (3.9) are
respectively given by (3.12) and (3.13):
(Y |P = 1) = α11S + α21S2 + β1X + θ11S∗ + θ21S2∗ + π1λ1 + ξ1 (3.12)
(Y |P = 1) = α12S+α22S2+α32W+β2X+θ12S∗+θ22S2∗+α42W ∗+π2λ2+ξ2 (3.13)
The obtained estimates of the returns to schooling from (3.12) and (3.13) using
OLS are consistent and efficient if π1 and π2 are significantly different from 0;
otherwise, there is no selection problem, and thus GC is more efficient.
3.4 Variables and Descriptive Statistics
The literature guides the variables used in this study. Table 3.1 shows the names
and definitions of each variable as used in the study. Refer to Chapter 2 for a
more detailed description of how the variables were constructed from the survey
data. Table 3.2 shows the summary statistics for the variables included in the
wage regression function. Wages in this table are aggregated to annualised wage
as described in Chapter 2. “Pooled” refers to the total sample when all pay periods
are combined, and it excludes the off-own-farm casual labour (ganyu) for Malawi.
Table 3.2 shows that workers in Malawi earn more than those in Tanzania and
Uganda across the pay periods. Because ganyu labour is excluded, it may mean
that there are very few unskilled workers in the regular employment in Malawi
and this partly explains the high wages. In all three countries, workers reporting
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earnings monthly are the highest earners (most of them may be in the formal
employment hence the high rate). Workers reporting earnings weekly are the
lowest earners in Tanzania and Uganda, whereas those reporting earnings daily
are the lowest earners in Malawi. Compared to the other countries, in Tanzania,
the wage penalty associated with working in daily or weekly employment is vast.
That is, workers reporting earnings daily and weekly earn at least three times less
than their monthly counterparts.
As far as education is concerned, workers in Malawi have more years of
schooling compared to Tanzania and Uganda. Malawi has a more significant
proportion (14%) of the workers reporting daily earnings holding higher education
(these may be professionals given that ganyu workers are excluded) compared to
Uganda (3%) and Tanzania (0%). Monthly earners have more education than
their daily and weekly counterparts in all three countries. In Tanzania, workers
with higher education are only paid monthly.
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Table 3.1: Definition of Variables Used in the Analysis
Variable Description
Wage equation:
log(wage) the logarithm of the common wage measure, as explained
in Chapter 2.
sch individual’s total number of years of schooling. Its square
is included to test convexity/concavity of the earnings
function.
noeduc educational dummy, 1 if less than primary education and
0 otherwise.
primary educational dummy, 1 if completed primary education and
0 otherwise.
secondary educational dummy, 1 if completed ordinary/advanced
secondary education and 0 otherwise.
higher educational dummy, 1 if completed post-secondary
(diploma/university) education and 0 otherwise
age individual’s age in years. Its square is included to capture
the non-linear relationship between earning and age.
female a gender dummy, 1 for females, included to capture the
effects of gender on wages.
rural location dummy, 1 for employment in rural areas, is used
to control for rural-urban wage differentials.
panel for Tanzania and Uganda, a dummy, 1 for individuals
observed more than once since we are using imperfect
panel surveys.
year only for Malawi, a year dummy, 1 for 2016 and 0 for 2010.
weeks number of weeks worked in the past 12 months.
Selection equation
married dummy for marital status, 1 if married or living together
and 0 otherwise.
head dummy equals 1 if head of the household and 0 otherwise.
kids5 proportion of children under 6 years of age in the
household.
kids14 proportion of children aged 6 to 14 years of age in the
household.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics for the Main Variables Used in Analysis
Country
& Sample
Obs. Wage ($ month) sch age weeks primary secondary higher female rural panel year
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD % % % % % %
Malawi
Daily 182 206.42 251.48 9.03 4.51 36.80 10.20 36.75 13.99 20 29 12 26 67 NA 74
Weekly 505 174.26 289.04 7.15 3.91 34.94 10.35 35.51 14.71 24 10 4 30 66 NA 53
Monthly 5,129 226.84 339.20 9.26 4.12 35.85 10.71 39.63 12.69 26 24 14 25 49 NA 50
Pooled 5,816 221.04 332.38 9.05 4.16 35.79 10.66 39.13 13.01 26 23 13 25 52 NA 51
Ganyu 16,528 33.76 53.52 4.77 3.52 33.42 11.89 15.64 12.66 14 2 0 51 92 NA 64
Tanzania
Daily 3,738 38.91 87.35 5.26 3.21 33.14 11.92 15.32 15.39 57 4 0 40 78 25 NA
Weekly 1,929 32.54 85.08 5.28 3.24 33.64 12.08 13.62 15.16 56 5 0 36 82 19 NA
Monthly 4,830 123.90 161.28 8.16 3.69 33.34 11.89 34.95 16 51 27 7 38 53 41 NA
Pooled 11,215 69.10 126.88 6.35 3.67 33.37 11.93 22.10 18.38 55 13 3 38 70 45 NA
Uganda
Daily 1,262 78.92 103.44 6.35 3.53 30.99 10.84 36.04 14.57 34 11 3 20 64 39 NA
Weekly 589 76.34 109.07 6.97 3.81 32.77 11.44 35.27 14.87 32 12 8 29 72 15 NA
Monthly 2,765 114.19 139.02 9.85 4.39 34.71 11.06 39.38 12.45 29 16 31 37 56 56 NA
Pooled 4,631 99.66 127.84 8.51 4.41 33.46 11.18 37.89 13.54 31 14 20 31 61 57 NA
Source: Author’s computations from IHS, TNPS and UNPS.
Note: The last two columns show % observed multiple times for Tanzania and Uganda (panel) and % in 2016 for Malawi (year) respectively
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3.5 Results and Discussion
3.5.1 Effects of Aggregating Earnings on Estimates of
Returns to Schooling
Firstly, we present the estimates of returns to schooling obtained from pooling
all workers together (as previous studies for Africa have done). As explained in
Chapter 2, the reported wage earnings were converted to three different common
periods: daily earnings (DailyC), monthly earnings (MonthlyC) and annualised
earnings expressed per month (MonthlyA). Note that Malawi’s off-own-farm labour
(Ganyu) is excluded in this analysis and is analysed separately in the next
section. Tables 3.3 - 3.5 compare the estimates of returns to schooling for the
three countries when these three measures are used as the dependent variables in
the regressions. The first three columns present the estimates from the baseline
OLS regression (ignoring the possible endogeneity bias). The next three columns
(columns 4 – 6) present estimates corrected for endogeneity due to ability bias
using GC model by Park and Gupta (2012). The last three columns (columns 7-9)
present estimates corrected for both ability bias and selection into employment
categories using Heckman sample selection model in combination with GC (HGC
henceforth). To simplify comparison, the predicted average marginal effects of
schooling (AME(sch)) are included in the tables since the quadratic component of
years of schooling may complicate the interpretation.
As GC and HGC tend to produce unstable estimates when the endogenous
regressors are discrete, bootstrap aggregating (bagging) is also employed to check
the robustness of both the GC and HGC results, by estimating the regressions
many times and averaging the coefficients. The results for bagging are presented
in Appendix 3D and the results in Tables 3.3 - 3.5 appear robust.
Tables 3.3 - 3.5 show that for Malawi and Tanzania the coefficient of schooling
(sch) is negative implying that there is a threshold in the years of schooling (about
six years for Malawi and two years for Tanzania) below which the returns are
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negative. Irrespective of the measure of earnings or the estimation strategy used,
Tables 3.3 - 3.5 show that in all countries the coefficient on schooling squared (sch2 )
is positive and highly statistically significant implying a strong convex relationship
between earnings and years of schooling. This tells us that, while each additional
year of education is associated with an increase in earnings, the rate of increase in
earnings also increases with years of schooling. That is, the slope of the earnings
function increases by some constant amount for each additional year of schooling.
In line with theory on ability bias but contrary to the consensus in the IV
literature on returns to education, Tables 3.3 -3.5 show that OLS gives upward
biased estimates. The predicted marginal effects of schooling in Table 3.3 -3.5
show that including the copula functions for education lowers the returns to
education in Malawi by about 50% from 13.8% to 6.0% when the reported
earnings are aggregated to daily earnings; from 14.7% to 6.9% when the reported
earnings are aggregated to monthly earnings; and from 15.3% to 8.8% when the
reported earnings are aggregated to annualised earnings. Correcting for selection
to employment categories in addition to ability bias lowers the returns even further
(daily to 4.1%, monthly to 4.8% and annualised to 7.2%). The coefficient of the
inverse mills ratio (IMR) in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 is statistically significant, implying
that ignoring selection leads to biased results. The negative (positive) sign of IMR
implies that there are negative (positive) correlations between the errors in the
wage equations and those from the labour force participation equations making
OLS results inconsistent. That is, there are unobserved factors that increase
(decrease) the likelihoods of both participation in wage employment and earning
lower (higher).
Importantly, Tables 3.3 - 3.5 show the effects of using different earnings
measures on the estimates of returns to schooling; estimates clearly differ
depending on how earnings are measured. Table 3.3 shows that MonthlyA
gives larger estimates of returns to schooling in Malawi compared to DailyC or
MonthlyC. There is a small (negligible) difference between estimates from DailyC
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and to MonthlyC (mainly due to the small proportion of the daily earners relative
to monthly earners in the sample). The pattern is irrespective of the estimation
strategy used. The top panel of Figure 3.1 plots the HGC (preferred) estimates
of returns to schooling from Table 3.3 for the selected grades. It shows how the
estimates differ with the measure of earnings
Table 3.4 shows the corresponding results for Tanzania. For Tanzania,
MonthlyC gives larger estimates of returns to schooling compared to DailyC or
MonthlyA. In addition, the strength of correlation between years of schooling
and the error terms in the regressions is significant and stronger for MonthlyC
compared to DailyC and MonthlyA. The middle panel of Figure 3.1 plots the
HGC estimates of returns to schooling in Tanzania. While the gap between the
estimates from DailyC and MonthlyC is generally constant, that between estimates
from MonthlyC and MonthlyA increases with education.
Table 3.5 shows the results for Uganda. Like the case for Malawi, MonthlyA
gives larger estimates of returns to schooling compared to aggregating to DailyC or
MonthlyC. Like Malawi and Tanzania, the correlation between years of schooling
and the error terms in the regressions exists and is generally significant. The
bottom panel of Figure 3.1 plots the HGC estimates of returns to schooling in
Uganda. In Uganda, the gap between the estimates from DailyC and MonthlyC is
also generally constant, while that between estimates from MonthlyC and DailyC
as well as between MonthlyC and MonthlyA increases with education.
These results, therefore, raise a concern that the choice of the conversion of
earnings matters in estimating returns to schooling in developing countries. The
estimates will depend on whether the reported earnings are aggregated to daily,
monthly or annualised earnings.
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Table 3.3: Effects of Aggregating Earnings on Estimates of Returns to Schooling -
Malawi
OLS GC HGC
DailyC MonthlyC MonthlyA DailyC MonthlyC MonthlyA DailyC MonthlyC MonthlyA
sch -0.077*** -0.073*** -0.066*** -0.109*** -0.106*** -0.093*** -0.110*** -0.107*** -0.094***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
sch2 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009***
(0.001) 0.000 0.000 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
age 0.063*** 0.059*** 0.055*** 0.064*** 0.060*** 0.056*** 0.054*** 0.049*** 0.048***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
age2/100 -0.063*** -0.056*** -0.051*** -0.064*** -0.057*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.044*** -0.043***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
female -0.134*** -0.136*** -0.105*** -0.134*** -0.136*** -0.106*** -0.059* -0.052 -0.044
(0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.035) (0.033) (0.032)
rural -0.136*** -0.209*** -0.207*** -0.135*** -0.209*** -0.209*** -0.060* -0.124*** -0.146***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031)
year 1.334*** 1.239*** 1.236*** 1.334*** 1.239*** 1.235*** 1.351*** 1.258*** 1.250***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019)
weeks 1.124*** 1.149*** 1.144***
(0.018) (0.029) (0.027)
Copula(sch) 0.146*** 0.149*** 0.123*** 0.151*** 0.155*** 0.127***
(0.047) (0.045) (0.045) (0.048) (0.046) (0.045)
Copula(sch2) 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.128*** 0.157*** 0.157*** 0.131***
(0.049) (0.047) (0.046) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050)
Copula(weeks) 1.149*** -0.005
(0.029) (0.004)
IMR -0.164*** -0.184*** -0.136***
(0.054) (0.051) (0.050)
Constant -0.438*** 2.601*** -1.743*** 0.105 3.150*** -1.362*** 0.545*** 3.645*** -0.981***
(0.118) (0.112) (0.121) (0.169) (0.158) (0.169) (0.204) (0.191) (0.212)
AME(sch) 0.138*** 0.147*** 0.153*** 0.060*** 0.069*** 0.088*** 0.041** 0.048*** 0.072***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Obs. 5,816 5,816 5,816 5,816 5,816 5816 5,816 5,816 5,816
R2 0.59 0.62 0.73 0.59 0.62 0.74
Notes: Copula() are Gaussian Copula functions. The copula functions for schooling are positive
and significant implying positive and significant correlation between schooling variables and the
errors in the regression models. IMR is the inverse mills ratio. AME(sch) is the average marginal
effects of schooling. Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.
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Table 3.4: Effects of Aggregating Earnings on Estimates of Returns to Schooling
- Tanzania
OLS GC HGC
DailyC MonthlyC MonthlyA DailyC MonthlyC MonthlyA DailyC MonthlyC MonthlyA
sch -0.029*** 0.004 -0.017*** -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.033*** -0.028*** -0.010 -0.022**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010)
sch2 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 (0.001) 0.000
age 0.075*** 0.065*** 0.067*** 0.075*** 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.027*** 0.046***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
age2/100 -0.079*** -0.067*** -0.070*** -0.079*** -0.067*** -0.070*** -0.065*** -0.017** -0.043***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
female -0.445*** -0.641*** -0.554*** -0.445*** -0.642*** -0.549*** -0.349*** -0.303*** -0.370***
(0.017) (0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.022) (0.019) (0.028) (0.039) (0.031)
rural -0.171*** -0.664*** -0.339*** -0.171*** -0.662*** -0.330*** -0.136*** -0.538*** -0.270***
(0.018) (0.022) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.025) (0.022)
panel -0.103*** -0.001 -0.085*** -0.104*** -0.002 -0.087*** -0.095*** 0.030 -0.068***
(0.017) (0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.022) (0.019)
weeks 1.123*** 1.078*** 1.069***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Copula(sch) -0.011 0.076** 0.039 -0.010 0.080** 0.041
(0.027) (0.033) (0.028) (0.027) (0.032) (0.028)
Copula(sch2) 0.032 0.084*** 0.038 0.029 0.076** 0.035
(0.026) (0.033) (0.028) (0.026) (0.033) (0.029)
Copula(weeks) 0.029*** 0.030***
(0.005) (0.005)
IMR -0.237*** -0.837*** -0.446***
(0.052) (0.075) (0.059)
Constant -0.181** 2.584*** -1.340*** -0.147 2.841*** -1.105*** 0.233* 4.182*** -0.368**
(0.073) (0.090) (0.079) (0.091) (0.112) (0.100) (0.124) (0.168) (0.144)
AME(sch) 0.089*** 0.142*** 0.104*** 0.084*** 0.102*** 0.083*** 0.079*** 0.086*** 0.075***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
Obs. 11,215 11,215 11,215 11,215 11,215 11,215 11,215 11,215 11,215
pp R2 0.27 0.37 0.78 0.27 0.37 0.78
Notes: Copula() are Gaussian Copula functions. Significance of copula functions for a variable
implies a significant correlation between variable and the errors in the regression models. IMR
is the inverse mills ratio. AME(sch) is the average marginal effects of schooling. Standard errors
in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.5: Effects of Aggregating Earnings on Estimates of Returns to Schooling
- Uganda
OLS GC HGC
DailyC MonthlyC MonthlyA DailyC MonthlyC MonthlyA DailyC MonthlyC MonthlyA
sch 0.061*** 0.074*** 0.069*** 0.020 0.040* 0.030 0.019 0.041** 0.029
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
sch2 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
age 0.080*** 0.077*** 0.068*** 0.081*** 0.077*** 0.068*** 0.082*** 0.076*** 0.070***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
age2/100 -0.090*** -0.088*** -0.077*** -0.090*** -0.088*** -0.077*** -0.092*** -0.086*** -0.079***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
female -0.443*** -0.451*** -0.438*** -0.439*** -0.448*** -0.435*** -0.458*** -0.422*** -0.459***
(0.028) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.054) (0.058) (0.055)
rural -0.224*** -0.293*** -0.239*** -0.221*** -0.290*** -0.239*** -0.237*** -0.267*** -0.259***
(0.027) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) (0.050) (0.053) (0.051)
panel 0.145*** 0.212*** 0.153*** 0.146*** 0.213*** 0.155*** 0.144*** 0.215*** 0.153***
(0.028) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
weeks 1.153*** 1.172*** 1.172***
(0.022) (0.038) (0.036)
Copula(sch) 0.151** 0.129* 0.144* 0.150** 0.129* 0.144*
(0.073) (0.076) (0.074) (0.072) (0.076) (0.074)
Copula(sch2) 0.045 0.034 0.042 0.043 0.036 0.040
(0.073) (0.079) (0.077) (0.071) (0.076) (0.074)
Copula(weeks) -0.005 -0.005
(0.006) (0.006)
IMR 0.045 -0.061 0.055
(0.113) (0.119) (0.114)
constant -1.025*** 1.918*** -2.218*** -0.677*** 2.208*** -1.933*** -0.745*** 2.300*** -2.018***
(0.128) (0.135) (0.143) (0.180) (0.196) (0.214) (0.255) (0.259) (0.270)
AME(sch) 0.113*** 0.126*** 0.122*** 0.069*** 0.090*** 0.081*** 0.072*** 0.087*** 0.084***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Obs. 4,631 4,631 4,631 4,631 4,631 4,631 4,631 4,631 4,631
R2 0.36 0.38 0.60 0.36 0.38 0.60
Notes: Copula() are Gaussian Copula functions. Significance of copula functions for a variable
implies a significant correlation between variable and the errors in the regression models. IMR
is the inverse mills ratio. AME(sch) is the average marginal effects of schooling. Standard errors
in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Figure 3.1: Effects of Aggregating Earnings on Estimates of Returns to Schooling
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Tables 3.6-3.8 present results when using the level of education attained instead
of completed years of schooling. GC and HGC are not suitable here, but we
present the results corrected for endogenous selection to the pay periods. The
results are consistent with those from using years of schooling. Importantly, the
different measures of earnings yield different estimates of the returns to the levels
of education as observed when using years of schooling. MonthlyA gives larger
estimates for Malawi and Uganda, while MonthlyC gives larger estimates for
Tanzania. Higher levels of education are associated with higher returns, implying
a convex relationship between earnings and education. Whether coefficients
accounting for selection bias are higher or lower than OLS varies by pay period,
level and country.
Table 3.9 shows how the coefficients of education from Tables 3.3-3.8 compare
to other studies in the three countries. Despite the methodological differences,
choice of measure of earnings and sample coverage, the results from this study are
consistent with the previous studies in these countries, in the sense that returns
increase with years of schooling and generally with levels of education (convex
returns). The previous studies for Malawi reported in Table 3.9 found that having
primary education increases earnings by 12% - 78%, secondary education increases
earnings by 35% - 110%, and tertiary increases earnings by 150% - 192%. For
Tanzania, previous studies estimated returns for primary education at 2.5% - 65%,
secondary education at 41% - 169% and tertiary at 109% - 203%. For Uganda,
returns for primary are estimated at 23% - 58%, for secondary at 74% - 119%,
and tertiary at 119% - 210%. Although the coefficient estimates vary significantly
across studies within each country, our results for all three countries fall well within
the respective country’s range.
In the next subsection, we estimate returns by pay period to show that the
pooling employed by others doesn’t capture returns for daily and weekly; and that
pay period may help to capture labour market segmentation that cannot otherwise
be identified in the data. The latter is a strength as data in developing countries
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are usually missing (or questions not asked) to identify segmented labour markets
or even formal versus informal employment. We argue that we are providing a
way to capture returns to different categories of workers (that may not correspond
to occupations even if included in data).
Table 3.6: Effects of Aggregating Earnings (Levels of Education) - Malawi
OLS Heckman
DailyC MonthlyC MonthlyA DailyC MonthlyC MonthlyA
primary 0.236*** 0.274*** 0.321*** 0.180*** 0.218*** 0.283***
(0.026) (0.024) (0.024) (0.032) (0.030) (0.029)
secondary 0.693*** 0.794*** 0.851*** 0.563*** 0.663*** 0.764***
(0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.051) (0.048) (0.047)
higher 1.443*** 1.549*** 1.601*** 1.256*** 1.359*** 1.474***
(0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.070) (0.066) (0.065)
age 0.068*** 0.063*** 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.053*** 0.052***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
age2/100 -0.069*** -0.062*** -0.057*** -0.058*** -0.050*** -0.049***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
female -0.133*** -0.134*** -0.104*** -0.054 -0.055* -0.051
(0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.035) (0.033) (0.032)
rural -0.158*** -0.229*** -0.227*** -0.081** -0.150*** -0.174***
(0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.033) (0.031) (0.031)
year 1.297*** 1.201*** 1.198*** 1.316*** 1.220*** 1.210***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019)
weeks 1.118*** 1.115***
(0.018) (0.018)
IMR -0.168*** -0.170*** -0.115**
(0.056) (0.053) (0.052)
Constant -0.445*** 2.625*** -1.672*** -0.042 3.033*** -1.389***
(0.113) (0.106) (0.116) (0.176) (0.165) (0.173)
Obs. 5,816 5,816 5,816 5,816 5,816 5,816
R2 0.59 0.62 0.73 0.59 0.62 0.74
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, * p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3.7: Effects of Aggregating Earnings (Levels of Education) - Tanzania
OLS Heckman
DailyC MonthlyC MonthlyA Daily MonthlyC MonthlyA
primary 0.202*** 0.402*** 0.263*** 0.200*** 0.394*** 0.261***
(0.020) (0.025) (0.021) (0.020) (0.024) (0.021)
secondary 0.797*** 1.365*** 0.962*** 0.755*** 1.217*** 0.892***
(0.027) (0.033) (0.029) (0.028) (0.035) (0.031)
higher 1.613*** 2.239*** 1.762*** 1.489*** 1.798*** 1.541***
(0.048) (0.059) (0.051) (0.055) (0.068) (0.059)
age 0.074*** 0.063*** 0.065*** 0.063*** 0.026*** 0.046***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
age2/100 -0.077*** -0.063*** -0.067*** -0.063*** -0.014* -0.042***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
female -0.460*** -0.675*** -0.572*** -0.365*** -0.341*** -0.401***
(0.017) (0.021) (0.018) (0.027) (0.034) (0.029)
rural -0.179*** -0.677*** -0.341*** -0.145*** -0.558*** -0.285***
(0.018) (0.022) (0.020) (0.019) (0.024) (0.021)
panel -0.106*** -0.005 -0.090*** -0.097*** 0.027 -0.072***
(0.017) (0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018)
weeks 1.132*** 1.124***
(0.008) (0.008)
IMR -0.233*** -0.824*** -0.427***
(0.052) (0.065) (0.056)
Constant -0.117* 2.770*** -1.260*** 0.260** 4.104*** -0.551***
(0.071) (0.089) (0.078) (0.111) (0.137) (0.122)
Obs. 11,215 11,215 11,215 11,215 11,215 11,215
R2 0.26 0.36 0.78 0.26 0.37 0.78
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, * p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
75
Table 3.8: Effects of Aggregating Earnings (Levels of Education) - Uganda
OLS Heckman
DailyC MonthlyC MonthlyA DailyC MonthlyC MonthlyA
primary 0.515*** 0.570*** 0.557*** 0.515*** 0.551*** 0.559***
(0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.036) (0.038) (0.037)
secondary 0.634*** 0.764*** 0.719*** 0.635*** 0.746*** 0.721***
(0.044) (0.046) (0.044) (0.046) (0.049) (0.047)
higher 1.271*** 1.415*** 1.367*** 1.273*** 1.339*** 1.376***
(0.039) (0.041) (0.040) (0.076) (0.081) (0.078)
age 0.084*** 0.082*** 0.072*** 0.084*** 0.079*** 0.072***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
age2/100 -0.097*** -0.096*** -0.084*** -0.098*** -0.091*** -0.085***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
female -0.461*** -0.470*** -0.456*** -0.463*** -0.421*** -0.461***
(0.029) (0.031) (0.030) (0.051) (0.054) (0.052)
rural -0.281*** -0.354*** -0.298*** -0.282*** -0.309*** -0.303***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.047) (0.050) (0.048)
panel 0.158*** 0.229*** 0.167*** 0.158*** 0.233*** 0.167***
(0.029) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030)
weeks 1.158*** 1.158***
(0.023) (0.023)
IMR 0.003 -0.114 0.012
(0.097) (0.103) (0.099)
Constant -0.742*** 2.246*** -1.920*** -0.747*** 2.405*** -1.938***
(0.124) (0.132) (0.141) (0.185) (0.195) (0.201)
Obs. 4,631 4,631 4,631 4,631 4,631 4,631
R2 0.34 0.36 0.58 0.34 0.36 0.58
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, * p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3.9: Selected studies on Returns to Education in East Africa
Country & Study Measure of Earnings Estimator Years of Education Primary Secondary Higher
Malawi
This study DailyC HGC/Heckman 0.041 0.18 0.563 1.256
MonthlyC HGC/Heckman 0.048 0.218 0.663 1.359
MonthlyA HGC/Heckman 0.072 0.283 0.764 1.474
Kim (2020) Hourly earnings Heckman NA 0.183 0.348 1.894
Monthly earnings Heckman NA 0.121 0.475 1.923
Peet et al. (2015) Annual earnings OLS 0.12 0.784 1.152 1.536
Tanzania
This study DailyC HGC/Heckman 0.079 0.2 0.755 1.489
MonthlyC HGC/Heckman 0.086 0.394 1.217 1.798
MonthlyA HGC/Heckman 0.075 0.261 0.892 1.541
Nikolov and Jimi (2018) Monthly earnings OLS 0.12 0.44 1.685 NA
Serneels et al. (2017) Daily earnings OLS 0.08 NA NA NA
Baffour (2013) Monthly earnings OLS NA 0.651 1.292 1.986
Bridges et al. (2017) Monthly earnings FE NA 0.025 0.412 NA
Peet et al. (2015) Annual earnings OLS 0.11 0.053 0.578 1.087
Kahyarara and Teal (2008) Monthly earnings control function NA 0.159 0.845 2.032
Uganda
This study DailyC HGC/Heckman 0.072 0.515 0.635 1.273
MonthlyC HGC/Heckman 0.087 0.551 0.746 1.339
MonthlyA HGC/Heckman 0.084 0.559 0.721 1.376
Kavuma et al. (2015) Monthly earnings OLS 0.161 0.34 1.042 2.101
Peet et al. (2015) Annual earnings OLS 0.12 0.576 1.186 1.544
Cuaresma and Raggl (2016) Hourly earnings Heckman 0.069 0.231 0.736 1.188
3.5.2 Effects of Pay Period on Estimates of Returns to
Schooling
The results presented in sections 3.5.1 show that if we convert the reported earnings
to one common unit, MonthlyC leads to larger estimates of returns to education
in Tanzania (compared to DailyC or MonthlyA) while for Malawi and Uganda
converting to MonthlyA leads to larger estimates. In this section, we present the
results for the samples for each of the pay periods to see whether the returns to
education vary depending on the period in which workers are paid. Owing to its
ability to allow for seasonal workers who only work some months in a year and
some weeks in a month, we choose MonthlyA as our preferred common earnings
measure and use it in examining returns by pay period. We focus our discussion
of the results on the endogenous corrected (both for ability and selection) results,
though we include OLS results for comparison. The corresponding GC results
and results for the first stage HGC regressions are available in the Appendixes
3B and 3C while the corresponding bootstrap aggregating results are reported in
Appendix 3D.
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Table 3.10 shows results by pay period for Malawi. The last three columns
of Table 3.10 shows that even after correcting for ability bias and selection, the
coefficient of schooling is negative and significant across the pay periods which
means there is a threshold below which the returns to education are negative.
This threshold varies by pay period: four years for workers reporting earnings
daily and monthly, and seven years for those reporting earnings weekly.
Comparing the returns to schooling from the different pay periods, workers
reporting earnings daily are associated with higher returns to education than their
weekly and monthly counterparts. More specifically, the average marginal effects
indicate that an extra year of schooling raises earnings by 11.7% if they report
earnings daily, 5.7% if report weekly, and 8.4% if report earnings monthly.
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Table 3.10: Effects of Pay Period on Estimates of Returns to Schooling - Malawi
OLS HGC
Period Daily Weekly Monthly Daily Weekly Monthly
sch -0.002 -0.095*** -0.066*** -0.018 -0.133** -0.091***
(0.076) (0.030) (0.008) (0.088) (0.052) (0.010)
sch2 0.006 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.007 0.012*** 0.009***
(0.005) (0.002) 0.000 (0.007) (0.002) (0.001)
age 0.041 0.076*** 0.053*** 0.060 0.079*** 0.045***
(0.059) (0.021) (0.006) (0.080) (0.028) (0.006)
age2/100 -0.035 -0.081*** -0.048*** -0.061 -0.083** -0.039***
(0.074) (0.027) (0.007) (0.100) (0.034) (0.008)
female 0.014 -0.098 -0.116*** -0.107 -0.129 -0.041
(0.210) (0.078) (0.022) (0.289) (0.105) (0.033)
rural -0.286 -0.322*** -0.185*** -0.297 -0.308*** -0.106***
(0.204) (0.079) (0.019) (0.227) (0.091) (0.033)
year 0.850*** 1.020*** 1.278*** 0.971*** 1.002*** 1.301***
(0.212) (0.073) (0.018) (0.358) (0.083) (0.020)
weeks 1.259*** 1.037*** 1.138*** 1.371*** 1.226*** 1.142***
(0.166) (0.052) (0.019) (0.221) (0.081) (0.029)
Copula(sch) -0.497 -0.046 0.095**
(0.463) (0.235) (0.048)
Copula(sch2) 0.534 0.277 0.134***
(0.510) (0.202) (0.045)
Copula(weeks) -0.025 -0.064*** -0.001
(0.045) (0.017) (0.005)
IMR 0.327 0.020 -0.163***
(0.843) (0.271) (0.052)
Constant -2.01 -1.224*** -1.834*** -3.664 -1.467 -1.003***
(1.256) (0.419) (0.121) (3.887) (1.144) (0.223)
AME(sch) 0.101*** 0.113*** 0.161*** 0.117 0.057 0.084***
(0.026) (0.009) (0.003) (0.124) (0.057) (0.015)
Obs. 182 505 5,129 182 505 5,129
R2 0.44 0.66 0.77
Notes: Copula() are Gaussian Copula functions. Significance of copula functions for a variable
implies a significant correlation between variable and the errors in the regression models. IMR
is the inverse mills ratio. AME(sch) is the average marginal effects of schooling. Standard errors
in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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After disaggregating the sample to pay periods, the coefficients of the copula
functions and the inverse mills ratio in Table 3.10 are insignificant for daily
and weekly suggesting that the correlation between earnings and the error terms
observed earlier are associated with only the monthly sample.
The implied returns from Table 3.10 for the selected years of schooling are
shown graphically in the top panel of Figure 3.2. The naïve estimates (pooled)
from the last column of Table 3.3 are also included for comparison. Except for
monthly, the pattern and slope of the curves for each pay period are different
from that of the pooled curve implying that each period has different returns to
education and ignoring this would lead to biased estimates. For monthly, it can be
explained by the fact that it constitutes about 88% of the sample and thus pooling
the periods together would very likely bias the returns in the direction of monthly.
Table 3.11 shows the results for Tanzania. Like Malawi, the coefficient of
schooling for Tanzania is negative throughout which suggests that there is also
a threshold below which the returns to education are negative (although this is
only a few years of education); and the correlation correlation between schooling
and the error terms is significant only for the monthly sample. When ability and
selection biases are accounted for, there are mixed results: the estimates of returns
for the monthly decrease while for daily and weekly increase (see the AME(sch)
in Table 3.11. This suggests that the way endogeneity affects OLS results is
not homogenous across the pay periods. For instance, unlike OLS, HGC results
show that returns for monthly are lower than for daily earners and the difference
increases with education (consistent with a particular level of education needed
to secure a job paid monthly but does not then affect earnings). This indicates
that selection was biasing the returns to schooling downwards for the daily, while
for monthly selection was biasing the returns upwards. As it is essential to take
into account the sch2 term, plotting returns over the range of years of education
reveals the pattern. The middle panel of Figure 3.2 plots the implied returns from
Table 3.11 (marginal effects of schooling on earnings, pooled estimates derived
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from Table 3.7). Returns for the weekly earners are not only higher but also
increase at a higher rate than the other periods (reflecting the higher coefficient
on sch2 ).
Table 3.12 shows the effects of the pay period on the estimates of returns to
schooling in Uganda. While the coefficients on sch are positive across the pay
periods, the coefficient of on sch2 for those reporting daily earnings is negative,
implying concave returns to education, that is, the returns to an extra year of
education decreases as one acquires more schooling. The concavity persists even
after accounting for ability bias and selection. The bottom panel of Figure 3.2
plots the implied returns from Table 3.12. The patterns of the curves for each pay
period are very different from that of the pooled curve, implying that each pay
period has different returns to education.
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Table 3.11: Effects of Pay Period on Estimates of Returns to Schooling - Tanzania
OLS HGC
Period Daily Weekly Monthly Daily Weekly Monthly
sch -0.023 -0.026 0.033*** -0.045** -0.033 -0.015
(0.015) (0.017) (0.009) (0.018) (0.020) (0.016)
sch2 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
age 0.054*** 0.046*** 0.098*** 0.027*** 0.040*** 0.085***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.014) (0.006)
age2/100 -0.066*** -0.053*** -0.093*** -0.027* -0.044** -0.077***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.015) (0.019) (0.008)
female -0.751*** -0.555*** -0.331*** -0.494*** -0.502*** -0.207***
(0.036) (0.040) (0.024) (0.063) (0.089) (0.031)
rural -0.537*** -0.228*** -0.258*** -0.547*** -0.211*** -0.088**
(0.041) (0.049) (0.023) (0.043) (0.062) (0.034)
panel -0.219*** -0.127*** -0.067*** -0.172*** -0.127** -0.074***
(0.039) (0.048) (0.024) (0.039) (0.051) (0.023)
weeks 1.165*** 1.096*** 1.073*** 1.068*** 0.997*** 1.036***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.021) (0.023) (0.024)
Copula(sch) -0.016 -0.027 0.038**
(0.044) (0.047) (0.042)
Copula(sch2) 0.036 0.026 0.101**
(0.045) (0.046) (0.042)
Copula(weeks) 0.073*** 0.096*** 0.009
(0.013) (0.018) (0.006)
IMR -0.707*** -0.159 -0.517***
(0.153) (0.247) (0.070)
constant -0.722*** -0.785*** -2.345*** 0.894** -0.250 -0.796***
(0.148) (0.165) (0.113) (0.364) (0.648) (0.230)
AME(sch) 0.050*** 0.073*** 0.148*** 0.069*** 0.077** 0.063**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.020) (0.021) (0.015)
Obs. 3,738 1,929 4,830 3,738 1,929 4,830
R2 0.73 0.79 0.71
Notes: Copula() are Gaussian Copula functions. Significance of copula functions for a variable
implies a significant correlation between variable and the errors in the regression models. IMR
is the inverse mills ratio. AME(sch) is the average marginal effects of schooling. Standard errors
in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.12: Effects of Pay Period on Estimates of Returns to Schooling - Uganda
OLS HGC
Period Daily Weekly Monthly Daily Weekly Monthly
sch 0.120*** 0.058* 0.064*** 0.105* 0.091 0.040*
(0.023) (0.033) (0.015) (0.061) (0.079) (0.022)
sch2 -0.002 0.003 0.004*** -0.002 0.003 0.004***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
age 0.063*** 0.077*** 0.080*** 0.065*** 0.075*** 0.082***
(0.013) (0.019) (0.010) (0.014) (0.020) (0.012)
age2/100 -0.082*** -0.090*** -0.084*** -0.088*** -0.084*** -0.086***
(0.018) (0.025) (0.013) (0.020) (0.027) (0.015)
female -0.596*** -0.535*** -0.312*** -0.693*** -0.415** -0.328***
(0.066) (0.087) (0.035) (0.138) (0.181) (0.053)
rural -0.248*** -0.358*** -0.232*** -0.303*** -0.317*** -0.251***
(0.055) (0.087) (0.034) (0.101) (0.101) (0.059)
panel 0.015 -0.063 0.176*** 0.013 -0.067 0.171***
(0.056) (0.102) (0.037) (0.054) (0.080) (0.042)
weeks 1.237*** 1.093*** 1.133*** 1.166*** 1.153*** 1.164***
(0.039) (0.054) (0.031) (0.067) (0.090) (0.051)
Copula(sch) 0.136 -0.072 0.052
(0.162) (0.257) (0.066)
Copula(sch2) -0.082 -0.079 0.107
(0.164) (0.209) (0.081)
Copula(weeks) 0.024* -0.020 -0.007
(0.013) (0.020) (0.008)
IMR 0.173 -0.348 0.069
(0.203) (0.416) (0.181)
constant -2.106*** -1.790*** -2.655*** -2.084*** -1.448 -2.592***
(0.260) (0.396) (0.191) (0.569) (1.110) (0.482)
AME(sch) 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.145*** 0.076 0.137* 0.116***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.004) (0.011) (0.074) (0.026)
Obs. 1,262 589 2,765 1,262 589 2,765
R2 0.57 0.57 0.63
Notes: Copula() are Gaussian Copula functions. Significance of copula functions for a variable
implies a significant correlation between variable and the errors in the regression models. IMR
is the inverse mills ratio. AME(sch) is the average marginal effects of schooling. Standard errors
in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Figure 3.2: Effects of Pay Period on Estimates of Returns to Schooling
Tables 3.13 – 3.15 show the corresponding results for levels of education. Table
3.13 shows the results for Malawi. Here the pattern of the returns is mixed: the
returns to primary education are highest if reporting earnings monthly; returns
to secondary education are highest if reporting earnings daily; and returns to
higher education are highest if reporting earnings weekly. Like for the years of
schooling, we do not find evidence of significant selection problems for daily and
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weekly, although it might mean that the sample sizes are too small to detect it
(and include professionals with relatively high earnings and education). Recall,
however, that ganyu workers (the majority by far) are excluded so Malawi is not
fully comparable to Tanzania and Uganda.
Table 3.14 presents the results for levels of education for Tanzania. As can be
seen, generally, we find a pattern of results similar to those in Table 3.11. The
returns to the levels of education differ by pay period and weekly have higher
returns than their daily and monthly counterparts. Compared to those for daily
and weekly, the results for monthly are closer to the results for the pooled sample
reported earlier in Table 3.7. This may suggest that the larger monthly sample
biases the pooled results into its direction.
Table 3.15 shows results for the levels of education by pay period for Uganda.
The results for daily are inconsistent with those obtained when using years
of schooling in Table 3.13. While results from Table 3.13 shows a concave
relationship between earnings and education, results from Table 3.15 shows a
convex relationship, i.e. returns to education increase with the levels of education.
A possibility is few observations at more years of education so estimates are
imprecise, exacerbated by the (negative) sch2 effect and perhaps some of those
with more education are ‘waiting’ to get into monthly paid work. Our data do not
provide enough information to investigate this issue further, but future research
could explore if agricultural wage employment plays a role here.
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Table 3.13: Effects of Pay Period on Estimates of Returns to Levels of Education
- Malawi
OLS HGC
Period Daily Weekly Monthly Daily Weekly Monthly
primary 0.26 0.135 0.355*** 0.315 0.139 0.313***
(0.233) (0.083) (0.024) (0.298) (0.089) (0.030)
secondary 0.684*** 0.826*** 0.885*** 0.795* 0.830*** 0.788***
(0.249) (0.107) (0.025) (0.452) (0.115) (0.049)
higher 1.067*** 1.643*** 1.648*** 1.224** 1.651*** 1.510***
(0.299) (0.139) (0.029) (0.612) (0.158) (0.067)
age 0.036 0.082*** 0.057*** 0.049 0.084*** 0.050***
(0.059) (0.020) (0.006) (0.073) (0.024) (0.006)
age2/100 -0.032 -0.093*** -0.053*** -0.047 -0.094*** -0.045***
(0.074) (0.026) (0.007) (0.090) (0.031) (0.008)
female 0.006 -0.104 -0.114*** -0.057 -0.112 -0.056*
(0.210) (0.077) (0.021) (0.301) (0.109) (0.033)
rural -0.307 -0.375*** -0.205*** -0.307 -0.380*** -0.145***
(0.204) (0.078) (0.019) (0.204) (0.090) (0.032)
year 0.866*** 1.014*** 1.233*** 0.938*** 1.017*** 1.253***
(0.212) (0.072) (0.018) (0.325) (0.078) (0.020)
weeks 1.265*** 1.020*** 1.136*** 1.263*** 1.020*** 1.132***
(0.167) (0.051) (0.019) (0.167) (0.052) (0.019)
IMR 0.244 0.029 -0.125**
(0.831) (0.268) (0.054)
Constant -1.708 -1.176*** -1.765*** -2.71 -1.273 -1.456***
(1.215) (0.402) (0.117) (3.616) (0.970) (0.178)
Obs. 182 505 5,129 182 505 5,129
R2 0.44 0.68 0.77 0.45 0.64 0.76
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, * p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3.14: Effects of Pay Period on Estimates of Returns to Levels of Education
- Tanzania
OLS Heckman
Daily Weekly Monthly Daily Weekly Monthly
primary 0.143*** 0.295*** 0.354*** 0.225*** 0.311*** 0.226***
(0.036) (0.040) (0.036) (0.040) (0.047) (0.040)
secondary 0.425*** 0.809*** 1.159*** 0.753*** 0.864*** 0.819***
(0.077) (0.085) (0.039) (0.102) (0.122) (0.064)
higher 1.892*** 1.337***
(0.052) (0.098)
age 0.053*** 0.043*** 0.095*** 0.027*** 0.037*** 0.085***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.012) (0.006)
age2/100 -0.065*** -0.049*** -0.087*** -0.028** -0.041** -0.076***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.013) (0.017) (0.008)
female -0.765*** -0.569*** -0.352*** -0.534*** -0.525*** -0.240***
(0.036) (0.039) (0.024) (0.059) (0.079) (0.029)
rural -0.541*** -0.233*** -0.265*** -0.570*** -0.251*** -0.118***
(0.041) (0.049) (0.023) (0.042) (0.057) (0.032)
panel -0.220*** -0.137*** -0.086*** -0.179*** -0.136*** -0.087***
(0.040) (0.049) (0.024) (0.040) (0.049) (0.024)
weeks 1.170*** 1.099*** 1.083*** 1.162*** 1.099*** 1.076***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017)
IMR -0.681*** -0.135 -0.443***
(0.139) (0.214) (0.066)
Constant -0.677*** -0.702*** -2.117*** 0.733** -0.274 -1.208***
(0.146) (0.162) (0.111) (0.322) (0.574) (0.175)
Obs. 3,738 1,929 4,830 3,738 1,929 4,830
R2 0.73 0.79 0.71 0.73 0.79 0.71
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, * p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3.15: Effects of Pay Period on Estimates of Returns to Levels of Education
- Uganda
OLS Heckman
Daily Weekly Monthly Daily Weekly Monthly
primary 0.466*** 0.439*** 0.650*** 0.462*** 0.425*** 0.666***
(0.060) (0.088) (0.047) (0.061) (0.089) (0.063)
secondary 0.628*** 0.476*** 0.866*** 0.609*** 0.491*** 0.888***
(0.092) (0.133) (0.057) (0.103) (0.134) (0.080)
higher 1.009*** 1.230*** 1.481*** 0.964*** 1.251*** 1.539***
(0.161) (0.157) (0.049) (0.198) (0.159) (0.157)
age 0.067*** 0.075*** 0.086*** 0.068*** 0.072*** 0.087***
(0.014) (0.019) (0.010) (0.014) (0.020) (0.011)
age2/100 -0.091*** -0.091*** -0.093*** -0.094*** -0.083*** -0.095***
(0.019) (0.025) (0.013) (0.019) (0.027) (0.014)
female -0.678*** -0.586*** -0.318*** -0.721*** -0.464*** -0.332***
(0.065) (0.087) (0.036) (0.126) (0.158) (0.051)
rural -0.297*** -0.460*** -0.292*** -0.327*** -0.413*** -0.310***
(0.056) (0.088) (0.035) (0.093) (0.102) (0.058)
panel 0.001 -0.042 0.209*** 0.003 -0.046 0.204***
(0.057) (0.103) (0.038) (0.057) (0.103) (0.041)
weeks 1.238*** 1.083*** 1.140*** 1.239*** 1.081*** 1.140***
(0.039) (0.055) (0.032) (0.039) (0.055) (0.032)
IMR 0.075 -0.326 0.055
(0.189) (0.354) (0.143)
Constant -1.678*** -1.326*** -2.414*** -1.796*** -0.600 -2.531***
(0.254) (0.379) (0.191) (0.392) (0.875) (0.358)
Obs. 1,262 589 2,765 1,262 589 2,765
R2 0.55 0.55 0.6 0.55 0.56 0.6
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, * p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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The results for the probit estimates (the first stage results for the selection
model) for the probabilities of participating in each of the periods of payment are
reported in Appendix 3C. Importantly for Tanzania (Table 3C.2), the coefficient
on sch2 for daily and weekly is negative and statistically significant, implying that
an extra year of schooling reduces participation in daily and weekly employment.
For monthly, the coefficient is positive and significant, indicating that an extra
year of schooling increases participation in this employment category. Thus, a
minimum level of education is essential for gaining employment in monthly paid
jobs but, conditional on securing such jobs, the marginal effect of schooling on
wages is lower than for weekly or daily paid work (which has lower education
entry requirements).
Like Tanzania, Table 3C.3 in the Appendix 3C (the first stage regression
for HGC) shows that an extra year of schooling reduces participation in daily
and weekly employment (as indicated by the negative sign of the coefficient on
sch2 ) but increases participation into monthly employment in Uganda. Therefore,
in Uganda, a minimum level of education is essential for gaining employment
in monthly paid jobs, conditional on securing such jobs, the marginal effect of
schooling on wages is lower than for weekly but higher than for daily paid work.
3.5.3 Measuring Returns for Casual Employment: A Case
of Ganyu in Malawi
This section presents the results for returns to education for ganyu labour. In
line with the objectives of the study, we explored how using different measures of
earnings affects the estimates of returns to education for ganyu labour. Table 3.16
shows returns to years of education by the measure of earnings while Figure 3.3
plots the estimates for the selected years of education. Generally, MonthlyC yields
larger estimates of returns to education than DailyC or MonthlyA. Furthermore,
the difference between estimates from DailyC and MonthlyA is small and the
standard errors using these measures of earnings are smaller, suggesting that
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converting to MonthlyC gives larger and less efficient estimates. There does not
seem to be a critical endogeneity of education, as indicated by the insignificance
of the copula function for the education variables, but the results should be
interpreted with cautious given the close to normal distribution of ganyu earnings.
Table 3.17 shows the corresponding results for levels of education. Because
there is a very small proportion of workers with higher education doing ganyu
labour, we will reserve the discussion on returns to higher education. As can
be seen, the results in Table 3.17 are consistent with those in Table 3.16 in
the sense that the three earnings measures yield different returns to education;
and MonthlyC results in higher estimates. In addition, the signs, pattern and
significance of the inverse mills ratios are similar to those in Table 3.17, suggesting
that the estimates are precise thanks to the large sample.
Figure 3.3: Earnings Measures and Returns to Years of Education for Ganyu
Labour
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Table 3.16: Earnings Measures and Returns to years of Schooling for Ganyu
Labour
OLS HGC
DailyC MonthlyC MonthlyA DailyC MonthlyC MonthlyA
sch 0.004 -0.018*** 0.000 0.006 -0.014 -0.005
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010)
sch2 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
age 0.034*** 0.047*** 0.040*** 0.032*** 0.039*** 0.036***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
age2/100 -0.040*** -0.057*** -0.048*** -0.037*** -0.043*** -0.040***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
female -0.240*** -0.444*** -0.341*** -0.223*** -0.367*** -0.299***
(0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.014)
rural -0.284*** -0.420*** -0.331*** -0.330*** -0.624*** -0.440***
(0.018) (0.025) (0.021) (0.029) (0.039) (0.034)
year 1.326*** 1.223*** 1.218*** 1.298*** 1.097*** 1.150***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.022) (0.018)
weeks 1.006*** 0.981***
(0.006) (0.011)
Copula(sch) -0.011 0.008 0.012
(0.020) (0.026) (0.023)




IMR -0.096** -0.430*** -0.237***
(0.042) (0.059) (0.050)
Constant 0.192*** 2.642*** -0.912*** 0.317*** 3.237*** -0.495***
(0.047) (0.065) (0.056) (0.091) (0.130) (0.111)
AME(sch) 0.02 0.009*** 0.018*** 0.028*** 0.035*** 0.025***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009)
Obs. 16,528 16,528 16,528 16,528 16,528 16,528
R2 0.60 0.38 0.77
Notes: Copula() are Gaussian Copula functions. Significance of copula functions for a variable
implies a significant correlation between variable and the errors in the regression models. IMR
is the inverse mills ratio. AME(sch) is the average marginal effects of schooling. Standard errors
in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.17: Earnings Measures and Returns to Levels of Education for Ganyu
Labour
OLS Heckman
DailyC MonthlyC MonthlyA DailyC MonthlyC MonthlyA
primary 0.122*** 0.095*** 0.122*** 0.149*** 0.207*** 0.187***
(0.014) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) (0.023) (0.020)
secondary 0.148*** 0.109** 0.133*** 0.219*** 0.402*** 0.303***
(0.031) (0.043) (0.036) (0.041) (0.057) (0.048)
higher 1.150*** 1.282*** 1.292*** 1.282*** 1.834*** 1.611***
(0.107) (0.148) (0.124) (0.118) (0.163) (0.138)
age 0.034*** 0.047*** 0.040*** 0.032*** 0.039*** 0.036***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
age2 -0.041*** -0.057*** -0.049*** -0.037*** -0.044*** -0.041***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
female -0.256*** -0.447*** -0.355*** -0.238*** -0.373*** -0.313***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014)
rural -0.289*** -0.415*** -0.333*** -0.341*** -0.629*** -0.458***
(0.018) (0.025) (0.021) (0.027) (0.037) (0.031)
year 1.336*** 1.223*** 1.227*** 1.306*** 1.097*** 1.155***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.021) (0.018)
weeks 1.004*** 1.001***
(0.006) (0.006)
IMR -0.106*** -0.443*** -0.257***
(0.041) (0.056) (0.047)
constant 0.277*** 2.629*** -0.846*** 0.448*** 3.339*** -0.429***
(0.045) (0.062) (0.054) (0.079) (0.109) (0.094)
Obs. 16,528 16,528 16,528 16,528 16,528 16,528
R2 0.56 0.39 0.77
Note: IMR is the inverse mills ratio. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this essay, we estimated returns to schooling in Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda
using nationally representative and comparable data from the Living Standard
Measurement Study. Of interest was whether the relationship between earnings
and education varies across workers reporting earnings over different pay periods,
and our results suggest that this is the case. This is the first study on Africa to
examine this issue. After controlling for endogeneity due to unobserved ability
and selection, by using Gaussian Copula to account for endogeneity and Heckman
method to account for selection, we showed that returns to education differ by
pay period and that pooling the periods together leads to imprecise estimates.
Returns to education do vary according to the period of payment and how the
vary differs across the three countries. Specifically, in Malawi the returns for
non-ganyu workers reporting earnings daily are the highest, followed by monthly
and then weekly; in Tanzania, the returns for weekly are not only higher but also
increase at a higher rate than for the other periods; and in Uganda, returns are
highest for weekly followed by monthly and then daily. Our results also show
that pooling/aggregating earnings to different common pay period measures yield
different estimates of returns to education and that estimates are generally leaning
toward the direction of the pay period that constitutes the largest proportion of
the sample. In this regard, our analysis suggests that estimating returns separately
for workers paid over different periods is more reliable than pooling.
The findings regarding the three common measures of earning yielding different
estimates of returns to education are sound. Given the seasonality of casual
work, earnings measures that allow for workers who do not work all weeks in
the month and for seasonal workers who only work some months in a year are
more reliable than measures that do not. Another explanation for the observed
pattern of results is that while workers who are paid monthly are more likely those
in formal jobs, their daily and weekly counterparts are more likely to be in informal
jobs. In a developing country context, a minimum level of education is essential for
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gaining employment in the formal sector, but conditional on securing such jobs the
marginal effect of schooling on wages may be lower than for the informal sector.
It is worth pointing out that since in Malawi ganyu labour is treated separately,
regular employment is likely to constitute only those from the formal sector who
are the better educated and hence better paid. Many of the workers reporting
earnings hourly, daily and weekly in Tanzania and Uganda may have been in
ganyu labour had they been residing in Malawi, and vice versa. Given this
characteristic of Malawi’s labour market, comparing the results with those for
Tanzania and Uganda need to be done with caution. This clearly deserves a




Appendix 3A: Selected Studies on Returns to Schooling in Developing Countries
Table 3A.1: Selected Studies on Returns to Schooling in Developing Countries
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Yes Non-linear schooling: 
primary vs post 
primary school levels 
Survey of Household 
Welfare and Labor in 
Tanzania (SHWALITA), 




Returns differ by survey 
instrument but not by type 
of respondent. Short 
module questionnaires lead 
to biased estimates 
compared to detailed 
questionnaires. After 
controlling for endogeneity 
and selection using 
Heckman method, returns 
are about 20% and 49% for 
a year of post primary 
school respectively for men 
and women if short 
modules are used. Using 
Heckman-Hotz method, the 
returns are respectively 
21% and 32%. While 
generally schooling is 
insignificant for men when 
detailed modules are used, 
post primary returns are 
50% and 29% for women 













Data and Sample Estimator(s) Main Results 






No Linear schooling LSMS 2004, 2008, 2010. 
Sample 985; 1,807 and 
2,716 respectively 
OLS  The returns are convex. 
Returns are 12.1% 9% 
and 12.2% for the survey 
years respectively with 
the period average of 
11.1%. Returns are 






 No Non-linear schooling: 
dummies for different 
completed levels of 
education 
  
OLS  Returns are 5%, 100% 
and 51% for basic, 







No Non-linear schooling: 
dummies for 







Fourth and fifth rounds of 
the Tanzanian 
Manufacturing Enterprise 









Returns are convex: 
higher levels of 
education(academic) 
have higher returns.  
Returns to vocation and 
technical education 
depend on the level of 
education(academic) 
with which one enters 
vocational/technical 
college. The higher the 


















No Non-linear post 
primary school levels 
Tracer survey 2001. A 
sample of 965 
respondents 
 
The returns are convex. 
The rate of returns for a 
year of Alevel of 
education for the wage 
employees is 8.8% 
while the rates for a 
year of university 
education is 17.1%. No 
significant effect of 
these levels of education 






No Linear schooling Surveys of employees in 
the manufacturing sector 
1993, 1994, 1999 and 









at age 6 and to 




The returns are convex. 
There has been an 
increase in returns from 
early 1990s to 2000. 
The earning profiles for 





returns are 10.6% and is 




























Returns are higher for 
females (5.7% 







are convex ranging 
from 2.2% for primary 
education to 18.9% for 












from 5.5% in 1978 to 
8.2 % in 2003 with an 
average of 6.5% The 
returns are higher for 






No Both linear and non-
linear schooling 
National Income 
Dynamics Study 2008 
(south Africa) 
OLS Returns are 18.7%, 
lowest for Africans 
(16%) and highest for 
Asians/Indians (25%). 
The returns are also 
higher for females. 
When allowing for 
non-linearities in 
schooling, returns are 
100
convex: 7%, 13% and 
29% respectively for 
primary, secondary 






No Non-linear schooling: 
dummies for different 
completed levels of 
education 
 Employment and 
Informal Sector Survey 










Primary education no 
effect on earning, 
returns for lower 
secondary, upper 
secondary and higher 
education are 
respectively 9%, 5% 
and 12% for 
Brazzaville and 9%, 
14% and 13% for 
Pointe-Noire. 




No Linear schooling LSMS data from 25 
developing countries of 
which 9 countries from 
Africa: Cote d’Ivoire, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, 
Niger, Nigeria, SA, 
Tanzania and Uganda 
OLS  Returns differ 
significantly by 
countries and within 
countries by survey 
years. But generally, 
they range from 3.2% 
to 12.5%. The pattern 
of returns across the 
levels of education 
also differs by 
countries and by 
survey years. Returns 
are generally higher 
for women though the 
difference is small 
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No Non-linear schooling: 
dummies for 
completed levels of 
education 
Post 2005 household and 
labour force surveys in 
Burundi, Egypt, Ghana, 
Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Sudan, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, 
and Uganda.  
OLS  The average Mincer 
returns for the 12 
countries are 7%, 26% 
and 26% for basic, 
upper secondary and 
tertiary education 
respectively. Returns 
are higher for women 
except for tertiary 
education where they 
are equal. The pattern 
of returns across the 
levels of education 






No Linear schooling urban sample of the China 
Household Income 







The returns increased 
over the two survey 
periods regardless of 
the instrument used. 
Returns are higher 
using parental 
education as IV 
relative to spouse 
education, but the 


















No Linear and quadratic 
schooling 
Purposive household 
survey in Punjab and the 
North West Frontier 
Province (NWFP) 
Pakistan 2006 -2007 




Males have returns of 
10% using IV method, 
schooling not 
significant for 
females. Using Fixed 
effects, returns are 5% 






No Linear schooling Brazil National 










colour gender and 
earning distribution, 






No Linear schooling The Argentine Permanent 








Decrease in returns 
between 1996 and 
1999 and increase in 
returns 1999 to 2002. 
Returns from OLS 
corrected for selection 
average at 8.5% while 
IV estimates are 






No Linear schooling Surveys of manufacturing 
firms in Ghana and 
Kenya. 
OLS Returns are 8.3% in 


























Returns are 17.5% and 
convex: primary - 
19%, secondary 29% 
and tertiary 33%. 
Generally public 
sector has higher 







No Linear schooling Household panel data for 
Ethiopian seven major 







Returns are 14%. The 
returns differ across 
the earning 
distribution: highest at 
25th (20%) quantile 
and lowest at 90th 
quantile (%). Lower 
returns for public 
sector (12%) relative 






No Non-linear schooling: 
dummies for 




surveys from 6 African 
Countries: Burkina Faso, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, 
Kenya, Nigeria and SA in 
the period 1985 - 1999 
OLS Returns differ 
significantly by 
countries and by levels 
of education. 
Generally, an extra 
year is associated with 
5 to 20% increase in 
earnings. Primary 
school returns range 
between 3 - 10% while 
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tertiary education 
returns range between 













No Both linear and non-
linear schooling 
Vietnam Living Standards 
Survey (VLSS) 1992-
1993 
OLS Using linear schooling 
returns are 8% while 
using education 
dummies returns are 
highest at primary 
school(13%), followed 
by university (11%). 
Returns for secondary 
and vocational 
education are 




Appendix 3B: GC Estimates of Returns to Schooling by Period
Table 3B.1: GC Estimates of Returns to Schooling by Period - Malawi
Period Daily Weekly Monthly Pooled
sch -0.015 -0.140** -0.091*** -0.101***
(0.086) (0.057) (0.011) (0.011)
sch2 0.005 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.009***
(0.007) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
age 0.039 0.078*** 0.054*** 0.055***
(0.058) (0.026) (0.006) (0.006)
age200 -0.034 -0.081** -0.049*** -0.051***
(0.074) (0.032) (0.007) (0.008)
female -0.031 -0.118* -0.119*** -0.106***
(0.188) (0.071) (0.022) (0.021)
rural -0.243 -0.305*** -0.188*** -0.211***
(0.222) (0.081) (0.019) (0.019)
year 0.851*** 0.990*** 1.277*** 1.234***
(0.214) (0.078) (0.017) (0.019)
weeks 1.366*** 1.231*** 1.146*** 0.168***
(0.207) (0.076) (0.029) (0.050)
copula(sch) 0.644 0.189 0.129*** 0.168***
(0.400) (0.261) (0.046) (0.049)
copula(sch2) -0.533 0.074 0.120** 1.151***
(0.511) (0.170) (0.048) (0.029)
copula(weeks) -0.038 -0.063*** -0.001 -0.006
(0.043) (0.018) (0.004) (0.005)
constant -2.052 -1.360* -1.401*** -1.199***
(1.427) (0.707) (0.171) (0.166)
AME(sch) 0.075 0.050 0.096*** 0.066***
(0.113) (0.643) (0.015) (0.014)
Obs. 182 505 5,129 5,816
R2 0.45 0.67 0.77 0.74
Notes: Copula() are Gaussian Copula functions. Significance of copula functions for a variable
implies a significant correlation between variable and the errors in the regression models
AME(sch) is the average marginal effects of schooling. Standard errors in parentheses * p <
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3B.2: GC Estimates of Returns to Schooling by Period - Tanzania
Period Daily Weekly Monthly Pooled
sch -0.022 -0.028 -0.006 -0.033***
(0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.010)
sch2 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) 0.000 0.000
age 0.053*** 0.046*** 0.098*** 0.066***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004)
age2/100 -0.065*** -0.053*** -0.093*** -0.070***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.006)
female -0.738*** -0.553*** -0.329*** -0.549***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.024) (0.019)
rural -0.521*** -0.191*** -0.256*** -0.330***
(0.041) (0.050) (0.023) (0.018)
panel -0.216*** -0.129*** -0.069*** -0.087***
(0.039) (0.049) (0.022) (0.018)
weeks 1.075*** 0.998*** 1.044*** 0.039
(0.023) (0.024) (0.026) (0.028)
copula(sch) -0.018 -0.027 0.058 0.038
(0.046) (0.045) (0.042) (0.028)
copula(sch2) 0.037 0.026 0.112*** 1.078***
(0.045) (0.046) (0.042) (0.011)
copula(weeks) 0.074*** 0.096*** 0.009* 0.029***
(0.013) (0.018) (0.006) (0.005)
constant -0.542*** -0.652*** -1.886*** -1.105***
(0.174) (0.170) (0.184) (0.100)
AME(sch) 0.038* 0.071*** 0.103*** 0.083***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.014) (0.009)
Obs. 3,738 1,929 4,830 11,215
R2 0.73 0.80 0.72 0.78
Notes: Copula() are Gaussian Copula functions. Significance of copula functions
for a variable implies a significant correlation between variable and the errors in the
regression models AME(sch) is the average marginal effects of schooling. Standard
errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3B.3: GC Estimates of Returns to Schooling by Period - Uganda
Period Daily Weekly Monthly Pooled
sch 0.105* 0.091 0.040* 0.030
(0.059) (0.078) (0.022) (0.020)
sch2 -0.002 0.003 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
age 0.063*** 0.079*** 0.080*** 0.068***
(0.014) (0.020) (0.010) (0.007)
age2/100 -0.082*** -0.092*** -0.083*** -0.077***
(0.019) (0.026) (0.013) (0.009)
female -0.592*** -0.544*** -0.313*** -0.435***
(0.063) (0.084) (0.033) (0.028)
rural -0.233*** -0.369*** -0.231*** -0.239***
(0.056) (0.083) (0.036) (0.029)
panel 0.009 -0.062 0.177*** 0.155***
(0.055) (0.082) (0.038) (0.030)
weeks 1.167*** 1.158*** 1.164*** 0.144*
(0.069) (0.090) (0.048) (0.074)
Copula(sch) 0.137 -0.056 0.055 0.042
(0.161) (0.269) (0.065) (0.077)
Copula(sch2) -0.085 -0.076 0.108 1.172***
(0.169) (0.200) (0.081) (0.038)
Copula(weeks) 0.023* -0.020 -0.008 -0.005
(0.014) (0.020) (0.007) (0.006)
constant -1.830*** -2.204*** -2.426*** -1.933***
(0.503) (0.686) (0.258) (0.214)
AME(sch) 0.082 0.131* 0.108*** 0.081***
(0.057) (0.074) (0.021) (0.018)
Obs. 1,262 589 2,765 4,631
R2 0.57 0.57 0.63 0.60
Notes: Copula() are Gaussian Copula functions. Significance of copula functions
for a variable implies a significant correlation between variable and the errors in the
regression models AME(sch) is the average marginal effects of schooling. Standard
errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3B.4: GC Estimates of Returns to Schooling - Ganyu
DailyC MonthlyC MonthlyA
sch 0.008 -0.007 -0.002
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
sch2 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002***
0.000 (0.001) 0.000
age 0.034*** 0.047*** 0.040***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
age2/100 -0.040*** -0.057*** -0.048***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
female -0.240*** -0.444*** -0.341***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.012)
rural -0.284*** -0.420*** -0.326***
(0.020) (0.028) (0.023)




Copula(sch) -0.012 0.004 0.010
(0.020) (0.027) (0.023)




Constant 0.172*** 2.591*** -0.855***
(0.061) (0.082) (0.078)
AME(sch) 0.024*** 0.020* 0.016*
(0.007) (0.010) (0.009)
Obs. 16,528 16,528 16,528
R2 0.56 0.38 0.77
Notes: Copula() are Gaussian Copula functions. Significance of copula functions
for a variable implies a significant correlation between variable and the errors in the
regression models AME(sch) is the average marginal effects of schooling. Standard
errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Appendix 3C: Determinants of Selection to Employment
Table 3C.1: Determinants of Selection to Employment - Malawi
Period Daily Weekly Monthly Pooled Ganyu
sch -0.025 0.031 -0.096*** -0.105*** 0.020*
(0.043) (0.030) (0.016) (0.015) (0.011)
sch2 0.004*** 0.000 0.009*** 0.010*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
age 0.042** 0.041*** 0.070*** 0.072*** 0.016***
(0.017) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
age2/100 -0.050** -0.055*** -0.083*** -0.087*** -0.037***
(0.021) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
female -0.142* -0.169*** -0.394*** -0.388*** -0.149***
(0.073) (0.046) (0.024) (0.023) (0.018)
rural 0.027 -0.191*** -0.677*** -0.659*** 0.627***
(0.075) (0.044) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019)
year 0.347*** 0.101*** -0.216*** -0.152*** 0.444***
(0.059) (0.035) (0.019) (0.018) (0.012)
kids5 0.113 -0.203 -0.552*** -0.527*** 0.423***
(0.209) (0.136) (0.062) (0.061) (0.045)
kids14 -0.024 -0.016 -0.408*** -0.367*** 0.128***
(0.177) (0.100) (0.049) (0.046) (0.037)
married -0.075 -0.069 -0.040* -0.049** -0.190***
(0.074) (0.047) (0.023) (0.022) (0.018)
head 0.343*** 0.393*** 0.573*** 0.613*** 0.323***
(0.076) (0.052) (0.027) (0.025) (0.018)
Copula(sch) 0.183 -0.110 0.137*** 0.138*** -0.045
(0.153) (0.086) (0.048) (0.046) (0.030)
Copula(sch2) -0.105 0.098 0.144*** 0.158*** -0.013
(0.132) (0.093) (0.048) (0.046) (0.030)
Constant -3.964*** -3.171*** -1.942*** -1.922*** -0.982***
(0.421) (0.278) (0.140) (0.136) (0.084)
Obs. 45,494 45,494 45,494 45,494 45,494
Notes: Copula() are Gaussian Copula functions. Significance of copula functions for a variable
implies a significant correlation between variable and the errors in the regression models.
Standard errors in parentheses.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3C.2: Determinants of Selection to Employment - Tanzania
Period Daily Weekly Monthly Pooled
sch 0.036*** 0.045*** -0.024** -0.037***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008)
sch2 -0.009*** -0.007*** 0.007*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
age 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.025*** 0.050***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
age2/100 -0.062*** -0.057*** -0.035*** -0.075***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
female -0.349*** -0.306*** -0.179*** -0.388***
(0.021) (0.027) (0.021) (0.017)
rural 0.046** 0.150*** -0.410*** -0.171***
(0.021) (0.028) (0.018) (0.015)
kids5 -0.191*** -0.035 -0.022 -0.064
(0.020) (0.025) (0.020) (0.049)
kids14 0.182*** 0.203*** -0.419*** -0.173***
(0.066) (0.078) (0.065) (0.043)
panel 0.055 0.079 -0.419*** -0.116***
(0.057) (0.069) (0.053) (0.015)
married -0.130*** -0.103*** -0.173*** -0.168***
(0.022) (0.027) (0.021) (0.017)
head 0.260*** 0.217*** 0.482*** 0.510***
(0.025) (0.032) (0.026) (0.019)
Copula(sch) 0.030 -0.022 0.035 -0.001
(0.026) (0.033) (0.029) (0.020)
Copula(sch2) 0.013 -0.054 0.098*** -0.010
(0.027) (0.033) (0.029) (0.021)
Constant -1.428*** -2.217*** -1.412*** -0.966***
(0.097) (0.121) (0.100) (0.074)
Obs. 38,857 38,857 38,857 38,857
Notes: Copula() are Gaussian Copula functions. Significance of copula functions for a variable
implies a significant correlation between variable and the errors in the regression models.
Standard errors in parentheses.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3C.3: Determinants of Selection to Employment - Uganda
Period Daily Weekly Monthly Pooled
sch 0.037 0.024 0.037 -0.010
(0.037) (0.045) (0.024) (0.023)
sch2 -0.004*** -0.001 0.007*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
age 0.031*** 0.021** 0.067*** 0.058***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005)
age2/100 -0.058*** -0.038*** -0.085*** -0.083***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.008) (0.007)
female -0.667*** -0.390*** -0.306*** -0.554***
(0.032) (0.042) (0.027) (0.022)
rural -0.470*** -0.160*** -0.330*** -0.448***
(0.033) (0.039) (0.026) (0.023)
kids5 0.024 -0.024 -0.276*** -0.492***
(0.043) (0.055) (0.033) (0.138)
kids14 -0.236 -0.478* -0.445** -0.385***
(0.201) (0.279) (0.185) (0.046)
panel -0.413*** -0.208** -0.254*** -0.160***
(0.074) (0.088) (0.052) (0.030)
married -0.299*** -0.192*** -0.208*** -0.297***
(0.033) (0.041) (0.027) (0.023)
head 0.182*** 0.220*** 0.090*** 0.176***
(0.039) (0.048) (0.030) (0.026)
Pstar(sch) -0.118 -0.057 -0.202*** -0.152***
(0.084) (0.101) (0.059) (0.052)
Pstar(sch2) 0.001 0.018 0.020 0.049
(0.102) (0.102) (0.067) (0.062)
Constant -1.280*** -1.945*** -2.457*** -1.280***
(0.224) (0.297) (0.173) (0.153)
Obs. 29,188 29,188 29,188 29,188
Notes: Copula() are Gaussian Copula functions. Significance of copula functions for a variable
implies a significant correlation between variable and the errors in the regression models.
Standard errors in parentheses.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Appendix 3D: Bootstrap Aggregating (Bagging) Results
Table 3D.1: Bootstrap Aggregation Results (Converted Earnings) -Malawi
GC HGC
DailyC MonthlyC MonthlyA DailyC MonthlyC MonthlyA
sch -0.110*** -0.105*** -0.095*** -0.111*** -0.106*** -0.096***
(0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
sch2 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age 0.064*** 0.060*** 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.048*** 0.047***
(0.000) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
age2/100 -0.064*** -0.057*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.044*** -0.042***
(0.000) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
female -0.135*** -0.136*** -0.106*** -0.055*** -0.049*** -0.040***
(0.001) (0.022) (0.021) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
rural -0.137*** -0.210*** -0.210*** -0.057*** -0.122*** -0.144***
(0.001) (0.020) (0.019) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
year 1.333*** 1.239*** 1.235*** 1.352*** 1.259*** 1.250***
(0.001) (0.019) (0.018) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
weeks 1.149*** 1.144***
(0.026) (0.001)
Copula(sch) 0.158*** 0.149*** 0.137*** 0.164*** 0.156*** 0.142***
(0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.045) (0.043) (0.042)
Copula(sch2) 0.158*** 0.149*** 0.138*** 0.164*** 0.156*** 0.142***
(0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.043) (0.043)
Copula(weeks) -0.006 -0.005***
(0.004) (0.000)
IMR -0.173*** -0.191*** -0.144***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant 0.134 3.141*** -1.320*** 0.607*** 3.663*** -0.914***
(0.082) (0.152) (0.166) (0.096) (0.089) (0.086)
Obs. 5,816 5,816 5,816 5,816 5,816 5,816
R2 0.59 0.62 0.74
Notes: GC and HGC results computed by averaging coefficients from 10,000 and 1,000
replications, respectively. Copula() are Gaussian Copula functions. Significant copula functions
imply significant correlation between the variable and the errors in the regression models. IMR
is the inverse mills ratio. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3D.2: Bootstrap Aggregation Results (Converted Earnings) -Tanzania
GC HGC
DailyC MonthlyC MonthlyA DailyC MonthlyC MonthlyA
sch -0.046*** -0.038*** -0.043*** -0.040*** -0.017** -0.032***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
sch2 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age 0.075*** 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.027*** 0.046***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age2/100 -0.079*** -0.067*** -0.070*** -0.065*** -0.017*** -0.043***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
female -0.445*** -0.642*** -0.549*** -0.349*** -0.303*** -0.370***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
rural -0.170*** -0.662*** -0.330*** -0.135*** -0.539*** -0.271***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
panel -0.104*** -0.002** -0.087*** -0.095*** 0.030*** -0.068***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
weeks 1.078*** 1.069***
(0.000) (0.000)
Copula(sch) 0.039 0.097*** 0.061** 0.039 0.093*** 0.060**
(0.025) (0.032) (0.027) (0.025) (0.032) (0.027)
Copula(sch2) 0.039 0.097*** 0.061** 0.038 0.094*** 0.060**
(0.025) (0.031) (0.027) (0.025) (0.030) (0.027)
Copula(weeks) 0.029*** 0.030***
(0.000) (0.000)
IMR -0.237*** -0.835*** -0.446***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.005)
Constant -0.054 2.902*** -1.029*** 0.327*** 4.238*** -0.292***
(0.048) (0.060) (0.052) (0.048) (0.060) (0.051)
Obs. 11,215 11,215 11,215 11,215 11,215 11,215
R2 0.27 0.37 0.78
Notes: GC and HGC results computed by averaging coefficients from 10,000 and 1,000
replications, respectively. Copula() are Gaussian Copula functions. Significant copula functions
imply significant correlation between the variable and the errors in the regression models. IMR
is the inverse mills ratio. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3D.3: Bootstrap Aggregation Results (Converted Earnings) -Uganda
GC HGC
DailyC MonthlyC MonthlyA DailyC MonthlyC MonthlyA
sch 0.008 0.027** 0.022* 0.008 0.027** 0.021*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
sch2 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age 0.081*** 0.077*** 0.068*** 0.082*** 0.076*** 0.069***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
age2/100 -0.091*** -0.088*** -0.077*** -0.092*** -0.085*** -0.079***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
female -0.439*** -0.448*** -0.436*** -0.454*** -0.416*** -0.454***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
rural -0.220*** -0.289*** -0.239*** -0.234*** -0.262*** -0.255***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
panel 0.147*** 0.214*** 0.156*** 0.145*** 0.216*** 0.154***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
weeks 1.171*** 1.171***
(0.001) (0.001)
Copula(sch) 0.125** 0.112* 0.111* 0.122** 0.113* 0.109*
(0.061) (0.064) (0.062) (0.061) (0.065) (0.062)
Copula(sch2) 0.124** 0.111* 0.111* 0.124** 0.115* 0.110*
(0.062) (0.065) (0.063) (0.061) (0.065) (0.062)
Copula(weeks) -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.000) (0.000)
IMR 0.036* -0.074*** 0.044**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Constant -0.579*** 2.318*** -1.864*** -0.637*** 2.436*** -1.933***
(0.098) (0.104) (0.100) (0.112) (0.120) (0.116)
Obs. 4,631 4,631 4,631 4,631 4,631 4,631
R2 0.36 0.39 0.60
Notes: GC and HGC results computed by averaging coefficients from 10,000 and 1,000
replications, respectively. Copula() are Gaussian Copula functions. Significant copula functions
imply significant correlation between the variable and the errors in the regression models. IMR
is the inverse mills ratio. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3D.4: Bootstrap Aggregation Results (Pay Periods) -Malawi
GC HGC
Period Daily Weekly Monthly Daily Weekly Monthly
sch -0.0002 -0.144*** -0.093*** 0.002 -0.143*** -0.094***
(0.087) (0.047) (0.010) (0.037) (0.034) (0.004)
sch2 0.006 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.006 0.012*** 0.009***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000)
age 0.039 0.079*** 0.054*** 0.036*** 0.079*** 0.044***
(0.059) (0.020) (0.006) (0.013) (0.003) (0.001)
age2 -0.033 -0.082*** -0.049*** -0.029* -0.083*** -0.038***
(0.073) (0.026) (0.007) (0.016) (0.003) (0.001)
female -0.006 -0.118 -0.117*** 0.011 -0.122*** -0.041***
(0.212) (0.078) (0.021) (0.068) (0.014) (0.004)
rural -0.288 -0.304*** -0.187*** -0.288*** -0.306*** -0.106***
(0.202) (0.078) (0.019) (0.020) (0.009) (0.004)
year 0.837*** 0.990*** 1.278*** 0.818*** 0.991*** 1.303***
(0.211) (0.072) (0.018) (0.076) (0.008) (0.002)
weeks 1.386*** 1.228*** 1.148*** 1.385*** 1.228*** 1.141***
(0.241) (0.074) (0.027) (0.021) (0.005) (0.002)
Copula(sch) -0.02 0.143 0.137*** -0.008 0.139 0.141***
(0.402) (0.178) (0.046) (0.402) (0.198) (0.043)
Copula(sch2) -0.013 0.139 0.139*** -0.027 0.140 0.145***
(0.311) (0.198) (0.047) (0.385) (0.188) (0.042)
Copula(weeks) -0.034 -0.063*** -0.002 -0.034*** -0.063*** -0.001***
(0.046) (0.017) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000)
IMR -0.063 0.015 -0.166***
(0.238) (0.046) (0.008)
Constant -2.392 -1.324** -1.359*** -2.134* -1.380*** -0.890***
(1.518) (0.605) (0.168) (1.280) (0.397) (0.084)
Obs. 182 505 5,129 182 505 5,129
R2 0.44 0.66 0.77
Notes: GC and HGC results computed by averaging coefficients from 10,000 and 1,000
replications, respectively. Copula() are Gaussian Copula functions. Significant copula functions
implies significant correlation between the variable and the errors in the regression models. IMR
is the inverse mills ratio. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3D.5: Bootstrap Aggregation Results (Pay Periods) -Tanzania
GC HGC
Period Daily Weekly Monthly Daily Weekly Monthly
sch -0.028*** -0.035*** -0.010 -0.050*** -0.040*** -0.019*
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
sch2 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
age 0.053*** 0.046*** 0.099*** 0.028*** 0.039*** 0.085***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
age2/100 -0.065*** -0.053*** -0.095*** -0.028*** -0.043*** -0.078***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
female -0.736*** -0.552*** -0.336*** -0.498*** -0.491*** -0.211***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.011) (0.003)
rural -0.520*** -0.191*** -0.257*** -0.547*** -0.215*** -0.093***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003)
panel -0.216*** -0.129*** -0.089*** -0.173*** -0.126*** -0.074***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
weeks 1.074*** 0.999*** 1.044*** 1.068*** 0.998*** 1.036***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Copula(sch) 0.032 0.022 0.094** 0.032 0.023 0.082**
(0.043) (0.045) (0.039) (0.043) (0.046) (0.039)
Copula(sch2) 0.031 0.023 0.094** 0.031 0.020 0.080**
(0.043) (0.044) (0.039) (0.044) (0.045) (0.039)
Copula(weeks) 0.074*** 0.096*** 0.009*** 0.073*** 0.096*** 0.009***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
IMR -0.689*** -0.190*** -0.503***
(0.016) (0.035) (0.008)
constant -0.481*** -0.597*** -1.846*** 0.919*** -0.121 -0.782***
(0.075) (0.072) (0.098) (0.078) (0.107) (0.091)
Obs. 3,738 1,929 4,830 3,738 1,929 4,830
R2 0.73 0.79 0.71
Notes: GC and HGC results computed by averaging coefficients from 10,000 and 1,000
replications, respectively. Copula() are Gaussian Copula functions. Significant copula functions
implies significant correlation between the variable and the errors in the regression models. IMR
is the inverse mills ratio. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3D.6: Bootstrap Aggregation Results (Pay Periods) - Uganda
GC HGC
Period Daily Weekly Monthly Daily Weekly Monthly
sch 0.103** 0.106* 0.040*** 0.106** 0.100* 0.040***
(0.051) (0.058) (0.009) (0.051) (0.059) (0.009)
sch2 -0.002*** 0.003*** 0.004*** -0.002*** 0.003*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age 0.063*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.065*** 0.074*** 0.081***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
age2 -0.082*** -0.092*** -0.081*** -0.087*** -0.082*** -0.086***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
female -0.592*** -0.542*** -0.308*** -0.680*** -0.405*** -0.328***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.019) (0.025) (0.010)
rural -0.233*** -0.368*** -0.229*** -0.294*** -0.313*** -0.250***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013)
panel 0.009*** -0.062*** 0.187*** 0.013*** -0.066*** 0.172***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
weeks 1.164*** 1.158*** 1.157*** 1.163*** 1.154*** 1.162***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Copula(sch) 0.032 -0.094 0.08 0.028 -0.087 0.081
(0.148) (0.195) (0.066) (0.145) (0.198) (0.068)
Copula(sch2) 0.029 -0.092 0.08 0.027 -0.093 0.077
(0.150) (0.193) (0.066) (0.147) (0.203) (0.066)
Copula(weeks) 0.024*** -0.020*** -0.007*** 0.024*** -0.020*** -0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
IMR 0.151*** -0.366*** 0.063
(0.031) (0.068) (0.044)
constant -1.804*** -2.297*** -2.406*** -2.040*** -1.457*** -2.573***
(0.311) (0.375) (0.106) (0.319) (0.413) (0.188)
Obs. 1,262 589 2,765 1,262 589 2,765
R2 0.57 0.57 0.63
Notes: GC and HGC results computed by averaging coefficients from 10,000 and 1,000
replications, respectively. Copula() are Gaussian Copula functions. Significant copula functions
implies significant correlation between the variable and the errors in the regression models. IMR
is the inverse mills ratio. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3D.7: Bootstrap Aggregation Results - Ganyu Labour
GC HGC
DailyC MonthlyC MonthlyA DailyC MonthlyC MonthlyA
sch -0.001 -0.018** -0.007 -0.003 -0.024*** -0.010
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
sch2 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age 0.034*** 0.047*** 0.040*** 0.032*** 0.039*** 0.036***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age2/100 -0.040*** -0.057*** -0.048*** -0.037*** -0.043*** -0.040***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
female -0.240*** -0.444*** -0.341*** -0.223*** -0.367*** -0.299***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
rural -0.284*** -0.420*** -0.326*** -0.329*** -0.623*** -0.439***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
year 1.326*** 1.223*** 1.217*** 1.298*** 1.097*** 1.150***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
weeks 0.982*** 0.981***
(0.000) (0.000)
Copula(sch) 0.009 0.001 0.012 0.010 0.003 0.013
(0.018) (0.025) (0.021) (0.018) (0.025) (0.021)
Copula(sch2) 0.009 0.0002 0.012 0.010 0.003 0.013
(0.018) (0.025) (0.021) (0.018) (0.025) (0.021)
Copula(weeks) 0.020*** 0.019***
(0.000) (0.000)
IMR -0.095*** -0.429*** -0.236***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.217*** 2.643*** -0.832*** 0.361*** 3.289*** -0.473***
(0.031) (0.042) (0.034) (0.032) (0.042) (0.036)
Obs. 16,528 16,528 16,528 16,528 16,528 16,528
R2 0.60 0.38 0.77
Notes: GC and HGC results computed by averaging coefficients from 10,000 and 1,000
replications, respectively. Copula() are Gaussian Copula functions. Significant copula functions
implies significant correlation between the variable and the errors in the regression models. IMR
is the inverse mills ratio. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Chapter 4
Pay Period and the Distributional Effect of
Education on Earnings: Evidence from Recentered
Influence Function Regressions
4.1 Introduction
Earning gaps and inequality between different groups and their determinants
have been extensively explored over the last three decades (Fortin et al., 2011).
Studies on earning gaps and inequalities have been approached from several angles
including gender (men vs women), location (rural vs urban), sector of employment
(public vs private or formal vs informal), and age group (youth vs adults).
Research has also analysed the trend in earnings inequality over time, whereby
inequality between any two periods is compared (Firpo et al., 2018; Rios-Avila,
2020b).
There is a wide range of measures in economics that have been employed
to measure earnings inequality, ranging from simple mean comparison to more
advanced measures that go beyond the mean. Popular measures include the Gini,
the Theil index, variance of the logarithm of earnings, interquantile share ratios
(such as the Palma Ratio1) and interquantile range. Table 4.1 below shows the
trend of income2 inequality for Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda, computed from
nationally representative household survey. On average, Malawi and Uganda
recorded about the same level of inequality while Tanzania had the lowest
1Proposed in 2013 by Alex Cobham and Andy Sumner and named after Jose G. Palma, Palma
Ratio is a measure of income inequality defined as the ratio of income earned by the richest 10%
to that of the poorest 40% (Cobham et al., 2016).
2Income proxied by per adult equivalent household consumption.
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inequality.
Table 4.1: Income Inequality Trends in Malawi, Tanzania and Malawi
Country &Year Data Measure of inequality Inequality
Malawi
2004 IHS2 Gini 40
2010 IHS3 Gini 45
2016 IHS4 Gini 45
Tanzania
2000 HBS 2001 Gini 37
2007 HBS 2007 Gini 40
2011 HBS 2012 Gini 38
2017 HBS 2018 Gini 40
Uganda
2002 UNHS 2002 Gini 45
2005 UNHS 2005 Gini 43
2009 UNHS 2009 Gini 44
2012 UNHS 2012 Gini 41
2016 UNHS 2016 Gini 43
Source: World Bank Povcal. Note: IHS stands for the Integrated Household Survey, HBS
for the Household Budget Survey and UNHS for Uganda National Household Survey.
Empirical estimation of the determinants of earning gaps and inequality tends
to aggregate reported earnings to a common unit. Typically, earnings are recorded
by day, week, month, and year. While that could work well for developed countries
with well-developed labour markets, the situation might be different for developing
countries, including those in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) where pay periods shorter
than monthly (such as daily or weekly) are most common in the informal sector.
In the first essay, we found that, in East Africa, the relationship between earnings
and education varies across workers reporting wage earnings daily, weekly, and
monthly. Since pooling the periods can lead to inaccurate estimates of returns
to education, it is also likely to affect estimates of the distributional effect of
education on earnings, essentially because the pay periods have different earnings
distributions.
This essay adds to the literature by analysing both the distributional effect
of education within each of the three pay periods; and examining how gender
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differences in educational attainment explain earning gaps and inequality between
women and men in Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda. Specifically, the essay seeks
to answer three questions. Firstly, for each pay period, how does a change in
education distribution affect the unconditional distribution of earnings? Secondly,
does education’s role in explaining the unconditional distribution of earnings differ
along the earnings distribution? Lastly, does the difference in education by gender
significantly explain the gender earnings gap within the pay periods?
As an extension, this essay seeks to answer the above questions while exploring
a particular type of casual employment specific to Malawi, namely ganyu. To the
best of our knowledge, this essay is the first study in SSA to analyse the link
between education and earnings distribution while considering the pay period’s
effect. The aim is to better understand the effects of education on the earnings
distribution and the gender earnings gap in East Africa, which is essential to devise
education policies and programs to curb earnings inequality.
Using comparable nationally representative data from the three countries (i.e.,
Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda), we employ Recentered Influence Function (RIF)
Regressions to examine how the distributional effect of education on wage earnings
vary by pay period. Precisely, we begin with employing unconditional quantile
regressions (Firpo et al., 2009) to examine the possible heterogeneous effects of
education on earnings and how these effects vary when workers report wages
over different periods. We then employ the reweighted RIF Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition (Firpo et al., 2018; Rios-Avila, 2020b) to assess how education
explains gender earnings inequalities within each pay period.
Our results show that there is heterogeneity in the effects of a change in
the distribution of education on the distribution of earnings across pay periods.
Generally, the effect is stronger for workers reporting monthly earnings compared
to their daily and weekly counterparts. The results of how education contributes
to earnings inequality within the pay periods suggest that if the average education
of the population were to increase by a year, it would reduce earnings inequality for
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workers paid daily and monthly but increase inequality for workers paid weekly. We
also show that gender differences in educational attainment is a significant factor
in explaining earnings differences between female and male workers in Tanzania
and Uganda.
Finally, we examine earnings inequality in casual employment using ganyu
labour in Malawi as our case study. We find that increase in the population’s
average education by a year increases the mean earnings of ganyu workers by 7
– 16% depending on the quantile of earnings distribution. About seven percent
(7%) of the gender earnings gap associated with gender differences in endowments
can be attributed to gender differences in educational attainment. This suggests
that policies to raise females’ education endowments are a good solution to curb
gender earnings inequality in the ganyu labour market.
It is worth noting that pooling the periods together gives an incomplete picture
of the distribution effects of education on earnings. For example, in the case of
Malawi (excluding ganyu) and Uganda where most of the workers report earnings
monthly, the results show that pooling yields estimates of the effects of education
on earnings which are leaning towards those from the monthly sample. This
reiterates the need to estimate for each of the periods separately for a more
informative inference
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 provides an overview
of the related literature. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology used,
followed by Section 4 on data and description. Section 5 presents the results and
discussions, and Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Literature Review
Labour earnings account for a sizable proportion of individual incomes and thus
are important in explaining income inequality (Peichl and Pestel, 2015). The
determinants of earnings inequality between different groups or its trend over time
have consequently attracted much research over the last three decades. Ever since
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the seminal works of Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973), economists have developed
several methodological frameworks to analyse earnings inequality. Recent research
has focused on formulation and application of methods that go beyond mean
decomposition to other inequality measures such as variance, quantiles (conditional
and unconditional), inter-quantile range and the Gini. We do not discuss the
different methods here; a review of these are provided in Fortin et al. (2011).
While most research on earnings inequality has focused on developed countries,
little research on this matter has been undertaken in SSA. However, with increasing
availability of data over the past decade, there has been a growing body of empirical
research across the region. Given that in labour market surveys workers report
wages over different pay periods (such as hourly, daily, weekly etc.), these studies
usually have aggregated these wages into a common earnings measure such as
monthly or annual earnings. Peichl and Pestel (2015) argue that the distribution
of such a common measure of earnings is affected by the components that are used
in its construction. However, since this has been the practice in the literature, in
this part, we summarise some of these studies on SSA with a particular focus on
education as one of the key determinants of earnings inequality.
One of the dimensions of inequality that has received considerable attention
is the gender earnings inequality/gap. The consensus is that, like many other
regions of the world, males earn considerably more than females (Agesa et al., 2013;
Joseph and Leyaro, 2019; Nix et al., 2016; Nordman et al., 2011). Many papers
have explored what factors determine the earnings differentials across gender.
According to Nix et al. (2016), the gender wage gap is predominantly explained
by differences in returns to the observable characteristics, although differences in
endowments do matter. They also found that the coefficients of the determinants
of the earnings gap between gender vary across the earnings distribution and
sectors of employment. Because males generally have more education than females,
increasing education endowments of women would raise women’s wages and thus
reduce the gender gap in earnings (Agesa et al., 2013; Joseph and Leyaro, 2019).
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In another gender dimension, Kilic et al. (2015) examined gender differences
in agricultural productivity (as measured by plot gross value of output)
using nationally representative data from Malawi. They applied both the
Oaxaca-Blinder type decomposition and RIF regressions to decomposing the
productivity differences both for the mean and at various quantiles of the
productivity distribution. They found that gender differences in education
endowments were only significant in explaining the productivity inequality at the
mean and centre of the productivity distribution. Women had higher returns to
education than men. Thus, assigning their coefficients to men would increase men’s
productivity and widen the gender gap further.
Numerous studies have also considered earnings differentials between public
and private sector workers, with a definite gap in favour of the public sector
(Kwenda and Ntuli, 2018; Nielsen and Rosholm, 2001). Nielsen and Rosholm
(2001), applied quantile regressions on three waves of household data from Zambia
and found that the returns to education varied along the earnings distribution,
however, there existed a larger gap for those in the bottom end of the distribution
across all education levels. Kwenda and Ntuli (2018), on the other hand, employed
the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method on an extensive cross-sectional dataset3
from South Africa. They found that the distribution effects of education on
wages differed within and across sectors of employment. Across sectors, the effect
was higher in the private than the public sector. Within the public sector, the
distributional effect of education declined by quantile while within the private
sector, the effect of education was non-monotonic: initially declined and then
increased by quantile.
Earnings differences between periods has also been widely explored to analyse
trends in earnings inequality. Essama-Nssah et al. (2013) used expenditure data
for 2001 and 2007 in Cameroon to analyse income inequality between the two
periods. They employed the RIF decomposition method and found that returns to
3The Post-Apartheid Labour Market Series (PALMS)
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education varied slightly along the earnings distribution (not very heterogenous),
were positive and statistically significant across quantiles, and were on average
higher for 2001 than 2007.
Although research on earnings inequality in SSA has increased in recent years,
what is noticed in all the previous studies (regardless of the kind or measure of
inequality) is the conventional method of aggregating earnings to a common unit.
So far, researchers have disregarded the importance of pay periods on inequality
decomposition. In the first essay, we found that the relationship between earnings
and education may vary across workers reporting wage earnings over different
periods including day, week, and month. We believe that pooling all the workers
together and aggregating their earnings to a common unit might also lead to
inaccurate estimates of the distributional effect of education on earnings, especially
if different pay periods have different wage distributions. This study aims to fill
this gap by estimating the distributional effects of education on earnings as well
as in decomposing the earnings gap between gender by pay period.
4.3 Empirical Strategy
The following extended Mincer equation (with education assumed to be
exogenous4) is used to model the relationship between education and earnings.
Yit = α1Sit + α2S
2
it + δZit + µit (4.1)
Where Y is the log of wage earnings, S and S2 are individual’s years of schooling
and its quadratic, Z is a vector (containing a constant) of individual characteristics
(age in years and its square, logarithm of number of weeks worked over the last
twelve months, and dummies for gender, rural residence, individuals observed more
than once, and survey year), i and t index individual and time respectively and µ
is a standard error term. The parameters5 of interest are α1 and α2.
4Note that in RIF regression and decomposition, we ignore endogeneity due to unobserved
ability and selection into employment categories because the methods to address the same are
not yet explicit or available (Rios-Avila, 2020a; Kwenda and Ntuli, 2018)
5On a few occasions, we assume α2 = 0 to simplify interpretation.
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4.3.1 RIF Regression
For simplicity and mathematical convenience, we rewrite the linear regression (4.1)
in the following form:
Y = X ′β + ε (4.2)
Where E(ε) =0, Y = [y1, y1, ...yn] is a vector of the observed values of Y , and X
is a vector (containing the constant) of all explanatory variables. The influence
function of the observed value y of the distribution statistic of interest v(FY ) is
defined as IF (y; v). The RIF is then defined as
RIF (y; v) = v(FY ) + IF (y; v) (4.3)
Such that the statistic of interest can be obtained by integration. That is,
v(FY ) =
∫
RIF (y; v)dF (y) (4.4)
The expectation of the RIF conditional on X (the explanatory variables) is
modelled as a linear function of X as:
E[RIF (Y ; v)|X] = v(FY ) = X ′β (4.5)
Where β is a vector of parameters which can be estimated using OLS. For quantiles,
RIF is given by




qτ can be estimated from the data by sample quantile q̂τ whereas fY (q̂τ ) can
be estimated using Kernel density. The RIF for quantile of Y is an indicator
variable (that is, 1(Y ≤ qτ )) which takes the value of 1 if the outcome variable is
less than or equal to the quantile qτ . It can, therefore, be modelled using a linear
probability model (LPM), probit or a non-parametric binomial model (Firpo et al.,
2009). Empirically, estimation of the RIF regressions for quantiles of log wages (or
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any other statistic such as interquantile share ratio in our case) can be performed
in Stata using user-written command rifhdreg (Rios-Avila, 2020b). As explained
earlier, interquantile share ratio (iqsr) is a measure of inequality calculated as the
ratio of total income received/earned by a certain percent of the population with
the highest income to the total received/earned by some percent of the population
with the lowest income. Iqsr is among the most flexible, intuitive and easy to
interpret measures of inequality, and can easily be customised to fit the purpose.
For instance, can be calculated as the income ratio of the income earned by the
richest 10% to the poorest 10%, the ratio earned by the richest 20% to the poorest
20%, the ratio earned by the richest 10% the poorest 40% etc. In this essay we
use the latter which is also known as the Palma Ratio. While it is expected that
estimates of the determinants of inequality to differ depending on the choice of the
measure of inequality (see for example Rios-Avila (2020a)) the reasons and extent
to which the results differ are beyond the scope of this essay.
4.3.2 RIF Decomposition
To examine gender wage gap and gender differences in earnings inequality
within the pay periods, we employ RIF based decomposition, an extension of
Oaxaca-Blinder (OB hereafter) methodology proposed by Firpo et al. (2009) and
further extended by Firpo et al. (2018). RIF decomposition uses RIF regression
in combination with reweighting to decompose any statistic of interest into two
parts: the difference due to endowments (characteristics or composition effect)
and the difference due to wage structure effects (coefficient effect). Using this
decomposition, the contribution of each explanatory variable on the two parts can
be examined. In addition, the decomposition shows the size of the specification
and reweighting errors which are essential in assessing the accuracy of the model.
Following Rios-Avila (2020b), the derivation of RIF decomposition is as follows:
Recall (4.2), i.e., Y = X ′β + ε. Suppose there is some categorical variable T such
that the joint distribution function of Y , X and T is given by fY,X,T (yi, xi, Ti). For
only two groups (T=0 and T=1) the joint distribution function is given as:
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fkY,X(y, x) = f
k
Y |X(Y |X)fkX(X) (4.7)
Where T = k ∈ [0, 1]; and its cumulative distribution function conditional on T
as:
F kY (y) =
∫
fkY |X(Y |X)dF kX(X) (4.8)





The cumulative distribution of Y conditional on T can then be used to decompose
the difference in the distribution of statistic v between the two groups. Accordingly,
∆v = v1 − v0 = v(f 1Y )− v(f 0Y ) (4.9)
Which implies
∆v = v(f 1Y |X(Y |X)dF (X))− v(f 0Y |X(Y |X)dF (X))
We can rewrite (4.9) as
∆v = v1 − vc + vc − v0
Alternatively, in a reduced form
∆v = ∆vS + ∆vX
Where vc is some counterfactual statistic defined as
vc = v(f
c
Y ) = v(f
0
Y |X(Y |X)dF 1X(X)) (4.10)
∆vS = v1 − vc is the difference attributed to the relationship between Y and
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X; and ∆vX = vc − v0 the difference arising due to differences in characteristics,
the Xs.
From (4.5), v(FY ) = X ′β, It follows therefore that
v1 = E(RIF (yi; v(f
1
Y ))) = X̄
1′ β̂1
v0 = E(RIF (yi; v(f
0





Since the counterfactual distribution is not observed, it is approximated as follows
F cY =
∫
f 0Y |X(Y |X)dF 1X(X) ∼=
∫
f 0Y |X(Y |X)dF 0X(X)ω(X) (4.11)




P (T = 1|X)
1− P (T = 1|X)
(4.12)
where p is the proportion of people in group 1 and P (T = 1|X) the probability
that an individual belongs to group 1 given that she has characteristics X. The
reweighting factor can be obtained after the conditional probability is estimated
using a probit or logit model. Plugging the reweighting factor into (4.10) yields
vc = E(RIF (yi; v(f
c
Y ))) = X̄
c′ β̂c (4.13)
The decomposition can then be rewritten as
∆v = X̄1
′
(β̂1 − β̂c) + (X̄1 − X̄c)′β̂c + (X̄c − X̄0)′β̂0 + X̄c′(β̂c − β̂0)
Define ∆vpS = X̄
1′(β̂1 − β̂c); ∆veS = (X̄1 − X̄c)′β̂c; ∆v
p
X = X̄












The component ∆vpS + ∆v
e
S is called the coefficient effect which constitutes of





X is called the aggregate composition effect and constitutes the pure
composition effect (∆vpX) and specification error (∆v
e
X). The error components
help assess the quality of the reweighting and specification of the regression
function (Rios-Avila, 2020b). For more robust results, the coefficients of these
components should be smaller and insignificant. The empirical estimation of
the RIF decomposition for the mean of log consumption to poverty line ratio is
performed in Stata using user-written command oaxaca_rif (Rios-Avila, 2020b).
4.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The sources of data for analysis are described in detail in Chapter 2 of this thesis.
The literature guides the variables used in this essay. Table 4.2 shows the names
and definitions of each variable used in the analysis. Chapter 2 of the thesis
provides a detailed description of the data sources and how the variables were
constructed from the data.
Table 4.3 shows, for each country and pay period, the means and standard
deviations for the continuous variables and the percentage composition of the
categorical variables in the sample. Earnings are annualised and expressed monthly
and thus comparable across countries and pay periods. Workers in Malawi earn
more than those in Tanzania and Uganda across the pay periods. In all three
countries, workers reporting earnings monthly are the highest wage earners (a
possible reason is monthly may have relatively larger proportion of workers in
formal employment). Workers reporting earnings by week are the lowest wage
earners in Tanzania and Uganda. Compared to the other countries, in Tanzania the
wage penalty associated with working in daily or weekly employment is enormous.
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Table 4.2: Definition of Variables Used in the Analysis
Variable Description
Log(earnings) Logarithm of annualised earnings (expressed monthly).
sch Individual’s total number of years of schooling.
age Individual’s age in years. Its square is included to capture
the non-linear relationship between earning and age.
noeduc educational dummy, 1 if less than primary education and
0 otherwise.
primary educational dummy, 1 if completed primary education and
0 otherwise.
secondary educational dummy, 1 if completed ordinary/advanced
secondary education and 0 otherwise.
higher educational dummy, 1 if completed post-secondary
(diploma/university) education and 0 otherwise.
female a gender dummy, 1 for females, included to capture the
effects of gender on wages.
rural location dummy, 1 for employment in rural areas, is used
to control for rural-urban wage differentials.
panel a dummy (for Tanzania and Uganda), 1 for individuals
observed more than once since we are using an imperfect
panel survey.
year year dummy (for Malawi), 1 for 2016 and 0 for 2010 since
we are using pooled cross-section data.
weeks logarithm of the number of weeks worked in the past 12
months.
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That is, workers reporting earnings by day and by week earn no more than a third
of their counterparts who report earnings by month.
As far as education is concerned, there are a few issues that could potentially
affect our results. While workers in Malawi have more years of schooling compared
to Tanzania and Uganda, monthly earners have more education than their daily
and weekly counterparts in all three countries. In Tanzania, there are no workers
with higher education reporting earnings by day or week. In Malawi, only 12%
of the workers reporting earnings by day and 4% of those reporting earnings by
week have higher education, while in Uganda 3% and 8% of the workers reporting
earnings by day and week respectively have higher education.
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics for the Main Variables Used in Analysis
Country & Sample Obs. Wage ($ month) sch age weeks primary secondary higher female rural panel year
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD % % % % % %
Malawi
Daily 182 206.42 251.48 9.03 4.51 36.80 10.20 36.75 13.99 20 29 12 26 67 NA 74
Weekly 505 174.26 289.04 7.15 3.91 34.94 10.35 35.51 14.71 24 10 4 30 66 NA 53
Monthly 5,129 226.84 339.20 9.26 4.12 35.85 10.71 39.63 12.69 26 24 14 25 49 NA 50
Pooled 5,816 221.04 332.38 9.05 4.16 35.79 10.66 39.13 13.01 26 23 13 25 52 NA 51
Ganyu 16,528 33.76 53.52 4.77 3.52 33.42 11.89 15.64 12.66 14 2 0 51 92 NA 64
Tanzania
Daily 3,738 38.91 87.35 5.26 3.21 33.14 11.92 15.32 15.39 57 4 0 40 78 25 NA
Weekly 1,929 32.54 85.08 5.28 3.24 33.64 12.08 13.62 15.16 56 5 0 36 82 19 NA
Monthly 4,830 123.90 161.28 8.16 3.69 33.34 11.89 34.95 16.00 51 27 7 38 53 41 NA
Pooled 11,215 69.10 126.88 6.35 3.67 33.37 11.93 22.10 18.38 55 13 3 38 70 45 NA
Uganda
Daily 1,262 78.92 103.44 6.35 3.53 30.99 10.84 36.04 14.57 34 11 3 20 64 39 NA
Weekly 589 76.34 109.07 6.97 3.81 32.77 11.44 35.27 14.87 32 12 8 29 72 15 NA
Monthly 2,765 114.19 139.02 9.85 4.39 34.71 11.06 39.38 12.45 29 16 31 37 56 56 NA
Pooled 4,631 99.66 127.84 8.51 4.41 33.46 11.18 37.89 13.54 31 14 20 31 61 57 NA
Source: Author’s computations from IHS, TNPS and UNPS.
Note: The last two columns show % observed multiple times for Tanzania and Uganda (panel) and % in 2016 for Malawi (year) respectively. The variable ’weeks’
is in its original scale (prior to taking logs) The figures are adjusted by survey weights.
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Figures 4.1 - 4.3 compare the distribution of earnings by pay period for each
country. Figure 4.1 shows the distribution for Malawi. Because 88% of the
workers report earnings by month, the distribution of the pooled periods looks
very similar to that of workers who report earnings by month. This is also true for
Uganda, where 60% of the workers report their earnings by month (Figure 4.3).
For Tanzania, however, the distribution for the pooled periods is very different
from those of the disaggregated pay periods (Figure 4.2). While the distribution
for those reporting earnings by month and pooled for Tanzania are left-skewed, we
observe more complicated shapes for the distribution curves for those reporting
earnings by day and week.
Figure 4.1: Distribution of Monthly Earnings by Pay Period in Malawi
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of Monthly Earnings by Pay Period in Tanzania
Figure 4.3: Distribution of Monthly Earnings by Pay Period in Uganda
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Figures 4.4 – 4.6 show the cross-sectional relationship between earnings and
education by pay period. The bars show the mean earnings by years of education.
As expected, on average more years of education are associated with higher
earnings in all three countries. The relationship is especially vivid for workers
reporting earnings by month.
Figure 4.4: Distribution of Earnings by Education and Pay Period in Malawi
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of Earnings by Education and Pay Period in Tanzania
Figure 4.6: Distribution of Earnings by Education and Pay Period in Uganda
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4.5 Results and Discussion
4.5.1 Pooled RIF Regression
In this section, we present estimates based on the pooled6 RIF regressions. For
each country, we analyse how education affects the distribution of earnings of the
workers. That is, using unconditional quantile regressions, we examine the possible
heterogeneous effects of education on earnings along the earnings distribution.
The coefficients of education measure the expected change in the unconditional
distribution of the earnings (as measured by quantiles of log earnings) when there
is a small change in the distribution of education (Rios-Avila, 2020b).
Owing to its easy interpretability, we begin by presenting the results for linear
specification (assuming α2 = 0 in equation (4.1). Table 4.4 present the results of
the distribution effects of education in each of the three countries. The top panel
of Table 4.4 shows the results for Malawi, the middle panel for Tanzania, and the
bottom panel for Uganda, for the selected unconditional quantiles of earnings. The
detailed results for all nine deciles are shown in Appendix 4A.
Table 4.4 shows that, in each country, education affects individuals at different
points of the earnings distribution differently. For instance the results for Malawi
suggest that an increase in the population’s education by one year increases the
mean of wages by approximately 7%, 13% and 12% at the bottom7, centre and top
of the distribution, respectively. The corresponding figures for Tanzania are -0.3%,
13% and 17%, respectively; while for Uganda are 11%, 15% and 9%, respectively.
Figure 4.7 plots the coefficients of education from Table 4.4 but for all nine
deciles. Figure 4.7 shows that for Malawi and Tanzania the effect of education
generally increases (although declines sharply after 80th quantile for Malawi) with
the quantiles of earnings while for Uganda it initially increases up to the 40th
quantile then declines monotonically by quantile of earnings.
6Like the usual practice in the literature.
7Throughout the chapter bottom end of the distribution refers to the first deciles (10th
percentile), middle/centre to the 50th percentile and top end to the nineth decile (90th percentile)
of the earnings distribution.
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Table 4.4: Unconditional Quantile Regression by Country
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
q(10) q(25) q(50) q(75) q(90)
Malawi
sch 0.070*** 0.125*** 0.128*** 0.161*** 0.123***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RIF mean 2.841 3.672 4.692 5.558 6.298
R2 0.39 0.45 0.48 0.37 0.19
Obs. 5,816 5,816 5,816 5,816 5,816
Tanzania
sch -0.003 0.023*** 0.125*** 0.174*** 0.171***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007)
covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RIF mean 0.307 1.545 3.199 4.615 5.461
R2 0.30 0.55 0.58 0.37 0.20
Obs. 11,215 11,215 11,215 11,215 11,215
Uganda
sch 0.105*** 0.118*** 0.153*** 0.110*** 0.092***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RIF mean 1.931 3.052 4.055 4.846 5.446
R2 0.41 0.42 0.38 0.26 0.14
Obs. 4,631 4,631 4,631 4,631 4,631
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors computed by 500 replications in parentheses; * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Full results with all variables available in Appendix 4A.
Table 4.4 shows that, in all three countries, there is considerable difference
in the RIF mean between the top and bottom deciles implying high degree of
earnings inequality. Using RIF regression, we examine whether education is a
significant determinant of earnings inequality, measured by the interquantile share
ratio (iqsr) defined as the ratio of the share earned by workers in the top decile of
earnings relative to that earned by those in the bottom four deciles. The results
are presented in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5 shows that there is a substantial earnings inequality between
the workers in the top decile of earnings and those in the bottom four deciles
in all three countries. Inequality is highest among workers in Tanzania and
lowest among workers in Uganda. Workers in the top decile in Tanzania earn
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Figure 4.7: RIF returns - Malawi
Table 4.5: Education and Wage Inequality (iqsr) by Country
(1) (2) (3)
Country Malawi Tanzania Uganda
sch -0.072 2.321*** -0.347***
(0.060) (0.216) (0.056)
covariates Yes Yes Yes
iqsr 7.495 24.819 6.051
R2 0.11 0.38 0.17
Obs. 5,816 11,215 4,631
Notes: iqsr is the interquantile share ratio defined as the ratio of the share earned by the top
decile relative to bottom four deciles. Bootstrap standard errors computed by 500 replications
in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Full results with all variables available
upon request.
approximately twenty five (25) times as much as those in the bottom four deciles.
The corresponding figures for Malawi and Uganda are 7.5 and 6, respectively.
However, despite the high inequality within workers in Malawi, education does
not seem to significantly drive the inequality. For Tanzania, an increase in
education in the population by one year would result in an increase in earnings
inequality by 9.4%,8 other things equal. This implies that education is likely to
benefit more those in higher than in low paying jobs. For Uganda, an increase in
8That is (2.321/24.819)*100.
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average education in the population by a year will reduce inequality by 5.7%.
Figures 4.8 plots the marginal effects for the quadratic specification of returns
against years of schooling for selected quantiles (10th, 50th and 90th); detailed
results are in Appendix 4B. Figure 4.8 shows a concave relationship for workers in
the bottom decile and strong convex relationship for workers in the top decile of
earnings in all three countries. This suggest that, in all three countries, an increase
in education in the population is more likely to benefit the higher than the lower
earnings workers and hence likely to increase inequality. For workers in the top
decile, the effects of education are very small (even negative) for early years of
schooling but increase rapidly after about the 6th year.
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Figure 4.8: RIF Coefficients of Education (quadratic) by Country
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4.5.2 Pooled RIF Decomposition
In this subsection, we assess the role of education in explaining inequality in gender
earnings. We begin by comparing the differences in means of earnings, educational
attainment, and returns to education between male and female workers. Table 4.6
shows the raw gender differences in the three variables. Female workers have lower
wage earnings than their male counterparts across the countries, but the difference
is not statistically significant for Malawi. Females in Malawi and Uganda have
more education than males but again the difference is not statistically different
for Malawi. In line with the previous literature on returns to education in SSA,
the right column of Table 4.6 shows that female workers have higher returns than
their male counterparts in all three countries.
Following Rios-Avila (2020b) and Firpo et al. (2018) we then decompose the
gender differences in the mean of log earnings as well as the difference in wage
inequality (iqsr) by country (see Appendix 4C for decomposition for quantiles of
log earnings). Since, as discussed earlier in Table 4.6, there is no statistical gender
difference in the mean of wages for Malawi, we present the decomposition results
only for Tanzania and Uganda. Table 4.7 shows the results for the reweighted RIF
OB gender decomposition for the two countries. The first and the third columns of
Table 4.7 show the results for mean decomposition and the second and the fourth
columns the results for interquantile share ratio decomposition. Counterfactual is
the estimated distribution of earnings, showing what would female mean wages (or
inequality) be if they had the coefficients of male. Explained refers to the part of
the gap due to gender differences in characteristics/endowments. Unexplained
refers to the part of the gap due to gender differences in returns to those
characteristics. The pure components are the differences net of specification and
reweight errors.
The results in Table 4.7 suggest that education is among the significant factors
explaining the gender earnings gap in both countries. Of the pure explained gender
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Table 4.6: Gender Differences in Earnings (US$ per month) by Period and Country
Earnings(US$ per month) Education(years) Returns to Education
Malawi
Male 98.49 8.99 0.142
Female 97.04 9.23 0.182
Difference 1.45 -0.23 -0.040***
Obs. Male 4,358 4,358 4,358
Obs. Female 1,458 1,458 1,458
Obs. Total 5,816 5,816 5,816
Tanzania
Male 28.21 6.68 0.093
Female 10.98 5.81 0.123
Difference 17.23*** 0.86*** -0.030***
Obs. Male 7,142 7,142 7,142
Obs. Female 4,073 4,073 4,073
Obs. Total 11,215 11,215 11,215
Uganda
Male 54.48 8.36 0.139
Female 31.43 8.83 0.158
Difference 23.05*** -0.46** -0.019***
Obs. Male 3,156 3,156 3,156
Obs. Female 1,475 1,475 1,475
Obs. Total 4,631 4,631 4,631
Notes: Difference for earnings is defined as geometric mean for males minus geometric mean for
females. Difference for education is defined as arithmetic mean for males minus arithmetic mean
for females. Difference for returns to education defined as the returns (AME(sch)) for males
minus the corresponding value for females. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
gap in earnings for Tanzania, differences in education explains approximately 7%.
This suggests that if females had the same level of education endowments as males,
their wage earnings would have been respectively 7% higher. The coefficient on
education for Uganda is negative implying that, while education has a positive
effect on earnings, females are better endowed with education and thus the gender
difference in earnings would have been larger if on average females had the same
(low) education endowments as males. In addition, the coefficients on education
for the unexplained component are negative for both contries consistent with the
fact that women have higher returns to education than men. On the other hand,
the results from the iqsr decomposition in Table 4.7 suggest that gender differences
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Table 4.7: Reweighted RIF Oaxaca-Blinder Gender Decomposition by Country
Country Tanzania Uganda
RIF Mean iqsr Mean iqsr
Overall
Male 3.340*** 17.167*** 3.998*** 5.176***
Counterfactual 2.951*** 27.568*** 3.901*** 6.821***
Female 2.396*** 38.566*** 3.448*** 7.510***
Difference 0.944*** -21.400*** 0.550*** -2.334***
Explained 0.389*** -10.401*** 0.097** -1.645***
Unexplained 0.555*** -10.998*** 0.454*** -0.689
Pure explained 0.384*** -9.848*** 0.096** -1.538***
education 0.028*** -0.974*** -0.043** -0.474***
covariates 0.356*** -8.874*** 0.140*** -1.063***
Pure unexplained 0.549*** -11.369*** 0.443*** -0.686
education -0.115*** -17.536*** -0.256*** 3.034*
covariates 0.236 37.625** -0.299 10.289
constant 0.428** -31.458* 0.998*** -14.010*
Specification error 0.005** -0.553 0.001 -0.107
Reweight error 0.006 0.371 0.011 -0.003
Obs. Male 7,142 7,142 3,156 3,156
Obs. Female 4,073 4,073 1,475 1,475
Obs. Total 11,215 11,215 4,631 4,631
Notes: iqsr is the interquantile share ratio defined as the ratio of the share earned by the top
decile relative to the bottom four deciles within each sex. P-values calculated from bootstrap
(500 replications for Uganda and 2000 replications for Tanzania) standard errors. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The significance of coefficients on ‘Male’ and ‘female’ implies that
the mean for each group is significantly different from their combine mean. Some significant
specification and reweight errors detected, warranting a cautious inference.
in educational attainment and returns to education, do play a significant role in
explaining the inequality differences across gender in both countries.
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4.5.3 RIF Regression by Pay Period
In this subsection, we present estimates based on RIF regressions by pay period..
For each country and pay period, we examine the possible heterogeneous effects
of education on earnings and how these effects vary when workers are paid over
different periods. Like for the pooled analysis, we begin by presenting the results
for linear specification (assuming α2 = 0 in equation (4.1). Tables 4.8, 4.9 and
4.10 present the results of the distribution effects of education in Malawi, Tanzania,
and Uganda, respectively, for the selected unconditional quantiles of earnings when
the samples are disaggregated by pay periods—daily, weekly, and monthly. The
detailed results for all nine deciles by pay period are shown in Appendix 4A.
Table 4.8 shows the RIF regressions results for Malawi. It shows two important
things—in Malawi education affects individuals at different points of the earnings
distribution differently, and within the corresponding earnings distributions,
education affects individuals in different pay periods differently. Since the latter
is the focus of our study, it deserves more interpretation. The effect of a change in
the distribution of education for the daily sample decreases with the quantiles of
earnings for the quantiles above the centre of the distribution. The results in Table
4.8 suggest that an increase of the population education by one year increases the
mean of wages by approximately 12% at the centre of the distribution compared
to only approximately 4% increase at the top of the distribution. For the weekly
sample, the effect increases monotonically from about 0.7% at the bottom end to
21% at the top end of distribution, while no specific pattern is observed for the
monthly.
Figure 4.9 plots the coefficients of education from Table 4.8 and appendix
Table 4A.. The curve for the pooled sample is included for comparison. The trend
observed in curve for pooled is consistent with the monthly sample but not with
the daily or weekly samples. This suggests that for countries where workers are
employed primarily by the month converting all wages to a monthly figure will not
distort the findings. However, in a country where workers are more likely to be
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paid by day or week this could lead to imprecise estimates.
Table 4.8: Unconditional Quantile Regression by Pay Period - Malawi
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
quantile q(10) q(25) q(50) q(75) q(90)
A. Daily
sch 0.103** 0.091** 0.119*** 0.072** 0.039
(0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.037) (0.042)
covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RIF mean 2.19 3.205 4.583 5.618 6.298
R2 0.25 0.33 0.35 0.16 0.11
Obs. 182 182 182 182 182
B. Weekly
sch 0.007 0.058*** 0.081*** 0.151*** 0.206***
(0.021) (0.018) (0.016) (0.023) (0.040)
covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RIF mean 2.946 3.602 4.592 5.365 6.243
R2 0.50 0.44 0.38 0.30 0.23
Obs. 505 505 505 505 505
C. Monthly
sch 0.076*** 0.139*** 0.133*** 0.168*** 0.123***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RIF mean 2.893 3.694 4.702 5.544 6.304
R2 0.39 0.46 0.50 0.38 0.20
Obs. 5,129 5,129 5,129 5,129 5,129
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors computed by 500 replications in parentheses; * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Full results with all variables available upon request in appendix 4A.
Table 4.9 presents the RIF regression results for Tanzania, illustrated in Figure
4.10 (with detailed results for all nine deciles in Appendix 4A). As for Malawi,
Table 4.9 and Figure 4.10 show that in Tanzania, there is heterogeneity in the
distributional effects of education across pay periods. Returns to monthly are
much higher, increase up the 40th quantile and are then flat. Generally, returns
increase gently but with no significant effect of increase in education on wage for
workers at the bottom of the distribution in the daily (peaking at the 70th quantile)
and weekly (returns increase sharply after 70th quantile) samples. Comparing the
patterns of the results from the pay periods to those from the pooled, it indicates
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Figure 4.9: RIF Returns by Pay Period - Malawi
that the common practice in the literature of pooling all the pay periods together
leads to imprecise estimates of the distributional effects of education.
Figure 4.10: RIF Returns by Pay Period - Tanzania
Finally, Table 4.10 reports the distribution effects of education in Uganda,
illustrated in Figure 4.11 (with detailed results for all nine deciles in Appendix 4A).
As for Malawi and Tanzania, in Uganda, there is also heterogeneity in the effects
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Table 4.9: Unconditional Quantile Regression for Tanzania
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
quantile q(10) q(25) q(50) q(75) q(90)
A. Daily
sch -0.014 0.026** 0.030*** 0.068*** 0.042***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012)
covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RIF mean -0.274 0.789 2.091 3.854 4.922
R2 0.19 0.41 0.53 0.44 0.20
Obs. 3,738 3,738 3,738 3,738 3,738
B. Weekly
sch 0.006 0.030** 0.046*** 0.091*** 0.127***
(0.016) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.019)
covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RIF mean -0.232 0.752 2.048 3.342 4.509
R2 0.23 0.44 0.60 0.48 0.27
Obs. 1,929 1,929 1,929 1,929 1,929
C. Monthly
sch 0.069*** 0.119*** 0.176*** 0.177*** 0.167***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RIF mean 2.137 3.178 4.352 5.203 5.838
R2 0.45 0.51 0.44 0.29 0.19
Obs. 4,830 4,830 4,830 4,830 4,830
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors computed by 500 replications in parentheses; * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Full results with all variables available in appendix 4A.
of education across pay periods and throughout the earnings distribution. Table
4.10 and Figure 4.11 show that, along the earnings distribution, while education
significantly increases earnings across the quantiles, the effect is higher at lower
quantiles for monthly (peaking at 40th quantile), generally declining for daily and
gradually increasing for the weekly sample. This suggests that education is vital in
reducing earnings inequality for workers paid daily and monthly but will increase
inequality for workers paid weekly. On the other hand, comparing the pay periods,
an additional year of education in the population increases the mean of earnings
by a higher proportion for workers paid monthly relative to their daily and weekly
counterparts.
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Table 4.10: Unconditional Quantile Regression by Pay Period - Uganda
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
quantile q(10) q(25) q(50) q(75) q(90)
A. Daily
sch 0.107*** 0.114*** 0.094*** 0.090*** 0.074***
(0.022) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015)
covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RIF mean 1.786 2.774 3.719 4.58 5.27
R2 0.36 0.39 0.31 0.21 0.11
Obs. 1,262 1,262 1,262 1,262 1,262
B. Weekly
sch 0.071** 0.082*** 0.111*** 0.116*** 0.127***
(0.028) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.027)
covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RIF mean 1.568 2.756 3.793 4.424 5.179
R2 0.28 0.44 0.38 0.23 0.14
Obs. 589 589 589 589 589
C. Monthly
sch 0.136*** 0.156*** 0.171*** 0.109*** 0.091***
(0.016) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007)
covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RIF mean 2.16 3.242 4.35 5.059 5.544
R2 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.27 0.15
Obs. 2,765 2,765 2,765 2,765 2,765
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors computed by 500 replications in parentheses; * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Full results with all variables available in appendix 4A.
Tables 4.8 – 4.10 show, in all pay periods, there is considerable difference in the
RIF mean between the top and bottom deciles implying high degree of earnings
inequality. Using RIF regression, we examine whether education is a significant
determinant of earnings inequality, measured by the interquantile share ratio (iqsr)
defined earlier. The results are presented in Table 4.11.
Table 4.11 shows that there is significant earnings inequality between the
workers in the top decile of earnings and those in the bottom four deciles. Panel
A shows that in Malawi the inequality is highest among workers paid daily and
lowest among those paid monthly. Workers in the top decile earn approximately
ten (10) times as much as those in the bottom four deciles. However, despite the
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Figure 4.11: RIF Returns by Pay Period - Uganda
high inequality within workers paid daily, education does not seem to significantly
drive the inequality. For workers paid weekly, an increase in education in the
population by one year would result in an increase in earnings inequality by 9%,9
other things equal. This implies that conditional on working and paid weekly,
education is likely to benefit those in higher paying jobs. For workers paid monthly,
an increase in average education in the population by a year will reduce inequality
by 1.7%.
Panel B of Table 4.11 presents the results for Tanzania. Inequality is very high
among workers in daily and weekly where those in the top decile earn at least
35 times as much as those in the bottom 4 deciles. Increase in education would
worsen the inequality although not significantly for workers paid daily. In contrast,
for workers paid monthly, education reduces inequality, but the coefficient is not
statistically significant.
The bottom panel (Panel C) of Table 4.11 shows the results for Uganda. For
workers paid daily and monthly, an increase in education in the population by one
year would result in a reduction in wage inequality by 5% and 9%, respectively.
9That is (0.744/8.138)*100.
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For those paid daily, increase in education would worsen the inequality but the
coefficient is not statistically significant.




sch -0.615 0.744*** -0.126*
(0.479) (0.248) (0.065)
covariates Yes Yes Yes
iqsr 10.021 8.138 7.373
R2 0.23 0.13 0.10
Obs. 182 505 5,129
B. Tanzania
sch 0.295 2.669*** -0.011
(0.514) (0.835) (0.083)
covariates Yes Yes Yes
iqsr 36.546 35.055 6.799
R2 0.13 0.04 0.32
Obs. 3,738 1,929 4,830
C. Uganda
sch -0.322*** 0.259 -0.505***
(0.112) (0.264) (0.074)
covariates Yes Yes Yes
iqsr 6.037 7.101 5.389
R2 0.15 0.16 0.20
Obs. 1,262 589 2,765
Notes: iqsr is the interquantile share ratio defined as the ratio of the share earned by the top
10% relative to bottom 40% within each pay period. Bootstrap standard errors computed by 500
replications in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Full results with all variables
available upon request.
Figures 4.12 - 4.14 plot the marginal effects for the quadratic specification of
returns against years of schooling for selected quantiles (10th, 50th and 90th);
detailed results are Appendix 4B. Figures 4.12 - 4.14 show a concave relationship
for workers in the bottom decile and strong convex relationship for workers in the
top decile of earnings. This suggest that, in all three countries, an increase in
education in the population is more likely to benefit the higher than the lower
earnings workers and hence likely to increase inequality. For workers in the top
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decile, the effects of education are very small (even negative for Malawi) for early
years of schooling but increase rapidly after about the 6th year, regardless of
the pay period. Figures 4.12 - 4.14 also show that an increase in education in the
population generates different earning outcomes depending on the pay period (and
on the level of education).
4.5.4 RIF Decomposition by Pay Period
In this subsection, we assess the role of education in explaining gender earnings
inequality by pay period. We begin by comparing the differences in means of
earnings and educational attainment between male and female workers as well as
gender differences in returns10 to education. Table 4.12 shows the raw differences
in the three variables by pay period and country. The second - fourth columns of
Table 4.12 reveal that while there is a slight gender gap in earnings in favour of
females paid daily and monthly in Malawi, females paid weekly earn significantly
less than their male counterparts. In Tanzania and Uganda female workers have
substantial lower wage earnings than their male counterparts across the pay
periods. Nonetheless, the mean difference for Tanzania is more substantial for
workers reporting daily earnings relative to their weekly and monthly counterparts.
Columns 5 - 7 of Table 4.12 shows that in all three countries there are significant
differences in educational attainment between female and male workers. As
expected, in most pay periods, female workers have lower educational attainment
than their male counterparts. Columns 8 - 9 of Table 4.12, on the other hand,
show that returns are higher for females except for workers paid weekly in Malawi
and Tanzania, and those paid daily in Tanzania.
We then decompose the gender differences in the mean of log of earnings by
country and pay period (see Appendix 4C for decomposition for quantiles of log
earnings). Table 4.13 presents the results for the reweighted RIF OB gender
decomposition by pay period for each of the three countries. Counterfactual is
the estimated distribution of earnings, showing what would female mean wages
10Returns in 4.12 are based on AME(sch) coefficients from Tables 4C.1-4C.3 in Appendix 4C
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Figure 4.12: RIF coefficients of education (quadratic) by Pay Period - Malawi
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Figure 4.13: RIF coefficients of education (quadratic) by Pay Period - Tanzania
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Figure 4.14: RIF coefficients of education (quadratic) by Pay Period - Uganda
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Table 4.12: Gender Differences in Earnings, Education and Returns to Education
by Pay Period and Country
Earnings (US$ per month) Education (years) Returns to Education
Daily Weekly Monthly Daily Weekly Monthly Daily Weekly Monthly
Malawi
Male 77.68 100.02 99.15 9.48 7.45 9.13 0.091 0.115 0.148
Female 78.07 78.97 100.19 7.73 6.44 9.66 0.148 0.105 0.198
Difference -0.39 21.05* -1.04 1.75 1.01* -0.53*** -0.057* 0.01 -0.05***
Obs. Male 133 361 3,864 133 361 3,864 133 361 3,864
Obs. Female 49 144 1,265 49 144 1,265 49 144 1,265
Obs. Total 182 505 5,129 182 505 5,129 182 505 5,129
Tanzania
Male 15.69 11.37 74.13 5.79 5.83 8.18 0.054 0.077 0.133
Female 3.71 3.69 41.42 4.46 4.31 8.11 0.025 0.055 0.177
Difference 11.98*** 7.68*** 32.71*** 1.34*** 1.51*** 0.07 0.029*** 0.022** -0.044***
Obs. Male 2,400 1,246 3,015 2,400 1,246 3,015 2,400 1,246 3,015
Obs. Female 1,338 683 1,815 1,338 683 1,815 1,338 683 1,815
Obs. Total 3,738 1,929 4,830 3,738 1,929 4,830 3,738 1,929 4,830
Uganda
Male 43.98 41.83 65.22 6.59 7.21 9.69 0.085 0.091 0.14
Female 16.54 19.46 40.75 5.37 6.35 10.12 0.118 0.109 0.158
Difference 27.44*** 22.37*** 24.47*** 1.22*** 0.86* -0.43* -0.033*** -0.018 -0.018***
Obs. Male 981 422 1,743 981 422 1,743 981 422 1,743
Obs. Female 281 167 1,022 281 167 1,022 281 167 1,022
Obs. Total 1,262 589 2,765 1,262 589 2,765 1,262 589 2,765
Note: Difference for earnings is defined as geometric mean for males minus geometric mean for
females. Difference for education is defined as arithmetic mean for males minus arithmetic mean
for females. Difference for returns to education defined as the returns (AME(sch)) for males
minus the corresponding value for females. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
be if they had the coefficients of male. Columns 2 - 4 of Table 4.13 reports the
decomposition results for Malawi. Education has no significant effect on the gender
difference in earnings for workers paid daily and weekly. These results also hold
for the decomposition by quantiles of earnings (see appendix 4D). A significant
proportion of the gender differences in earnings for workers paid monthly are
attributable to gender differences in educational attainment. As discussed earlier,
females paid monthly in Malawi have both more education and higher earnings,
thus raising males educational endowment to the females’ level would reduce the
gender earnings gap.
Columns 5- 7 of Table 4.13 reports the decomposition results for Tanzania.
As explained earlier, males in Tanzania earn higher than females across the pay
periods. The results in suggest that education is among the significant factors
explaining the gender wag gap in daily and weekly. Of the pure explained gender
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gap in earnings, differences in education explains approximately 7% and 14% for
workers paid daily and weekly, respectively. This suggests that if females in daily
and weekly had the same level of education endowments as males, their wage
earnings would have been respectively 7% and 14% higher. In addition, the findings
for Tanzania also show that gender differences in returns to education explains
the earnings gap for workers paid weekly and monthly. Precisely, of the pure
unexplained gender gap in earnings, difference in returns to education between
males and females explains approximately 22% and 47% for those in weekly and
monthly respectively. Note that for the monthly the coefficient on education for
the unexplained part is negative implying that females have higher returns to
education than males.
Columns 8 - 10 of Table 4.13 presents the corresponding results for Uganda.
Like Tanzania, the mean wage for males in Uganda is higher than that of females
across the pay periods, and gender earnings gap is wider for workers reporting
daily earnings relative to their weekly and monthly counterparts. The findings
show that while gender differences in education attainment play a significant role
in explaining the gender earnings gap across the pay periods, gender differences
in returns to education do not. Of the pure explained gender gap in earnings,
differences in education explains approximately 37%, 38% and 33% for workers
paid daily, weekly, and monthly respectively. This implies that if females in daily
and weekly had the same level of education endowments as males, their wage
earnings would have been more than a third higher. Because females paid monthly
have higher educational attainment than their male counterparts, the coefficient
is negative pointing out that if females had the same level of education as males
then their wages would have been about a third lower.
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Table 4.13: Reweighted RIF OB Gender Decomposition by Period and Country
Malawi Tanzania Uganda
Daily Weekly Monthly Daily Weekly Monthly Daily Weekly Monthly
Overall
Male 4.353*** 4.605*** 4.597*** 2.753*** 2.431*** 4.306*** 3.784*** 3.734*** 4.178***
Counterfactual 4.345*** 4.478*** 4.735*** 1.959*** 1.760*** 4.088*** 3.335*** 3.491*** 4.039***
Female 4.358*** 4.369*** 4.607*** 1.312*** 1.306*** 3.724*** 2.806*** 2.968*** 3.707***
Difference -0.005 0.237* -0.01 1.441*** 1.125*** 0.582*** 0.978*** 0.766*** 0.470***
Explained 0.008 0.128 -0.138*** 0.794*** 0.671*** 0.218*** 0.449*** 0.243** 0.138***
Unexplained -0.013 0.109 0.128*** 0.647*** 0.454*** 0.364*** 0.529*** 0.523*** 0.332***
Pure explained 0.0000 0.128 -0.139*** 0.810*** 0.659*** 0.215*** 0.452*** 0.235** 0.135***
education 0.018 -0.004 -0.112*** 0.055*** 0.094*** -0.008 0.167*** 0.090** -0.045*
covariates -0.018 0.132 -0.026 0.755*** 0.565*** 0.223*** 0.286*** 0.145 0.181***
Pure unexplained 0.034 0.094 0.114*** 0.726*** 0.519*** 0.340*** 0.602*** 0.548*** 0.327***
education -0.494 0.206 -0.118 0.034 0.112* -0.159* -0.086 -0.131 -0.148
covariates -0.674 -1.17 0.027 0.872*** -0.037 0.125 1.596** -0.475 -0.576
constant 1.202 1.058 0.205 -0.18 0.444 0.374 -0.908 1.154 1.051**
Specification error 0.008 0.000 0.001 -0.016** 0.012 0.003 -0.003 0.008 0.003
Reweight error -0.047 0.015 0.014* -0.079*** -0.064*** 0.024** -0.073 -0.025 0.005
Obs. Male 133 361 3,864 2,400 1,246 3,015 981 422 1,743
Obs. Female 49 144 1,265 1,338 683 1,815 281 167 1,022
Obs. Total 182 505 5,129 3,738 1,929 4,830 1,262 589 2,765
Note: The significance of coefficients on ‘Male’ and ‘female’ implies that the mean for each
group is significantly different from their combine mean. P-values calculated from bootstrap
(500 replications for Malawi and Uganda and 2000 replications for Tanzania) standard errors. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Some significant specification and reweight errors detected,
warranting a cautious inference.
4.5.5 Distributional Effects of Education in Ganyu Labour
This subsection presents the analysis and results for ganyu labour. It follows
the same approach employed in the main analysis. It begins by examining how
an increase in education in the population affects the distribution of earnings
at different unconditional quantiles of earnings. It then goes further to explore
whether gender differences in education significantly explain the earnings gap
between male and female workers in ganyu .
Table 4.14 reports the distribution effect of education for ganyu workers using
both linear and quadratic specification of the earnings function. The coefficients
from the linear specification shows that an increase in the population’s average
education by a year increases the mean wage of ganyu workers by 7 – 16%
depending on the quantile of earnings distribution. Figure 4.15 shows that at
the 10th quantile the predicted returns increase at a constant rate across years of
education, while at the 50th and 90th the predicted returns increase at increasing
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rates with years of education. At the 90th quantile the predicted returns increase
at a higher rate than the other quantiles implying that an increase in education is
more likely to benefit the higher than the lower wage earners.
Table 4.14: Unconditional Quantile Regression (RIF) Results for Ganyu
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
quantile q(10) q(25) q(50) q(75) q(90)
Linear
sch 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.008** 0.021*** 0.026***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RIF mean 0.523 1.537 2.569 3.544 4.423
R2 0.31 0.48 0.53 0.37 0.20
Obs. 16,528 16,528 16,528 16,528 16,528
Quadratic
sch 0.019 0.002 -0.008 -0.001 -0.003
(0.015) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015)
sch2 0.000 0.002* 0.001* 0.002** 0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RIF mean 0.523 1.537 2.569 3.544 4.423
R2 0.31 0.48 0.53 0.37 0.20
Obs. 16,528 16,528 16,528 16,528 16,528
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors computed by 500 replications in parentheses; * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Full results with all variables included in the RIF regression available
upon request.
Tables 4.15 shows gender differences in earnings, education attainment and
returns to education. Males have higher earnings, more schooling and higher
returns to schooling. Table 4.16 reports the results for gender wage gap
decomposition for workers in ganyu labour. Males in ganyu earn higher than
females in both rural and urban areas. The results suggest that gender differences
in education explain about 7% of the pure explained wage gap and the effect
is slightly higher (8.5%) in urban areas. Since males are better endowed with
education than females, the results imply that raising the female endowment
of education to the male level would increase females’ earnings and narrow the
earnings gap in both rural and urban areas.
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Figure 4.15: RIF coefficients of education (quadratic) - Ganyu
Table 4.15: Gender Differences in Earnings, Education Attainment and Returns
to Education in Ganyu
Earnings Education (years) Returns to Education
All Rural Urban All Rural Urban All Rural Urban
Male 16.74 15.51 37.65 5.51 5.33 7.3 0.022 0.019 0.053
Female 8.59 8.35 12.73 4.06 3.93 5.68 0.013 0.011 0.049
Difference 7.15*** 6.16*** 24.92*** 1.45*** 1.40*** 1.62*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.004
Obs. Male 8,282 7,570 712 8,282 7,570 712 8,282 7,570 712
Obs. Female 8,246 7,681 565 8,246 7,681 565 8,246 7,681 565
Obs. Total 16,528 15,259 1,277 16,528 15,259 1,277 16,528 15,259 1,277
Notes: Difference for earnings is the geometric mean for males minus geometric mean for
females. Difference for education is arithmetic mean for males minus arithmetic mean for females.
Difference for returns to education is the returns for males minus returns for females.* p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Male 2.898*** 2.816*** 3.713***
Counterfactual 2.528*** 2.504*** 2.865***
Female 2.250*** 2.230*** 2.507***
Difference 0.648*** 0.586*** 1.206***
Explained 0.370*** 0.312*** 0.848***
Unexplained 0.278*** 0.275*** 0.358**
Pure Explained 0.371*** 0.312*** 0.850***
education 0.027*** 0.022*** 0.073***
covariates 0.343*** 0.289*** 0.777***
Pure Unexplained 0.336*** 0.321*** 0.492***
education 0.043 0.036 0.170
covariates 0.364** 0.515*** 0.589
constant -0.07 -0.23 -0.268
Specification error -0.001 0.000 -0.002
Reweight error -0.058** -0.046 -0.133
Obs. Male 8,282 7,570 712
Obs. Female 8,246 7,681 565
Obs. Total 16,528 15,259 1,277
Notes: P-values calculated from bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications). * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All other OLS regressors included in the RIF regression.The significance
of coefficients on ’Male’ and ’female’ implies that the mean for each group is significantly different
from their combine mean.
4.6 Conclusion
Education is among the key factors that determine the levels of earnings among
workers. But is the effect of education on earnings the same for low and high
wage earners? Studies seeking to answer this question have mainly done so while
aggregating various pay periods to a common period. This essay re-examined
the relationship between education and earnings along the unconditional earnings
distribution, taking into consideration the effects of pay period. Using nationally
representative data from Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda and RIF regression
techniques, we found that estimates significantly differ across the pay periods in all
three countries. Generally, the effect of education is stronger for workers reporting
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monthly earnings compared to their daily and weekly counterparts, consistent with
formal sector workers being more likely to be paid monthly.
Examination of the RIF means by the unconditional quantile of earnings
revealed a considerable earnings inequality between low-wage and high-wage
workers. We then investigated whether education is a significant factor that
explains this wage inequality in each pay period. To measure wage inequality,
we use the interquantile share ratio of the top decile of earnings to the bottom
four (4) deciles. The findings from RIF regression reveal that education can either
contribute to increasing or reducing wage inequality depending on the period in
which the worker is paid. Education is found to increase inequality for workers paid
monthly (suggesting higher wages for more skilled workers) and reduce inequality
for those paid daily and monthly (perhaps because more educated workers are
recent or temporary entrants with less on the job experience).
The essay investigated how much of the gender differences in earnings and
inequality can be attributed to gender differences in educational attainment for
each of the pay periods. Employing RIF OB decomposition method, we found
that gender differences in education significantly explain the gender wage gap for
workers paid daily and weekly for Tanzania, and in all pay periods for Uganda,
while there was no significant gender wage gap for Malawi. This suggests that, for
Tanzania and Uganda, policies targeting increasing female education attainment
could narrow the gender wage gap. Further decomposition of the inequality within
gender shows that inequality is higher among women compared to men, but the
difference is mainly insignificant.
An extension examined the distributional effects of education on earnings
for casual (ganyu) workers in Malawi. An increase in the population’s average
education by a year increases the mean wage of ganyu workers by 7 – 16%
depending on the quantile of earnings distribution. RIF OB decomposition results
further show that, in ganyu labour, the gender differences in education explain
about 7% of the pure explained earnings gap and the effects is slightly higher in
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urban areas.
As discussed in the decomposition section, there are significant earnings
differences between men and women in Tanzania and Uganda, across the pay
periods with men generally earning more than women. For Malawi, gender gaps
are significant only for ganyu workers. The discussion also shows that wages for
women are more unequally distributed compared to that of males. Unfortunately,
with the data in hand, we can not tell whether the wage penalties faced by women
in Tanzania and Uganda can be accounted for by “glass ceilings” or “sticky floors”.




Appendix 4A: RIF Regression by Quantile (Linear Schooling)
Table 4A.1: RIF Regression Results by Quantile of Earnings for Malawi (Daily)
quantile q(10) q(20) q(30) q(40) q(50) q(60) q(70) q(80) q(90)
sch 0.103** 0.137*** 0.083* 0.090** 0.119*** 0.110*** 0.092** 0.060 0.039
(0.043) (0.045) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.039) (0.036) (0.037) (0.042)
age 0.069 0.049 0.019 0.097 0.094 0.036 0.059 0.020 -0.032
(0.117) (0.112) (0.137) (0.133) (0.109) (0.103) (0.091) (0.087) (0.083)
age2/100 -0.086 -0.054 -0.013 -0.085 -0.092 0.000 -0.027 -0.002 0.081
(0.145) (0.138) (0.176) (0.164) (0.137) (0.131) (0.118) (0.113) (0.108)
female -0.069 -0.039 0.227 0.601 -0.009 -0.091 -0.118 -0.178 -0.225
(0.433) (0.384) (0.418) (0.464) (0.379) (0.327) (0.341) (0.310) (0.281)
rural 0.138 -0.233 -0.540 -0.644* -0.664* -0.353 -0.077 -0.320 -0.473
(0.392) (0.377) (0.404) (0.371) (0.379) (0.360) (0.351) (0.351) (0.363)
year 0.483 0.077 1.163** 1.659*** 1.433*** 1.131*** 0.821*** 0.524* 0.456**
(0.450) (0.508) (0.581) (0.506) (0.426) (0.364) (0.317) (0.270) (0.226)
weeks 1.863*** 2.442*** 2.195*** 2.063*** 1.655*** 1.123*** 0.789*** 0.611*** 0.298*
(0.593) (0.465) (0.410) (0.323) (0.316) (0.254) (0.191) (0.160) (0.166)
RIF mean 2.19 2.785 3.509 3.998 4.583 5.026 5.497 5.782 6.298
R2 0.255 0.363 0.311 0.356 0.348 0.295 0.221 0.123 0.106
Obs. 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182
Notes: Regression includes a constant. Bootstrap standard errors (computed by 500 replications) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4A.2: RIF Regression Results by Quantile of Earnings for Malawi (Weekly)
quantile q(10) q(20) q(30) q(40) q(50) q(60) q(70) q(80) q(90)
sch 0.007 0.041** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.081*** 0.109*** 0.116*** 0.167*** 0.206***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.023) (0.028) (0.040)
age 0.018 0.089* 0.143*** 0.092** 0.094** 0.057 0.076** 0.055 0.055
(0.057) (0.046) (0.048) (0.044) (0.040) (0.038) (0.037) (0.040) (0.052)
age2/100 -0.027 -0.116** -0.171*** -0.110** -0.101** -0.039 -0.069 -0.037 -0.012
(0.068) (0.059) (0.061) (0.055) (0.051) (0.049) (0.048) (0.053) (0.070)
female -0.172 -0.058 -0.008 -0.062 -0.123 -0.140 -0.053 -0.012 0.234
(0.169) (0.161) (0.145) (0.140) (0.133) (0.133) (0.143) (0.155) (0.233)
rural -0.100 -0.473*** -0.664*** -0.525*** -0.456*** -0.497*** -0.353** -0.183 -0.014
(0.171) (0.161) (0.151) (0.162) (0.144) (0.142) (0.156) (0.174) (0.277)
year 0.698*** 1.319*** 1.600*** 1.419*** 1.243*** 0.968*** 0.973*** 0.842*** 1.098***
(0.172) (0.170) (0.158) (0.186) (0.165) (0.145) (0.150) (0.157) (0.212)
weeks 2.088*** 1.512*** 1.179*** 1.106*** 0.970*** 0.779*** 0.678*** 0.478*** 0.409***
(0.342) (0.154) (0.132) (0.106) (0.098) (0.092) (0.085) (0.086) (0.101)
RIF mean 2.946 3.395 3.867 4.296 4.592 4.942 5.255 5.608 6.243
R2 0.50 0.42 0.44 0.40 0.38 0.36 0.31 0.27 0.23
Obs. 505 505 505 505 505 505 505 505 505
Notes: Regression includes a constant. Bootstrap standard errors (computed by 500 replications) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4A.3: RIF Regression Results by Quantile of Earnings for Malawi (Monthly)
quantile q(10) q(20) q(30) q(40) q(50) q(60) q(70) q(80) q(90)
sch 0.007 0.041** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.081*** 0.109*** 0.116*** 0.167*** 0.206***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.023) (0.028) (0.040)
age 0.018 0.089* 0.143*** 0.092** 0.094** 0.057 0.076** 0.055 0.055
(0.057) (0.046) (0.048) (0.044) (0.040) (0.038) (0.037) (0.040) (0.052)
age2/100 -0.027 -0.116** -0.171*** -0.110** -0.101** -0.039 -0.069 -0.037 -0.012
(0.068) (0.059) (0.061) (0.055) (0.051) (0.049) (0.048) (0.053) (0.070)
female -0.172 -0.058 -0.008 -0.062 -0.123 -0.140 -0.053 -0.012 0.234
(0.169) (0.161) (0.145) (0.140) (0.133) (0.133) (0.143) (0.155) (0.233)
rural -0.100 -0.473*** -0.664*** -0.525*** -0.456*** -0.497*** -0.353** -0.183 -0.014
(0.171) (0.161) (0.151) (0.162) (0.144) (0.142) (0.156) (0.174) (0.277)
year 0.698*** 1.319*** 1.600*** 1.419*** 1.243*** 0.968*** 0.973*** 0.842*** 1.098***
(0.172) (0.170) (0.158) (0.186) (0.165) (0.145) (0.150) (0.157) (0.212)
weeks 2.088*** 1.512*** 1.179*** 1.106*** 0.970*** 0.779*** 0.678*** 0.478*** 0.409***
(0.342) (0.154) (0.132) (0.106) (0.098) (0.092) (0.085) (0.086) (0.101)
RIF mean 2.946 3.395 3.867 4.296 4.592 4.942 5.255 5.608 6.243
R2 0.50 0.42 0.44 0.40 0.38 0.36 0.31 0.27 0.23
Obs. 505 505 505 505 505 505 505 505 505
Notes: Regression includes a constant. Bootstrap standard errors (computed by 500 replications) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4A.4: RIF Regression Results by Quantile of Earnings for Malawi (Pooled)
quantile q(10) q(20) q(30) q(40) q(50) q(60) q(70) q(80) q(90)
sch 0.070*** 0.112*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.128*** 0.121*** 0.155*** 0.160*** 0.123***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
age 0.052*** 0.076*** 0.097*** 0.093*** 0.070*** 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.045*** 0.041***
(0.018) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
age2/100 -0.057*** -0.084*** -0.098*** -0.090*** -0.063*** -0.047*** -0.044*** -0.029* -0.028*
(0.022) (0.019) (0.017) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
female -0.153*** -0.150*** -0.084* -0.013 0.028 -0.076* -0.102** 0.029 -0.026
(0.057) (0.046) (0.044) (0.046) (0.040) (0.039) (0.045) (0.052) (0.053)
rural -0.276*** -0.320*** -0.233*** -0.178*** -0.139*** -0.249*** -0.196*** -0.175*** -0.249***
(0.047) (0.043) (0.043) (0.047) (0.034) (0.033) (0.039) (0.044) (0.059)
year 0.933*** 1.175*** 1.419*** 1.419*** 1.425*** 1.485*** 1.526*** 1.389*** 0.952***
(0.054) (0.049) (0.054) (0.055) (0.049) (0.053) (0.060) (0.061) (0.056)
weeks 2.427*** 1.720*** 1.517*** 1.297*** 0.965*** 0.798*** 0.646*** 0.528*** 0.313***
(0.142) (0.072) (0.063) (0.052) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.026)
RIF mean 2.841 3.427 3.876 4.354 4.692 4.995 5.36 5.797 6.298
R2 0.39 0.42 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.46 0.40 0.32 0.19
Obs. 5816 5816 5816 5816 5816 5816 5816 5816 5816
Notes: Regression includes a constant. Bootstrap standard errors (computed by 500 replications) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01
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Table 4A.5: RIF Regression Results by Quantile of Earnings for Malawi (Ganyu)
quantile q(10) q(20) q(30) q(40) q(50) q(60) q(70) q(80) q(90)
sch 0.022*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.011*** 0.008** 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.026*** 0.026***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
age 0.027*** 0.040*** 0.048*** 0.046*** 0.048*** 0.050*** 0.044*** 0.047*** 0.044***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
age2/100 -0.030*** -0.047*** -0.055*** -0.056*** -0.059*** -0.061*** -0.053*** -0.054*** -0.052***
(0.012) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
female -0.126*** -0.176*** -0.266*** -0.325*** -0.392*** -0.437*** -0.467*** -0.513*** -0.523***
(0.038) (0.028) (0.029) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.035)
rural 0.019 -0.06 -0.086** -0.161*** -0.295*** -0.365*** -0.473*** -0.624*** -0.847***
(0.060) (0.048) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.048) (0.062) (0.085)
year 1.109*** 1.375*** 1.520*** 1.605*** 1.584*** 1.393*** 1.263*** 1.144*** 0.808***
(0.047) (0.042) (0.039) (0.043) (0.038) (0.044) (0.029) (0.033) (0.030)
weeks 1.324*** 1.215*** 1.156*** 1.112*** 1.028*** 0.964*** 0.939*** 0.917*** 0.745***
(0.047) (0.032) (0.025) (0.022) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.023)
RIF mean 0.523 1.277 1.74 2.192 2.569 2.942 3.371 3.834 4.423
R2 0.31 0.45 0.52 0.54 0.53 0.49 0.43 0.35 0.20
Obs. 16528 16528 16528 16528 16528 16528 16528 16528 16528
Notes: Regression includes a constant. Bootstrap standard errors (computed by 500 replications) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01
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Table 4A.6: RIF Regression Results by Quantile of Earnings for Tanzania (Daily)
quantile q(10) q(20) q(30) q(40) q(50) q(60) q(70) q(80) q(90)
sch -0.014 0.006 0.027*** 0.025** 0.030*** 0.055*** 0.077*** 0.070*** 0.042***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
age 0.035 0.025 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.075*** 0.079*** 0.076*** 0.071*** 0.056***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016)
age2/100 -0.033 -0.03 -0.069*** -0.074*** -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.094*** -0.085*** -0.064***
(0.029) (0.028) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.026) (0.025) (0.023) (0.021)
female -0.384*** -0.407*** -0.613*** -0.815*** -1.012*** -1.153*** -1.189*** -0.991*** -0.633***
(0.130) (0.102) (0.073) (0.076) (0.080) (0.089) (0.095) (0.086) (0.062)
rural 0.037 0.051 -0.162** -0.321*** -0.637*** -0.999*** -1.327*** -1.085*** -0.698***
(0.094) (0.080) (0.068) (0.068) (0.080) (0.102) (0.131) (0.132) (0.119)
panel -0.243** -0.178** -0.214*** -0.275*** -0.304*** -0.366*** -0.183* -0.073 -0.141
(0.100) (0.086) (0.077) (0.073) (0.077) (0.091) (0.098) (0.100) (0.097)
weeks 0.894*** 1.339*** 1.333*** 1.347*** 1.440*** 1.553*** 1.550*** 1.142*** 0.680***
(0.111) (0.059) (0.052) (0.047) (0.054) (0.059) (0.061) (0.053) (0.033)
RIF mean -0.274 0.500 1.129 1.631 2.091 2.812 3.475 4.194 4.922
R2 0.19 0.37 0.46 0.50 0.53 0.52 0.49 0.38 0.20
Obs. 3738 3738 3738 3738 3738 3738 3738 3738 3738
Notes: Regression includes a constant. Bootstrap standard errors (computed by 500 replications) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01
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Table 4A.7: RIF Regression Results by Quantile of Earnings for Tanzania (Weekly)
quantile q(10) q(20) q(30) q(40) q(50) q(60) q(70) q(80) q(90)
sch 0.006 0.032** 0.019 0.039*** 0.046*** 0.071*** 0.082*** 0.113*** 0.127***
(0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019)
age 0.048* 0.049** 0.036* 0.039** 0.040** 0.050*** 0.056*** 0.039* 0.031
(0.028) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.023) (0.028)
age2/100 -0.056 -0.053* -0.04 -0.045* -0.048* -0.062** -0.069*** -0.045 -0.028
(0.038) (0.028) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.030) (0.038)
female -0.348*** -0.315*** -0.429*** -0.591*** -0.714*** -0.598*** -0.550*** -0.746*** -0.783***
(0.107) (0.101) (0.092) (0.078) (0.088) (0.091) (0.096) (0.097) (0.103)
rural 0.698*** 0.469*** 0.380*** 0.200** -0.135 -0.488*** -0.886*** -1.166*** -1.554***
(0.124) (0.092) (0.087) (0.093) (0.088) (0.109) (0.150) (0.170) (0.235)
panel -0.003 0.057 -0.024 0.020 -0.119 -0.142 -0.126 -0.444*** -0.430***
(0.114) (0.104) (0.099) (0.100) (0.097) (0.100) (0.117) (0.128) (0.154)
weeks 0.884*** 1.042*** 1.246*** 1.348*** 1.456*** 1.360*** 1.273*** 1.068*** 0.907***
(0.060) (0.061) (0.057) (0.063) (0.057) (0.061) (0.059) (0.061) (0.072)
RIF mean -0.232 0.457 0.999 1.526 2.048 2.503 2.948 3.642 4.509
R2 0.23 0.38 0.51 0.57 0.60 0.57 0.53 0.41 0.27
Obs. 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929
Notes: Regression includes a constant. Bootstrap standard errors (computed by 500 replications) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01
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Table 4A.8: RIF Regression Results by Quantile of Earnings for Tanzania (Monthly)
quantile q(10) q(20) q(30) q(40) q(50) q(60) q(70) q(80) q(90)
sch 0.069*** 0.110*** 0.143*** 0.178*** 0.176*** 0.175*** 0.179*** 0.175*** 0.167***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
age 0.143*** 0.181*** 0.187*** 0.160*** 0.116*** 0.079*** 0.055*** 0.024** 0.007
(0.023) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
age2/100 -0.177*** -0.205*** -0.196*** -0.155*** -0.103*** -0.058*** -0.031** 0.008 0.030*
(0.027) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016)
female -0.218*** -0.298*** -0.511*** -0.547*** -0.455*** -0.351*** -0.261*** -0.163*** -0.086*
(0.075) (0.070) (0.057) (0.053) (0.046) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.050)
rural -0.260*** -0.391*** -0.349*** -0.393*** -0.317*** -0.224*** -0.187*** -0.175*** -0.185***
(0.066) (0.056) (0.051) (0.047) (0.041) (0.037) (0.040) (0.042) (0.046)
panel -0.013 0.037 0.022 0.118** -0.029 -0.151*** -0.205*** -0.202*** -0.264***
(0.060) (0.052) (0.048) (0.051) (0.044) (0.043) (0.045) (0.048) (0.056)
weeks 2.482*** 1.797*** 1.510*** 1.175*** 0.848*** 0.607*** 0.455*** 0.300*** 0.155***
(0.155) (0.087) (0.063) (0.053) (0.033) (0.025) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021)
RIF mean 2.137 2.863 3.465 3.853 4.352 4.701 5.021 5.368 5.838
R2 0.45 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.44 0.38 0.32 0.26 0.19
Obs. 4830 4830 4830 4830 4830 4830 4830 4830 4830
Notes: Regression includes a constant. Bootstrap standard errors (computed by 500 replications) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01
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Table 4A.9: RIF Regression Results by Quantile of Earnings for Tanzania (Pooled)
quantile q(10) q(20) q(30) q(40) q(50) q(60) q(70) q(80) q(90)
sch -0.003 0.018*** 0.043*** 0.088*** 0.125*** 0.164*** 0.177*** 0.170*** 0.171***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
age 0.018 0.040*** 0.064*** 0.102*** 0.125*** 0.126*** 0.100*** 0.070*** 0.034***
(0.014) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
age2/100 -0.030 -0.057*** -0.088*** -0.123*** -0.139*** -0.124*** -0.088*** -0.051*** -0.003
(0.018) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
female -0.477*** -0.668*** -0.676*** -0.691*** -0.709*** -0.724*** -0.587*** -0.369*** -0.184***
(0.059) (0.061) (0.044) (0.049) (0.045) (0.043) (0.037) (0.039) (0.035)
rural 0.124** -0.100** -0.302*** -0.532*** -0.700*** -0.695*** -0.581*** -0.361*** -0.286***
(0.049) (0.045) (0.040) (0.040) (0.046) (0.051) (0.046) (0.045) (0.047)
panel -0.138** -0.117*** -0.043 -0.071* 0.003 0.021 -0.076** -0.153*** -0.183***
(0.054) (0.044) (0.041) (0.038) (0.041) (0.039) (0.037) (0.036) (0.040)
weeks 1.405*** 1.712*** 1.826*** 1.659*** 1.493*** 1.154*** 0.823*** 0.509*** 0.307***
(0.054) (0.046) (0.045) (0.039) (0.041) (0.028) (0.023) (0.015) (0.014)
RIF mean 0.307 1.155 1.88 2.572 3.199 3.745 4.380 4.836 5.461
R2 0.30 0.50 0.58 0.60 0.58 0.51 0.43 0.31 0.20
Obs. 11215 11215 11215 11215 11215 11215 11215 11215 11215
Notes: Regression includes a constant. Bootstrap standard errors (computed by 500 replications) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01
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Table 4A.10: RIF Regression Results by Quantile of Earnings for Uganda (Daily)
quantile q(10) q(20) q(30) q(40) q(50) q(60) q(70) q(80) q(90)
sch 0.107*** 0.095*** 0.110*** 0.095*** 0.094*** 0.093*** 0.088*** 0.083*** 0.074***
(0.022) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
age -0.027 0.028 0.069*** 0.105*** 0.104*** 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.116*** 0.096***
(0.041) (0.028) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
age2/100 0.033 -0.042 -0.090*** -0.142*** -0.135*** -0.123*** -0.121*** -0.143*** -0.115***
(0.056) (0.039) (0.034) (0.034) (0.032) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027)
female -0.672*** -0.735*** -0.652*** -0.767*** -0.723*** -0.747*** -0.601*** -0.579*** -0.452***
(0.215) (0.151) (0.117) (0.112) (0.103) (0.100) (0.094) (0.087) (0.088)
rural -0.213 -0.239** -0.283*** -0.334*** -0.416*** -0.422*** -0.337*** -0.264** -0.360***
(0.139) (0.094) (0.087) (0.087) (0.091) (0.088) (0.098) (0.103) (0.115)
panel 0.046 0.034 -0.080 -0.084 -0.090 -0.079 0.019 0.096 0.075
(0.135) (0.098) (0.088) (0.093) (0.091) (0.091) (0.093) (0.102) (0.113)
weeks 2.388*** 1.812*** 1.394*** 1.154*** 0.989*** 0.855*** 0.705*** 0.573*** 0.421***
(0.236) (0.136) (0.110) (0.089) (0.068) (0.059) (0.053) (0.049) (0.046)
RIF mean 1.786 2.543 3.029 3.348 3.719 4.104 4.389 4.801 5.270
R2 0.36 0.41 0.38 0.35 0.31 0.28 0.22 0.18 0.11
Obs. 1262 1262 1262 1262 1262 1262 1262 1262 1262
Notes: Regression includes a constant. Bootstrap standard errors (computed by 500 replications) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01
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Table 4A.11: RIF Regression Results by Quantile of Earnings for Uganda (Weekly)
quantile q(10) q(20) q(30) q(40) q(50) q(60) q(70) q(80) q(90)
sch 0.071** 0.070*** 0.084*** 0.096*** 0.111*** 0.090*** 0.107*** 0.117*** 0.127***
(0.028) (0.023) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.027)
age 0.018 0.042 0.069* 0.101*** 0.105*** 0.062** 0.110*** 0.124*** 0.120***
(0.059) (0.044) (0.035) (0.035) (0.032) (0.028) (0.028) (0.024) (0.029)
age2/100 -0.01 -0.059 -0.088* -0.127*** -0.133*** -0.071* -0.125*** -0.145*** -0.133***
(0.075) (0.059) (0.048) (0.046) (0.044) (0.037) (0.037) (0.032) (0.037)
female -0.707** -0.713*** -0.828*** -0.634*** -0.716*** -0.591*** -0.479*** -0.417*** -0.169
(0.280) (0.194) (0.170) (0.156) (0.132) (0.129) (0.132) (0.131) (0.152)
rural -0.482*** -0.614*** -0.687*** -0.528*** -0.405*** -0.388*** -0.299** -0.314* -0.225
(0.178) (0.140) (0.134) (0.145) (0.135) (0.138) (0.146) (0.164) (0.196)
panel 0.217 0.153 -0.076 -0.044 -0.148 -0.124 -0.089 -0.137 -0.318*
(0.220) (0.182) (0.173) (0.166) (0.146) (0.138) (0.140) (0.172) (0.180)
weeks 1.850*** 2.123*** 1.464*** 1.192*** 0.978*** 0.810*** 0.541*** 0.517*** 0.376***
(0.336) (0.246) (0.156) (0.111) (0.096) (0.071) (0.074) (0.064) (0.075)
RIF mean 1.568 2.490 3.031 3.416 3.793 4.125 4.282 4.739 5.179
R2 0.28 0.46 0.44 0.38 0.38 0.30 0.26 0.22 0.14
Obs. 589 589 589 589 589 589 589 589 589
Notes: Regression includes a constant. Bootstrap standard errors (computed by 500 replications) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01
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Table 4A.12: RIF Regression Results by Quantile of Earnings for Uganda (Monthly)
quantile q(10) q(20) q(30) q(40) q(50) q(60) q(70) q(80) q(90)
sch 0.136*** 0.137*** 0.187*** 0.202*** 0.171*** 0.139*** 0.115*** 0.101*** 0.091***
(0.016) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
age 0.125*** 0.121*** 0.141*** 0.138*** 0.124*** 0.085*** 0.040*** 0.012 0.000
(0.032) (0.024) (0.020) (0.019) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014)
age2/100 -0.156*** -0.140*** -0.157*** -0.153*** -0.132*** -0.080*** -0.025 0.004 0.020
(0.040) (0.030) (0.025) (0.024) (0.020) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.019)
female -0.386*** -0.321*** -0.336*** -0.416*** -0.315*** -0.253*** -0.272*** -0.280*** -0.266***
(0.101) (0.064) (0.065) (0.063) (0.053) (0.048) (0.047) (0.044) (0.055)
rural 0.014 -0.094 -0.189*** -0.251*** -0.214*** -0.269*** -0.313*** -0.390*** -0.486***
(0.098) (0.063) (0.065) (0.065) (0.055) (0.048) (0.046) (0.047) (0.056)
panel 0.321*** 0.377*** 0.323*** 0.279*** 0.252*** 0.126** 0.037 -0.019 -0.06
(0.108) (0.079) (0.077) (0.075) (0.060) (0.053) (0.050) (0.050) (0.059)
weeks 3.191*** 1.724*** 1.350*** 1.026*** 0.699*** 0.499*** 0.365*** 0.303*** 0.230***
(0.279) (0.111) (0.080) (0.062) (0.047) (0.040) (0.034) (0.028) (0.028)
RIF mean 2.16 2.983 3.43 3.941 4.35 4.659 4.861 5.161 5.544
R2 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.38 0.30 0.23 0.15
Obs. 2765 2765 2765 2765 2765 2765 2765 2765 2765
Notes: Regression includes a constant. Bootstrap standard errors (computed by 500 replications) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01
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Table 4A.13: RIF Regression Results by Quantile of Earnings for Uganda (Pooled)
quantile q(10) q(20) q(30) q(40) q(50) q(60) q(70) q(80) q(90)
sch 0.105*** 0.115*** 0.133*** 0.155*** 0.153*** 0.146*** 0.121*** 0.109*** 0.092***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
age 0.063** 0.064*** 0.101*** 0.119*** 0.107*** 0.101*** 0.072*** 0.054*** 0.024**
(0.026) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
age2/100 -0.087*** -0.083*** -0.124*** -0.141*** -0.122*** -0.109*** -0.071*** -0.045*** -0.013
(0.034) (0.022) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
female -0.643*** -0.549*** -0.515*** -0.580*** -0.510*** -0.388*** -0.322*** -0.309*** -0.279***
(0.096) (0.063) (0.053) (0.050) (0.046) (0.044) (0.038) (0.038) (0.043)
rural -0.134* -0.190*** -0.208*** -0.325*** -0.256*** -0.254*** -0.290*** -0.306*** -0.362***
(0.076) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.046) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.049)
panel 0.340*** 0.252*** 0.215*** 0.193*** 0.182*** 0.190*** 0.115*** 0.052 0.011
(0.083) (0.062) (0.052) (0.053) (0.049) (0.046) (0.039) (0.041) (0.044)
weeks 2.978*** 1.929*** 1.381*** 1.125*** 0.855*** 0.602*** 0.443*** 0.345*** 0.260***
(0.184) (0.090) (0.056) (0.047) (0.038) (0.041) (0.026) (0.022) (0.020)
RIF mean 1.931 2.77 3.251 3.678 4.055 4.375 4.705 5.054 5.446
R2 0.41 0.44 0.41 0.40 0.38 0.36 0.29 0.24 0.14
Obs. 4631 4631 4631 4631 4631 4631 4631 4631 4631
Notes: Regression includes a constant. Bootstrap standard errors (computed by 500 replications) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01
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Appendix 4B: RIF Regression by Quantile (Quadratic Schooling)
Table 4B.1: RIF Regression for Malawi (Quadratic Schooling)
quantile q(10) q(25) q(50) q(75) q(90)
A. Daily
sch 0.278* 0.042 0.031 -0.096 -0.130
(0.165) (0.144) (0.140) (0.132) (0.126)
sch2 -0.011 0.003 0.006 0.011 0.011
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
RIF mean 2.190 3.205 4.583 5.618 6.298
R2 0.26 0.33 0.35 0.17 0.12
Obs. 182 182 182 182 182
B. Weekly
sch 0.046 0.030 -0.037 -0.179*** -0.376***
(0.073) (0.062) (0.048) (0.058) (0.095)
sch2 -0.003 0.002 0.008*** 0.023*** 0.040***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008)
RIF mean 2.946 3.602 4.592 5.365 6.243
R2 0.50 0.44 0.39 0.36 0.31
Obs. 505 505 505 505 505
C. Monthly
sch 0.137*** 0.103*** -0.064*** -0.177*** -0.260***
(0.027) (0.021) (0.013) (0.017) (0.024)
sch2 -0.004*** 0.002** 0.012*** 0.021*** 0.024***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
RIF mean 2.893 3.694 4.702 5.544 6.304
R2 0.40 0.46 0.52 0.43 0.25
Obs. 5129 5129 5129 5129 5129
D. Pooled
sch 0.126*** 0.083*** -0.061*** -0.167*** -0.258***
(0.026) (0.020) (0.014) (0.017) (0.024)
sch2 -0.003** 0.003** 0.012*** 0.020*** 0.024***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
RIF mean 2.841 3.672 4.692 5.558 6.298
R2 0.39 0.45 0.49 0.41 0.25
Obs. 5816 5816 5816 5816 5816
Note: Bootstrap standard errors computed by 500 replications in parentheses; * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Full results with all variables available upon request.
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Table 4B.2: RIF Regression for Tanzania (Quadratic Schooling)
quantile q(10) q(25) q(50) q(75) q(90)
A. Daily
sch -0.016 0.030 -0.069** -0.081** -0.035
(0.038) (0.031) (0.030) (0.037) (0.036)
sch2 0.000 0.000 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.008*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
RIF mean -0.274 0.789 2.091 3.854 4.922
R2 0.19 0.41 0.53 0.44 0.20
Obs. 3738 3738 3738 3738 3738
B. Weekly
sch -0.054 -0.011 -0.009 -0.003 -0.041
(0.044) (0.033) (0.035) (0.039) (0.059)
sch2 0.007 0.005 0.006* 0.010** 0.019**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
RIF mean -0.232 0.752 2.048 3.342 4.509
R2 0.24 0.44 0.60 0.49 0.28
Obs. 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929
C. Monthly
sch 0.147*** 0.116*** 0.076*** -0.065*** -0.170***
(0.035) (0.025) (0.016) (0.012) (0.019)
sch2 -0.005*** 0.000 0.006*** 0.014*** 0.020***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
RIF mean 2.137 3.178 4.352 5.203 5.838
R2 0.45 0.51 0.45 0.32 0.24
Obs. 4830 4830 4830 4830 4830
D. Pooled
sch 0.074*** 0.050*** 0.046*** -0.088*** -0.202***
(0.019) (0.016) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012)
sch2 -0.006*** -0.002** 0.006*** 0.020*** 0.028***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
RIF mean 0.307 1.545 3.199 4.615 5.461
R2 0.30 0.55 0.58 0.40 0.28
Obs. 11215 11215 11215 11215 11215
Note: Bootstrap standard errors computed by 500 replications in parentheses; * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Full results with all variables available upon request.
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Table 4B.3: RIF Regression for Uganda (Quadratic Schooling)
quantile q(10) q(25) q(50) q(75) q(90)
A. Daily
sch 0.161** 0.223*** 0.106*** 0.040 -0.003
(0.081) (0.048) (0.040) (0.037) (0.044)
sch2 -0.004 -0.008*** -0.001 0.004 0.006
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
RIF mean 1.786 2.774 3.719 4.580 5.270
R2 0.36 0.39 0.31 0.21 0.12
Obs. 1262 1262 1262 1262 1262
B. Weekly
sch 0.135 0.154** 0.154*** 0.027 -0.118*
(0.088) (0.061) (0.054) (0.045) (0.070)
sch2 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 0.006** 0.017***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006)
RIF mean 1.568 2.756 3.793 4.424 5.179
R2 0.28 0.45 0.38 0.23 0.17
Obs. 589 589 589 589 589
C. Monthly
sch 0.340*** 0.240*** 0.074*** -0.095*** -0.204***
(0.060) (0.034) (0.022) (0.017) (0.022)
sch2 -0.012*** -0.005*** 0.005*** 0.012*** 0.017***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
RIF mean 2.16 3.242 4.35 5.059 5.544
R2 0.46 0.45 0.44 0.30 0.20
Obs. 2765 2765 2765 2765 2765
D. Pooled
sch 0.229*** 0.206*** 0.103*** -0.071*** -0.154***
(0.039) (0.023) (0.019) (0.013) (0.017)
sch2 -0.008*** -0.005*** 0.003*** 0.011*** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
RIF mean 1.931 3.052 4.055 4.846 5.446
R2 0.41 0.42 0.38 0.28 0.18
Obs. 4631 4631 4631 4631 4631
Note: Bootstrap standard errors computed by 500 replications in parentheses; * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Full results with all variables available upon request.
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Appendix 4C: Gender Differences in Returns to Education
Table 4C.1: Returns to Education by Gender and Period - Malawi
Daily Weekly Monthly Pooled
female male female male female male female male
sch 0.012 -0.052 -0.162*** -0.082** -0.095*** -0.056*** -0.095*** -0.057***
(0.123) (0.094) (0.048) (0.038) (0.016) (0.009) (0.016) (0.009)
sch2 0.008 0.008 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.011***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
age 0.088 -0.005 0.105*** 0.067** 0.033*** 0.062*** 0.046*** 0.060***
(0.087) (0.076) (0.034) (0.026) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007)
age2 -0.085 0.021 -0.136*** -0.067** -0.024 -0.058*** -0.043*** -0.056***
(0.113) (0.094) (0.047) (0.033) (0.015) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008)
rural -0.919*** -0.085 -0.229* -0.363*** -0.121*** -0.213*** -0.152*** -0.232***
(0.334) (0.248) (0.132) (0.096) (0.039) (0.022) (0.038) (0.022)
year 0.138 1.106*** 1.171*** 0.981*** 1.302*** 1.284*** 1.248*** 1.243***
(0.361) (0.258) (0.121) (0.090) (0.037) (0.021) (0.036) (0.021)
weeks 1.187*** 1.306*** 1.198*** 0.977*** 1.226*** 1.094*** 1.206*** 1.084***
(0.268) (0.201) (0.084) (0.065) (0.034) (0.023) (0.032) (0.022)
constant -2.020 -1.381 -2.156*** -0.874 -1.927*** -1.816*** -1.971*** -1.690***
(1.892) (1.588) (0.630) (0.537) (0.232) (0.143) (0.223) (0.143)
AME(sch) 0.148*** 0.091*** 0.105*** 0.115*** 0.198*** 0.145*** 0.182*** 0.142***
(0.043) (0.032) (0.014) (0.012) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
R2 0.58 0.44 0.77 0.63 0.8 0.76 0.77 0.72
Obs. 49 133 144 361 1,265 3,864 1,458 4,358
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4C.2: Returns to Education by Gender and Period - Tanzania
Daily Weekly Monthly Pooled
female male female male female male female male
sch -0.032 -0.013 -0.114*** 0.010 0.016 0.036*** -0.050*** -0.002
(0.027) (0.020) (0.027) (0.022) (0.014) (0.013) (0.009) (0.008)
sch2 0.006* 0.006*** 0.019*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.014*** 0.007***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
age 0.033*** 0.064*** 0.039*** 0.049*** 0.079*** 0.097*** 0.060*** 0.069***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
age2 -0.043*** -0.077*** -0.046*** -0.054*** -0.062*** -0.094*** -0.060*** -0.073***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007)
rural -0.571*** -0.493*** -0.092 -0.255*** -0.215*** -0.302*** -0.300*** -0.356***
(0.072) (0.050) (0.075) (0.063) (0.035) (0.030) (0.032) (0.025)
panel -0.452*** -0.128*** -0.042 -0.178*** 0.025 -0.122*** -0.051* -0.113***
(0.068) (0.048) (0.073) (0.063) (0.036) (0.030) (0.029) (0.022)
weeks 1.036*** 1.226*** 1.018*** 1.135*** 1.107*** 1.047*** 1.083*** 1.141***
(0.024) (0.018) (0.022) (0.020) (0.025) (0.023) (0.012) (0.010)
constant -0.704*** -1.144*** -1.090*** -0.965*** -2.669*** -2.085*** -1.776*** -1.364***
(0.227) (0.190) (0.228) (0.222) (0.159) (0.154) (0.118) (0.103)
AME(sch) 0.148*** 0.091*** 0.105*** 0.115*** 0.198*** 0.145*** 0.182*** 0.142***
(0.043) (0.032) (0.014) (0.012) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
R2 0.64 0.72 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.66 0.80 0.76
Obs. 1,338 2,400 683 1,246 1,815 3,015 4,073 7,142
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4C.3: Returns to Education by Gender and Period - Uganda
Daily Weekly Monthly Pooled
female male female male female male female male
sch 0.108*** 0.111*** 0.076 0.040 0.054** 0.071*** 0.074*** 0.066***
(0.040) (0.029) (0.051) (0.044) (0.023) (0.020) (0.017) (0.015)
sch2 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.004 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
age -0.005 0.085*** 0.092*** 0.072*** 0.093*** 0.066*** 0.078*** 0.064***
(0.026) (0.016) (0.034) (0.023) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009)
age2 0.011 -0.111*** -0.112** -0.082*** -0.097*** -0.069*** -0.084*** -0.073***
(0.035) (0.022) (0.046) (0.030) (0.021) (0.016) (0.017) (0.012)
rural -0.175 -0.282*** -0.298** -0.377*** -0.171*** -0.276*** -0.142*** -0.288***
(0.117) (0.063) (0.147) (0.108) (0.052) (0.045) (0.045) (0.035)
panel -0.151 0.044 -0.322 -0.001 0.249*** 0.133*** 0.143*** 0.147***
(0.128) (0.062) (0.204) (0.119) (0.059) (0.048) (0.048) (0.036)
weeks 1.178*** 1.260*** 1.229*** 1.043*** 1.112*** 1.132*** 1.140*** 1.151***
(0.068) (0.047) (0.092) (0.067) (0.044) (0.044) (0.034) (0.029)
constant -1.461*** -2.469*** -3.117*** -1.452*** -3.247*** -2.331*** -3.022*** -2.005***
(0.508) (0.300) (0.663) (0.481) (0.274) (0.264) (0.222) (0.182)
AME(sch) 0.118*** 0.085*** 0.109*** 0.091*** 0.158*** 0.139*** 0.145*** 0.110***
(0.016) (0.009) (0.018) (0.013) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
R2 0.58 0.52 0.64 0.50 0.70 0.56 0.69 0.54
Obs. 281 981 167 422 1,022 1,743 1,475 3,156
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Appendix 4D:RIF OB Gender Decomposition by Quantile and Country
Table 4D.1: RIF OB Gender Decomposition by Quantile for Malawi(Daily)
Quantile q(10) q(20) q(30) q(40) q(50) q(60) q(70) q(80) q(90)
Overall
Male 2.204*** 2.800*** 3.465*** 3.782*** 4.638*** 5.136*** 5.545*** 5.924*** 6.343***
Counterfactual 2.224*** 2.851*** 3.561*** 3.935*** 4.631*** 5.058*** 5.419*** 5.762*** 6.242***
Female 2.294*** 2.888*** 3.737*** 4.230*** 4.565*** 5.005*** 5.421*** 5.664*** 6.189***
Difference -0.09 -0.088 -0.271 -0.448 0.073 0.131 0.123 0.26 0.154
Explained -0.02 -0.051 -0.096 -0.153 0.007 0.078 0.126 0.162 0.101
Unexplained -0.07 -0.037 -0.175 -0.294 0.066 0.053 -0.003 0.098 0.053
Pure explained 0.006 -0.024 -0.121 -0.139 -0.011 0.141 0.127 0.011 0.086
education 0.116 0.079 0.008 -0.055 0.002 0.025 0.024 -0.020 -0.005
covariates -0.109 -0.103 -0.129 -0.084 -0.013 0.117 0.103 0.031 0.091
Pure unexplained -0.001 0.037 -0.102 -0.22 0.115 0.108 0.032 0.114 0.087
education 0.834 -0.269 -1.232 -1.819 -2.042* -1.138 -0.871 -0.054 1.699
covariates 0.508 -9.582 -7.637 -1.515 3.372 2.109 -0.171 3.201 2.367
_cons -1.344 9.889 8.767 3.113 -1.215 -0.863 1.074 -3.034 -3.979
Specification error -0.027 -0.027 0.026 -0.014 0.018 -0.063 -0.001 0.151 0.015
Reweight error -0.068 -0.074 -0.074 -0.074 -0.049 -0.055 -0.035 -0.016 -0.035
Obs. Male 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 133
Obs. Female 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49
Obs. Total 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors computed by 500 replications. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The significance of coefficients on
‘Male’ and ‘female’ implies that the mean for each group is significantly different from their combine mean.
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Table 4D.2: RIF OB Gender Decomposition by Quantile for Malawi(Weekly)
Quantile q(10) q(20) q(30) q(40) q(50) q(60) q(70) q(80) q(90)
Overall
Male 3.058*** 3.462*** 3.976*** 4.269*** 4.671*** 5.043*** 5.307*** 5.693*** 6.254***
Counterfactual 2.774*** 3.401*** 3.754*** 4.233*** 4.538*** 4.898*** 5.243*** 5.611*** 6.130***
Female 2.675*** 3.342*** 3.755*** 4.171*** 4.378*** 4.744*** 5.048*** 5.398*** 6.239***
Difference 0.383 0.120 0.221 0.098 0.292* 0.299* 0.258* 0.294 0.014
Explained 0.284 0.061 0.222 0.036 0.132 0.145 0.064 0.082 0.124
Unexplained 0.099 0.059 -0.001 0.062 0.16 0.154 0.195 0.213 -0.11
Pure explained 0.197 0.166 0.147 0.119 0.130 0.138 0.097 0.057 0.108
education 0.002 0.027 0.033 0.007 0.006 -0.001 -0.001 -0.035 -0.055
covariates 0.194 0.139 0.115 0.112 0.123 0.139* 0.098 0.093 0.163**
Pure unexplained 0.070 0.038 -0.012 0.048 0.150 0.144 0.182 0.198 -0.127
education -0.512 0.177 0.618 0.391 0.680* 0.171 -0.083 -0.191 0.109
covariates -0.634 -4.027 -1.528 -1.55 -0.696 -3.256* -1.075 -2.938* -0.571
_cons 1.216 3.889 0.898 1.207 0.166 3.229* 1.340 3.327* 0.335
Specification error 0.087 -0.104 0.075 -0.083 0.003 0.006 -0.033 0.024 0.016
Reweight error 0.030 0.020 0.012 0.014 0.010 0.010 0.013 0.015 0.018
Obs. Male 361 361 361 361 361 361 361 361 361
Obs. Female 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144
Obs. Total 505 505 505 505 505 505 505 505 505
Notes: Notes: Bootstrap standard errors computed by 500 replications. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.The significance of coefficients
on ‘Male’ and ‘female’ implies that the mean for each group is significantly different from their combine mean.
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Table 4D.3: RIF OB Gender Decomposition by Quantile for Malawi(Monthly)
quantile q(10) q(20) q(30) q(40) q(50) q(60) q(70) q(80) q(90)
Overall
Male 2.939*** 3.482*** 3.921*** 4.350*** 4.670*** 4.985*** 5.362*** 5.770*** 6.283***
Counterfactual 2.911*** 3.588*** 3.988*** 4.435*** 4.799*** 5.183*** 5.566*** 6.018*** 6.514***
Female 2.709*** 3.375*** 3.870*** 4.429*** 4.718*** 4.960*** 5.417*** 5.938*** 6.370***
Difference 0.229*** 0.108 0.051 -0.079 -0.048 0.025 -0.055 -0.168*** -0.087
Explained 0.028 -0.105 -0.067 -0.085 -0.128** -0.198*** -0.204*** -0.249*** -0.231***
Unexplained 0.202*** 0.213*** 0.118* 0.006 0.080* 0.223*** 0.149** 0.08 0.144**
Pure explained 0.054 -0.061 -0.087* -0.117** -0.156*** -0.194*** -0.238*** -0.253*** -0.245***
education -0.029** -0.069*** -0.097*** -0.111*** -0.119*** -0.119*** -0.146*** -0.171*** -0.161***
covariates 0.084* 0.007 0.01 -0.007 -0.038 -0.076** -0.092** -0.082** -0.083***
Pure unexplained 0.190** 0.202*** 0.105* -0.006 0.067 0.209*** 0.133** 0.063 0.126*
education 0.102 0.081 -0.607** -0.05 -0.044 0.054 -0.233 -0.174 -0.252*
covariates 1.057 0.166 -1.156 -0.099 0.974* 0.866 -0.588 -1.441** -0.696
_cons -0.968 -0.045 1.868* 0.143 -0.863 -0.712 0.954 1.678** 1.074
Specification error -0.027 -0.044 0.02 0.032 0.028 -0.004 0.034 0.004 0.013
Reweight error 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.013* 0.014* 0.016** 0.017** 0.018***
Obs. Male 3864 3864 3864 3864 3864 3864 3864 3864 3864
Obs. Female 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265
Obs. Total 5129 5129 5129 5129 5129 5129 5129 5129 5129
Notes: Notes: Bootstrap standard errors computed by 500 replications. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The significance of coefficients on
‘Male’ and ‘female’ implies that the mean for each group is significantly different from their combine mean.
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Table 4D.4: RIF OB Gender Decomposition by Quantile for Malawi(Pooled)
quantile q(10) q(20) q(30) q(40) q(50) q(60) q(70) q(80) q(90)
Overall
Male 2.914*** 3.476*** 3.907*** 4.345*** 4.670*** 4.993*** 5.353*** 5.760*** 6.281***
Counterfactual 2.837*** 3.495*** 3.943*** 4.372*** 4.769*** 5.129*** 5.521*** 5.973*** 6.475***
Female 2.706*** 3.358*** 3.831*** 4.340*** 4.754*** 5.004*** 5.367*** 5.891*** 6.349***
Difference 0.208*** 0.118 0.076 0.005 -0.085** -0.012 -0.014 -0.131** -0.068
Explained 0.077 -0.019 -0.036 -0.027 -0.099** -0.137*** -0.168*** -0.212*** -0.194***
Unexplained 0.131* 0.137** 0.112** 0.032 0.015 0.125*** 0.154*** 0.081 0.126**
Pure explained 0.076 -0.034 -0.06 -0.088** -0.123*** -0.154*** -0.191*** -0.207*** -0.203***
education -0.017 -0.047*** -0.074*** -0.087*** -0.095*** -0.097*** -0.121*** -0.145*** -0.144***
covariates 0.092* 0.014 0.014 -0.001 -0.028 -0.058* -0.070** -0.062** -0.059***
Pure unexplained 0.116* 0.125** 0.098* 0.018 0.001 0.110** 0.138*** 0.065 0.109**
education 0.053 0.101 -0.430** -0.086 -0.004 -0.011 -0.231 -0.166 -0.020
covariates 0.215 -0.501 -1.573* -0.476 0.686 0.492 -0.718 -1.498*** -0.432
_cons -0.152 0.524 2.102** 0.580 -0.682 -0.370 1.088* 1.729*** 0.561
Specification error 0.014 0.012* 0.014* 0.014** 0.014** 0.015** 0.016** 0.017*** 0.018***
Reweight error 0.002 0.015 0.024 0.06 0.023 0.018 0.023 -0.005 0.009
Obs. Male 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358
Obs. Female 1458 1458 1458 1458 1458 1458 1458 1458 1458
Obs. Total 5816 5816 5816 5816 5816 5816 5816 5816 5816
Notes: Notes: Bootstrap standard errors computed by 500 replications. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The significance of coefficients on
‘Male’ and ‘female’ implies that the mean for each group is significantly different from their combine mean.
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Table 4D.5: RIF OB Gender Decomposition by Quantile for Malawi(Ganyu)
q(10) q(20) q(30) q(40) q(50) q(60) q(70) q(80) q(90)
Overall
Male 0.872*** 1.566*** 2.020*** 2.481*** 2.929*** 3.312*** 3.689*** 4.161*** 4.715***
Counterfactual 0.410*** 1.093*** 1.567*** 2.082*** 2.555*** 2.944*** 3.378*** 3.850*** 4.471***
Female 0.221*** 0.989*** 1.495*** 1.875*** 2.231*** 2.657*** 2.958*** 3.409*** 3.931***
Difference 0.651*** 0.578*** 0.526*** 0.607*** 0.698*** 0.655*** 0.731*** 0.753*** 0.784***
Explained 0.462*** 0.473*** 0.453*** 0.400*** 0.374*** 0.368*** 0.311*** 0.311*** 0.244***
Unexplained 0.190*** 0.105** 0.073** 0.207*** 0.324*** 0.287*** 0.420*** 0.442*** 0.539***
Pure explained 0.532*** 0.496*** 0.465*** 0.407*** 0.379*** 0.372*** 0.363*** 0.335*** 0.280***
education 0.035*** 0.052*** 0.036*** 0.018** 0.027*** 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.033***
covariates 0.497*** 0.444*** 0.429*** 0.389*** 0.352*** 0.335*** 0.329*** 0.298*** 0.247***
Pure unexplained 0.246*** 0.175*** 0.145*** 0.278*** 0.386*** 0.345*** 0.475*** 0.497*** 0.585***
education -0.110 0.045 0.069 0.071 0.026 0.044 0.067* 0.020 -0.072
covariates -0.675 0.018 0.641** 0.964*** 0.563** 0.240 0.274 0.611** -0.308
_cons 1.032* 0.112 -0.565* -0.756** -0.203 0.06 0.134 -0.133 0.965***
Specification error -0.071 -0.023 -0.012 -0.007 -0.005 -0.004 -0.052* -0.024 -0.036**
Reweight error -0.056*** -0.071*** -0.073*** -0.071*** -0.062*** -0.057*** -0.055*** -0.056*** -0.046***
Obs. Male 8282 8282 8282 8282 8282 8282 8282 8282 8282
Obs. Female 8246 8246 8246 8246 8246 8246 8246 8246 8246
Obs. Total 16528 16528 16528 16528 16528 16528 16528 16528 16528
Notes: Notes: Bootstrap standard errors computed by 500 replications. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The significance of coefficients on
‘Male’ and ‘female’ implies that the mean for each group is significantly different from their combine mean.
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Table 4D.6: RIF OB Gender Decomposition by Quantile for Tanzania(Daily)
quantile q(10) q(20) q(30) q(40) q(50) q(60) q(70) q(80) q(90)
Overall
Male 0.090* 0.925*** 1.664*** 2.241*** 2.817*** 3.481*** 4.165*** 4.730*** 5.218***
Counterfactual -0.358*** 0.141 0.732*** 1.395*** 1.842*** 2.445*** 3.013*** 3.854*** 4.765***
Female -0.661*** -0.242*** 0.475*** 0.906*** 1.237*** 1.670*** 2.132*** 2.755*** 3.603***
Difference 0.751*** 1.167*** 1.190*** 1.335*** 1.580*** 1.811*** 2.033*** 1.975*** 1.615***
Explained 0.448*** 0.784*** 0.932*** 0.846*** 0.975*** 1.035*** 1.152*** 0.876*** 0.454***
Unexplained 0.303*** 0.383*** 0.258*** 0.489*** 0.605*** 0.776*** 0.881*** 1.099*** 1.161***
Pure explained 0.809*** 0.996*** 0.964*** 1.062*** 1.123*** 1.133*** 0.885*** 0.622*** 0.377***
education 0.029 0.068*** 0.046** 0.040* 0.092*** 0.103*** 0.092*** 0.073*** 0.032*
covariates 0.780*** 0.928*** 0.918*** 1.022*** 1.031*** 1.030*** 0.793*** 0.549*** 0.345***
Pure unexplained 0.340*** 0.461*** 0.355*** 0.583*** 0.701*** 0.875*** 0.983*** 1.201*** 1.228***
education -0.296** 0.135 0.227* 0.138 0.053 0.022 0.102 0.005 0.026
covariates 0.261 0.426 1.690** 0.661 1.080* 1.294** 1.645** 1.811** 1.520**
_cons 0.375 -0.099 -1.562* -0.215 -0.433 -0.442 -0.764 -0.615 -0.319
Specification error -0.361*** -0.212*** -0.032 -0.216*** -0.148** -0.097 0.267*** 0.254*** 0.077
Reweight error -0.037*** -0.078*** -0.097*** -0.094*** -0.096*** -0.099*** -0.102*** -0.102*** -0.067***
Obs. Male 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400
Obs. Female 1338 1338 1338 1338 1338 1338 1338 1338 1338
Obs. Total 3738 3738 3738 3738 3738 3738 3738 3738 3738
Notes: Notes: Bootstrap standard errors computed by 500 replications. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The significance of coefficients on
‘Male’ and ‘female’ implies that the mean for each group is significantly different from their combine mean.
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Table 4D.7: RIF OB Gender Decomposition by Quantile for Tanzania(Weekly)
quantile q(10) q(20) q(30) q(40) q(50) q(60) q(70) q(80) q(90)
Overall
Male 0.124* 0.823*** 1.477*** 2.032*** 2.447*** 2.895*** 3.563*** 4.123*** 4.899***
Counterfactual -0.176** 0.295*** 0.736*** 1.175*** 1.645*** 2.222*** 2.718*** 3.321*** 4.158***
Female -0.417*** 0.014 0.490*** 0.837*** 1.173*** 1.650*** 2.170*** 2.724*** 3.337***
Difference 0.541*** 0.809*** 0.987*** 1.195*** 1.274*** 1.246*** 1.393*** 1.400*** 1.562***
Explained 0.300*** 0.528*** 0.741*** 0.857*** 0.802*** 0.673*** 0.845*** 0.803*** 0.741***
Unexplained 0.240* 0.281*** 0.247*** 0.338*** 0.472*** 0.573*** 0.548*** 0.597*** 0.822***
Pure explained 0.457*** 0.620*** 0.788*** 0.796*** 0.783*** 0.817*** 0.811*** 0.730*** 0.611***
education 0.027 0.058* 0.095*** 0.080*** 0.093*** 0.127*** 0.122*** 0.140*** 0.162***
covariates 0.430*** 0.562*** 0.693*** 0.716*** 0.690*** 0.690*** 0.689*** 0.590*** 0.449***
Pure unexplained 0.257** 0.323*** 0.306*** 0.408*** 0.555*** 0.655*** 0.629*** 0.684*** 0.902***
education 0.083 -0.013 0.024 0.196 0.280** 0.059 0.031 0.124 0.123
covariates -0.371 0.086 1.189 0.305 0.471 -0.833 -1.072 -0.583 -0.473
_cons 0.544 0.249 -0.907 -0.093 -0.196 1.429* 1.669** 1.144 1.252
Specification error -0.157 -0.091 -0.047 0.061 0.019 -0.143** 0.034 0.073 0.129
Reweight error -0.016 -0.042** -0.059** -0.070*** -0.083*** -0.082*** -0.080*** -0.087*** -0.081***
Obs. Male 1246 1246 1246 1246 1246 1246 1246 1246 1246
Obs. Female 683 683 683 683 683 683 683 683 683
Obs. Total 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929
Notes: Notes: Bootstrap standard errors computed by 500 replications. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The significance of coefficients on
‘Male’ and ‘female’ implies that the mean for each group is significantly different from their combine mean.
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Table 4D.8: RIF OB Gender Decomposition by Quantile for
Tanzania(Monthly)
quantile q(10) q(20) q(30) q(40) q(50) q(60) q(70) q(80) q(90)
Overall
Male 2.437*** 3.230*** 3.708*** 4.220*** 4.559*** 4.803*** 5.128*** 5.499*** 5.900***
Counterfactual 2.148*** 2.761*** 3.446*** 3.918*** 4.374*** 4.720*** 5.014*** 5.333*** 5.783***
Female 1.774*** 2.565*** 2.982*** 3.415*** 3.746*** 4.227*** 4.663*** 5.067*** 5.702***
Difference 0.663*** 0.665*** 0.726*** 0.804*** 0.814*** 0.576*** 0.465*** 0.432*** 0.198***
Explained 0.290*** 0.469*** 0.262*** 0.302*** 0.185*** 0.083 0.114** 0.166*** 0.117***
Unexplained 0.374*** 0.196*** 0.464*** 0.503*** 0.629*** 0.493*** 0.351*** 0.266*** 0.082*
Pure explained 0.382*** 0.395*** 0.329*** 0.230*** 0.195*** 0.153*** 0.124*** 0.112*** 0.092***
education -0.001 -0.004 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008 -0.009 -0.010 -0.012 -0.014
covariates 0.383*** 0.399*** 0.335*** 0.237*** 0.203*** 0.162*** 0.134*** 0.124*** 0.106***
Pure unexplained 0.343*** 0.154** 0.428*** 0.473*** 0.603*** 0.470*** 0.332*** 0.254*** 0.073
education 0.019 0.445* 0.441** 0.17 -0.243 -0.646*** -0.512*** -0.402*** -0.331***
covariates -2.052 1.947** 1.100 -0.195 -1.221** -0.917* 0.092 0.513 1.053***
_cons 2.375 -2.238** -1.114 0.497 2.066*** 2.033*** 0.753 0.144 -0.650
Specification error -0.092 0.074 -0.067 0.072** -0.010 -0.070 -0.010 0.054* 0.024
Reweight error 0.031 0.043* 0.036* 0.030* 0.026* 0.023** 0.019** 0.012 0.009
Obs. Male 3015 3015 3015 3015 3015 3015 3015 3015 3015
Obs. Female 1815 1815 1815 1815 1815 1815 1815 1815 1815
Obs. Total 4830 4830 4830 4830 4830 4830 4830 4830 4830
Notes: Notes: Bootstrap standard errors computed by 500 replications. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The significance of coefficients
on ‘Male’ and ‘female’ implies that the mean for each group is significantly different from their combine mean.
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Table 4D.9: RIF OB Gender Decomposition by Quantile for Tanzania(Pooled)
quantile q(10) q(20) q(30) q(40) q(50) q(60) q(70) q(80) q(90)
Overall
Male 0.732*** 1.644*** 2.345*** 3.001*** 3.663*** 4.155*** 4.664*** 5.079*** 5.565***
Counterfactual 0.230*** 1.089*** 1.795*** 2.496*** 3.120*** 3.714*** 4.368*** 4.831*** 5.460***
Female -0.131*** 0.642*** 1.181*** 1.824*** 2.440*** 2.998*** 3.572*** 4.239*** 5.104***
Difference 0.863*** 1.002*** 1.165*** 1.176*** 1.223*** 1.157*** 1.092*** 0.840*** 0.461***
Explained 0.502*** 0.555*** 0.550*** 0.505*** 0.543*** 0.442*** 0.296*** 0.248*** 0.105***
Unexplained 0.361*** 0.448*** 0.615*** 0.671*** 0.680*** 0.716*** 0.796*** 0.592*** 0.355***
Pure explained 0.543*** 0.588*** 0.596*** 0.592*** 0.501*** 0.364*** 0.240*** 0.167*** 0.075***
education 0.026** 0.026*** 0.032*** 0.051*** 0.054*** 0.048*** 0.029** 0.018 -0.004
covariates 0.517*** 0.562*** 0.564*** 0.541*** 0.447*** 0.316*** 0.210*** 0.150*** 0.079***
Pure unexplained 0.362*** 0.449*** 0.614*** 0.668*** 0.673*** 0.707*** 0.785*** 0.579*** 0.340***
education 0.358*** 0.271** 0.186* 0.079 -0.060 -0.107 -0.317*** -0.691*** -0.681***
covariates 0.662 1.531*** 0.990** 0.637 0.923** -0.063 -1.192*** -0.994*** -0.191
_cons -0.658 -1.354*** -0.563 -0.048 -0.19 0.877** 2.294*** 2.264*** 1.213***
Specification error -0.041 -0.033 -0.046 -0.087*** 0.042 0.078** 0.056** 0.081*** 0.031
Reweight error -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.007 0.009 0.011 0.013** 0.015***
Obs. Male 7142 7142 7142 7142 7142 7142 7142 7142 7142
Obs. Female 4073 4073 4073 4073 4073 4073 4073 4073 4073
Obs. Total 11215 11215 11215 11215 11215 11215 11215 11215 11215
Notes: Notes: Bootstrap standard errors computed by 500 replications. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The significance of coefficients on
‘Male’ and ‘female’ implies that the mean for each group is significantly different from their combine mean.
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Table 4D.10: RIF OB Gender Decomposition by Quantile for Uganda (Daily)
quantile q(10) q(20) q(30) q(40) q(50) q(60) q(70) q(80) q(90)
Overall
Male 2.115*** 2.785*** 3.246*** 3.617*** 3.966*** 4.278*** 4.576*** 4.957*** 5.398***
Counterfactual 1.426*** 2.381*** 2.763*** 3.245*** 3.562*** 3.957*** 4.285*** 4.649*** 5.214***
Female 1.147*** 1.800*** 2.307*** 2.516*** 3.033*** 3.288*** 3.549*** 3.958*** 4.478***
Difference 0.968*** 0.986*** 0.940*** 1.101*** 0.933*** 0.990*** 1.027*** 1.000*** 0.920***
Explained 0.689*** 0.404** 0.484*** 0.372*** 0.404*** 0.321*** 0.290*** 0.309*** 0.185*
Unexplained 0.279 0.582*** 0.456*** 0.729*** 0.529*** 0.670*** 0.737*** 0.691*** 0.736***
Pure explained 0.703*** 0.598*** 0.505*** 0.482*** 0.413*** 0.383*** 0.319*** 0.271*** 0.204***
education 0.185** 0.242*** 0.201*** 0.197*** 0.189*** 0.176*** 0.142*** 0.128*** 0.093**
covariates 0.517*** 0.356*** 0.305*** 0.285*** 0.224*** 0.207*** 0.177*** 0.144*** 0.110**
Pure unexplained 0.420** 0.669*** 0.528*** 0.793*** 0.580*** 0.711*** 0.776*** 0.723*** 0.760***
education 0.031 -0.319 -0.034 -0.199 -0.276 -0.179 -0.031 -0.114 -0.167
covariates 2.169 1.049 1.510 1.536 1.340 0.888 0.407 1.279 0.912
_cons -1.780 -0.061 -0.948 -0.544 -0.484 0.002 0.399 -0.443 0.015
Specification error -0.014 -0.195 -0.022 -0.110 -0.009 -0.062 -0.028 0.038 -0.019
Reweight error -0.141 -0.088 -0.072 -0.064 -0.051 -0.041 -0.039 -0.032 -0.024
Obs. Male 981 981 981 981 981 981 981 981 981
Obs. Female 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281
Obs. Total 1262 1262 1262 1262 1262 1262 1262 1262 1262
Notes: Notes: Bootstrap standard errors computed by 500 replications. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The significance of coefficients
on ‘Male’ and ‘female’ implies that the mean for each group is significantly different from their combine mean.
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Table 4D.11: RIF OB Gender Decomposition by Quantile for Uganda (Weekly)
quantile q(10) q(20) q(30) q(40) q(50) q(60) q(70) q(80) q(90)
Overall
Male 1.914*** 2.763*** 3.210*** 3.720*** 3.954*** 4.320*** 4.401*** 4.842*** 5.380***
Counterfactual 1.563*** 2.467*** 3.041*** 3.348*** 3.798*** 4.156*** 4.304*** 4.727*** 5.301***
Female 1.283*** 1.791*** 2.369*** 2.712*** 3.125*** 3.539*** 3.804*** 4.253*** 4.756***
Difference 0.631*** 0.972*** 0.841*** 1.008*** 0.828*** 0.781*** 0.597*** 0.589*** 0.623***
Explained 0.351 0.296 0.169 0.371** 0.155 0.163 0.096 0.115 0.079
Unexplained 0.280 0.676*** 0.671*** 0.637*** 0.673*** 0.617*** 0.500*** 0.474*** 0.545***
Pure explained 0.494* 0.381** 0.312** 0.257** 0.165* 0.159* 0.159* 0.141* 0.071
education 0.116 0.126** 0.130** 0.130** 0.071 0.061 0.084 0.079 0.024
covariates 0.377 0.254 0.182 0.127 0.094 0.098 0.075 0.061 0.048
Pure unexplained 0.303 0.706*** 0.695*** 0.663*** 0.698*** 0.640*** 0.529*** 0.500*** 0.577***
education 0.406 -0.169 0.057 0.07 0.271 -0.319 -0.650* -0.439 -0.765*
covariates 1.587 -0.908 -0.759 0.342 -0.208 -1.581 -1.032 -0.245 0.054
_cons -1.689 1.783 1.396 0.251 0.635 2.539* 2.212 1.184 1.288
Specification error -0.143 -0.085 -0.143 0.114 -0.01 0.004 -0.063 -0.025 0.007
Reweight error -0.024 -0.029 -0.023 -0.026 -0.026 -0.022 -0.029 -0.026 -0.032
Obs. Male 422 422 422 422 422 422 422 422 422
Obs. Female 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167
Obs. Total 589 589 589 589 589 589 589 589 589
Notes: Notes: Bootstrap standard errors computed by 500 replications. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The significance of coefficients
on ‘Male’ and ‘female’ implies that the mean for each group is significantly different from their combine mean.
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Table 4D.12: RIF OB Gender Decomposition by Quantile for Uganda
(Monthly)
quantile q(10) q(20) q(30) q(40) q(50) q(60) q(70) q(80) q(90)
Overall
Male 2.546*** 3.206*** 3.684*** 4.100*** 4.427*** 4.714*** 5.034*** 5.234*** 5.588***
Counterfactual 2.127*** 2.920*** 3.411*** 4.021*** 4.388*** 4.693*** 4.969*** 5.228*** 5.609***
Female 1.724*** 2.582*** 3.048*** 3.525*** 3.999*** 4.418*** 4.640*** 4.976*** 5.332***
Difference 0.822*** 0.623*** 0.636*** 0.575*** 0.428*** 0.296*** 0.394*** 0.258*** 0.256***
Explained 0.419*** 0.286*** 0.273*** 0.078 0.039 0.021 0.065 0.005 -0.021
Unexplained 0.403*** 0.338*** 0.364*** 0.497*** 0.388*** 0.275*** 0.329*** 0.253*** 0.276***
Pure explained 0.350*** 0.203*** 0.137** 0.130** 0.100** 0.058 0.040 -0.004 -0.026
education -0.033* -0.048* -0.064* -0.063* -0.055* -0.045* -0.038* -0.034* -0.033*
covariates 0.383*** 0.251*** 0.201*** 0.193*** 0.155*** 0.103*** 0.078*** 0.03 0.007
Pure unexplained 0.400*** 0.334*** 0.357*** 0.489*** 0.377*** 0.265*** 0.323*** 0.250*** 0.275***
education 0.122 -0.612 0.493 -0.028 -0.386 -0.276 -0.073 -0.125 0.020
covariates -0.247 -0.784 -1.130 -0.362 -0.569 -0.254 0.159 0.135 0.155
_cons 0.525 1.730 0.994 0.879 1.332* 0.794 0.238 0.240 0.100
Specification error 0.069 0.083 0.135*** -0.052 -0.061 -0.038 0.026 0.009 0.006
Reweight error 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.01 0.006 0.003 0.001
Obs. Male 1743 1743 1743 1743 1743 1743 1743 1743 1743
Obs. Female 1022 1022 1022 1022 1022 1022 1022 1022 1022
Obs. Total 2765 2765 2765 2765 2765 2765 2765 2765 2765
Notes: Notes: Bootstrap standard errors computed by 500 replications. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The significance of coefficients
on ‘Male’ and ‘female’ implies that the mean for each group is significantly different from their combine mean.
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Table 4D.13: RIF OB Gender Decomposition by Quantile for Uganda (Pooled)
quantile q(10) q(20) q(30) q(40) q(50) q(60) q(70) q(80) q(90)
Overall
Male 2.370*** 3.034*** 3.455*** 3.900*** 4.166*** 4.532*** 4.816*** 5.103*** 5.502***
Counterfactual 1.931*** 2.803*** 3.333*** 3.736*** 4.179*** 4.512*** 4.831*** 5.168*** 5.515***
Female 1.422*** 2.304*** 2.808*** 3.228*** 3.586*** 3.975*** 4.420*** 4.783*** 5.224***
Difference 0.949*** 0.731*** 0.647*** 0.671*** 0.580*** 0.557*** 0.396*** 0.320*** 0.278***
Explained 0.439*** 0.231*** 0.122** 0.163*** -0.013 0.02 -0.014 -0.065* -0.013
Unexplained 0.510*** 0.500*** 0.525*** 0.508*** 0.593*** 0.537*** 0.411*** 0.385*** 0.291***
Pure explained 0.335*** 0.212*** 0.159*** 0.083** 0.060 0.020 -0.018 -0.051** -0.092***
education 0.007 0.005 -0.011 -0.031 -0.051** -0.065*** -0.076*** -0.080*** -0.087***
covariates 0.328*** 0.208*** 0.169*** 0.114*** 0.111*** 0.085*** 0.058*** 0.029** -0.005
Pure unexplained 0.505*** 0.492*** 0.513*** 0.493*** 0.579*** 0.522*** 0.397*** 0.374*** 0.282***
education 0.230 -0.322 -0.247 -0.240 -0.502*** -0.636*** -0.547*** -0.313*** -0.162*
covariates 0.383 -0.652 -0.529 -0.671 -0.533 -0.757 -0.486 -0.061 0.076
_cons -0.108 1.466 1.290 1.405* 1.614*** 1.914*** 1.430*** 0.748* 0.368
Specification error 0.104* 0.019 -0.037 0.081** -0.073 0.000 0.004 -0.014 0.079***
Reweight error 0.005 0.007 0.012 0.014 0.014 0.015** 0.014** 0.012** 0.009**
Obs. Male 3156 3156 3156 3156 3156 3156 3156 3156 3156
Obs. Female 1475 1475 1475 1475 1475 1475 1475 1475 1475
Obs. Total 4631 4631 4631 4631 4631 4631 4631 4631 4631
Notes: Notes: Bootstrap standard errors computed by 500 replications. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The significance of coefficients
on ‘Male’ and ‘female’ implies that the mean for each group is significantly different from their combine mean.
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Chapter 5
Youth Education and Household Welfare
5.1 Introduction
In the past two decades, Tanzania witnessed a considerable increase in education
investment by households and the government, leading to a significant increase
in enrolment across all levels (primary, secondary and tertiary). The free and
Universal Primary Education (UPE) 2001 and the massive secondary school
expansion program (known as ‘ward secondary schools’) that began in 2006 are
the two significant reforms/initiatives in the 2000s that had a substantial effect on
enrolment.
Following free UPE 2001, the primary school gross enrolment ratio increased
from 84% in 2001 to 98.6% in 2002 and then to 109.9%1 in 2005. During the same
period, the number of primary schools increased from 11,873 to 12,286 and then
to 14,257 in 2001, 2002 and 2005, respectively (URT, 2005). Similarly, following
the ’ward secondary schools’ initiative, secondary school gross enrolment increased
from 20.2% in 2006 to 30.5% in 2007 and then to 36.9% in 2012. The number of
secondary schools increased from 2,289 to 3,485 and then to 4,528 in 2006, 2007
and 2012, respectively (URT, 2008, 2013, 2016).
Household consumption expenditure remains popular among the measures
of income and welfare in developing countries. Using the per adult household
consumption relative to the national poverty line to proxy welfare in Tanzania,
this ratio2 improved significantly from 1.79 in 2001 to 2.28 in 2018, equivalent to a
27% increase. Within the period, poverty incidence (using national poverty lines)
1Enrolment went above 100% due to older children taking advantage of the opportunity for
free schooling.
2Authors’ own calculations from the Tanzania Household Surveys 2001 and 2018.
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declined from to 36% to 26.4% (URT, 2002, 2019).
This essay’s primary focus is to examine whether differences in educational
attainment between the youth3 cohort in 2001 (those aged between 15 and 35 who
should have completed primary school before the reforms) and their corresponding
cohort in 2018 (who should have benefited from the reforms) explain the welfare
difference between the two periods. While many researchers have investigated the
relationship between education and household welfare in developing countries, the
most recent studies have focused on the role of gender, employment status, and
rural/urban categories in that relationship (Delesalle, 2019; Khan and Morrissey,
2020; Belghith et al., 2020). This essay explores the relationship between
education and welfare for this important demographic group which accounts for
approximately 65% of the total labour force in Tanzania (URT, 2005, 2018).
With such a massive share in the labour force, there is no doubt that youth
contribute substantially to the livelihood of the household in which they live
(Arsalan et al., 2019), either through the income they earn from employment or
through supplying labour to the household production activities and enterprises.
For that reason in this paper we explore the role of youth in household welfare
over time.
The essay makes two contributions to the literature on the link between
education and household welfare. First, although considerable research has been
devoted to welfare differences and their determinants across gender, employment,
and rural/urban categories rather less attention has been paid to age groups (e.g.
youth vs adults). Secondly, it examines how schooling gains between 2001 and
2018 are associated with household welfare changes over the period. Contrasted
with previous studies which mainly examined the association between education
and welfare at any given point in time, this essay examines how much of the welfare
differences between 2001 and 2018 can be attributed to changes in the association
3What age range is considered as youth varies by institution and country e.g. United Nations
(15 - 24), European Union (15 - 29), African Union (15 - 35), Uganda (18 - 30), Nigeria (18-35),
Ethiopia (15-29). This study uses the Tanzania’s definition which is in line with that of the
African Union and define youth as all males and females aged 15 to 35 years (URT, 2007).
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between education and welfare over this period. It also explores how much of the
welfare differences can be attributed to changes in educational attainment between
2001 and 2018 (i.e. the welfare effects of change in education distribution between
the period).
Using data from the Tanzania household budget surveys (HBS) for 2001 and
2018 and recentered influence function (RIF) based decomposition, the findings
reveal that differences in educational attainment between youth and adults are
significant factors in explaining the difference in welfare between the two groups
in both years. Precisely, if adults had the same level of educational attainment
as the youth, their welfare would have been about 40% and 32% higher in 2001
and 2018 respectively. The findings also suggest that if the youth in 2001 had the
same education endowment as their 2018 counterparts, their welfare would have
been about 20% higher. Although there appears to have been a decline in returns
to education for the youth, we do not find evidence that this reduced welfare.
We do not control for endogeneity of education from unobserved ability or
for endogenous selection of youth to be heads of households in our welfare
decomposition, which is a limitation of the analysis. Absence of good instrumental
variables from the data is one factor, and another is that most of the instrument
free methods are not suitable given the presence of multiple endogenous regressors
and the normal distribution nature of the dependent variable. Most importantly,
even with good instruments, the debate on the combination of RIF and the
standard methods for endogeneity control remains inconclusive. We do show that
education is a minor factor determining whether a young person is a head of
household: an additional year of schooling increases a young member’s probability
to head the household by only 0.5%. Such a small effect is unlikely to significantly
affect the estimated coefficients of education in our main results.
The rest of the essay is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the
selected related literature, followed by a detailed description of the methodology in
section 3. Section 4 describes the data used in our analysis and provides descriptive
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statistics for the main variables. Section 5 presents the results and discussion, and
section 6 concludes.
5.2 Literature Review
The determinants of household welfare in developing countries have attracted
many studies in the past 40 years. Factors such as education, age, gender, race,
household shocks, employment status, sector of employment, place of residence
and rural-urban migration have been found to have a significant contribution
to welfare (e.g. Arouri et al. (2015); Arsalan et al. (2019); Delesalle (2019);
Khan and Morrissey (2020); Belghith et al. (2020)) . In exploring these factors,
previous studies have mainly categorised households in terms of gender, sector of
employment and place of residence (rural/urban).
This essay can be linked to three broad categories of literature on household
welfare. The first category consists of studies that focus on the determinants
of household welfare. Within this category, we will focus on only such studies
that include education as one of the determinants of household welfare. In
Tanzania, these studies include Khan and Morrissey (2020), Arsalan et al. (2019)
and Delesalle (2019). Using households data from the first three waves of the
Tanzania National Panel Survey (TNPS), Khan and Morrissey (2020) found that
an extra year of education of the head of household is associated with about 1.2%
higher level of consumption (fixed effects estimation; no significant effect in the
instrumental variable (IV) regression). Delesalle (2019) on the other hand used the
same waves of the survey in combination with the 2002 Tanzania Population and
Housing Census (TPHC) and estimated the consumption returns to head education
of between 7.3% and 9.3% for rural households, much larger estimates than those
by Khan and Morrissey (2020). Having employed different estimation strategies,
samples, and dependent variables one would expect differences in the estimates
of the association between education and consumption between the two studies,
though not as large, warranting more investigation using other approaches.
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Using the proportion of members with at least secondary education, Arsalan
et al. (2019) explored the association between education and household log per
capita expenditure and poverty status (based on the international poverty line).
The study combined population density data, satellite data and household surveys
from 12 developing countries, including Tanzania. They found that an increase in
the number of working-age household members with secondary schooling by one
person was associated with a 23% increase in expenditure for younger households
and a 34% increase for older households; and a 7% and 6% decrease in poverty,
respectively. In a closely related study on Vietnam, Arouri et al. (2015)4 found that
a percentage point increase in household members with an upper-secondary degree
was associated with 36% and 55% higher household income and consumption
respectively; and a decrease of the likelihood of being poor of 20%. More strikingly,
they found, a percentage point increase in members with college/university degree
was associated with a 92% and 71% higher level of income and consumption
respectively and 19% lower likelihood of being poor.
Elsewhere in other developing countries, Himaz and Aturupana (2018) proxied
household education by year of schooling of the most educated adult member in
the household to estimate the association between education and household per
capita expenditure in Sri Lanka. The study applied quantile IV regression on a
sample of 72,811 households (18, 203 per survey) from the Household Income and
Expenditure Surveys 1990/1, 1995/6, 2001/2 and 2005/6. The findings suggest
that while, in general, an extra year of schooling increases welfare by about
3.8%, the effect varies considerably across the welfare distribution with the effect
declining by quantile.
Fulford et al. (2014) estimated youth consumption returns to education for
different cohorts in India. Using data from the Indian National Sample Surveys
(INSS) 1983, 1987, 1993, 1999, and 2005 the study found that an extra year of
education brings male cohorts 4% more consumption but provide no additional
4They categorized household as younger if the proportion of youth in the household is greater
or equal to the proportion of youth in the population, and older if less than that in the population.
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consumption for female cohorts. Alem and Söderbom (2012) found that although
only higher education had a significant effect on consumption in 2004 and 2008
in Ethiopia, all levels (primary, secondary, and higher) significantly explain the
growth of consumption between the years.
The second category consists of the studies examining welfare differences
between various household categories such as gender (of the head or composition),
sector of employment, and residence (rural/urban). The most common strategy in
this literature is to include dummies for the different categories in their regressions
to capture the welfare differences (see for example Arouri et al. (2015); Himaz
and Aturupana (2018); Khan and Morrissey (2020); and Ayyash and Sek (2020)).
Other studies analyse welfare and its determinants separately for each category
(e.g. Van de Walle (2013); Delesalle (2019)).
For gender, findings from these types of studies generally suggest that
female-headed households and households with higher proportions of female
members tend to have lower welfare than their male counterparts (e.g. Ayyash
and Sek (2020)). For residence, households residing in rural areas tend to have
lower welfare than their urban counterparts. Furthermore, households with the
majority of members employed in agriculture have lower welfare levels than those
with the majority of members in wage employment or self-employment.
The third category of studies related to ours focuses on decomposing the welfare
differences/inequality between groups or periods. The most relevant are those
with a methodology based on the seminal works of Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder
(1973) and their extensions (for most recent extensions, see Firpo et al. (2018)
and Fortin et al. (2011)). Within this strand, our study is most closely related to
Belghith et al. (2020) which employed Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to examine
what amount of poverty reduction can be attributed to changes in the endowments
of household characteristics and the amount due to changes in the returns to these
characteristics between 2012 and 2018 in Tanzania. Using data from HBS 2012 and
2018, the study’s findings suggest that between 2012 and 2018 gains in education
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have benefited the better-off more than the poor and that the returns to education,
while increased for the better-off, significantly declined for the poor.
Ramadan et al. (2018) applied RIF regression technique to decompose the
welfare gap between various socio-demographic groups (male vs female-headed,
rural vs urban households, educated vs uneducated head) for four Arab countries,
namely Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan and Palestine. The study used household
expenditure from household surveys5 from the countries spanning between 2005
and 2015 to measure welfare. The study’s findings revealed significant welfare
gaps between female and male; rural and urban; and educated and uneducated
within the countries. Differences in educational attainment remained one of the
main determinants of the welfare gaps between male and female-headed and rural
and urban households. Households with an educated head fared better in terms
of welfare compared to their uneducated counterparts regardless of gender of the
head or location. Agyire-Tettey et al. (2018) applied a similar approach to examine
the rural-urban welfare gap for Ghana and obtained similar results: differences in
educational attainment significantly explained the welfare gaps between rural and
urban households.
Another study by Skoufias and Katayama (2011) examined the welfare
difference between metropolitan, urban, and rural households in Brazil’s five
regions. The study employed the Oaxaca-Blinder method on a sample of
households from the 2003-2004 Household Budget Survey to decompose welfare
differences both at the mean and at different quantiles of the welfare distribution.
The findings revealed that the welfare differences between metropolitan, urban,
and rural households are mainly attributed to differences in endowments between
households residing in these geographical areas. Differences in the household head’s
education explained about 40% of the welfare difference between metropolitan
5These are the 2008/2009, 2010/2011, 2012/2013 and 2014/2015 Household Income,
Expenditure and Consumption Surveys (HIECS) for Egypt, the 2005 and 2010 National Survey
on Household Budget, Consumption and Standard of Living (EBCNV) for Tunisia, the 2006,
2010 and 2013 Household Expenditure and Income Survey (HEIS) for Jordan and 2007, 2010
and 2011 Palestine Expenditure and Consumption Surveys (PECS) for Palestine
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and urban areas. Nevertheless, quantile decomposition revealed that this effect of
education on welfare differences is heterogenous along the welfare distribution.
This essay aims not to replicate the reviewed studies above on the link between
education and welfare. Instead, it contributes to this literature by focusing on a
rarely exploited socio-demographic dimension, namely the age group (youth), and
second by examining how differences in educational attainment and returns to
education are associated with differences in welfare.
5.3 Empirical Strategy
This Chapter’s empirical methodology follows Firpo et al. (2009, 2018)’s RIF based
decomposition for the mean difference between two groups, derived in Chapter 4.
As explained in Chapter 4, for a given dependent variable Y and independent
variables X, RIF decomposition uses RIF regression in combination with
reweighting to decompose any statistic of interest into two parts: the difference due
to endowments (characteristics/explained/composition effect) and the difference
attributed to the relationship between Y and X (coefficient/unexplained/return
effect). It goes further to decompose the contribution of each explanatory variable
on the two parts.
In this essay, the aim is to decompose the welfare differences between cohorts
to two parts: the part that can is attributable to the cohort differences in
characteristics (in our case education is the focus) and the part attributable to
returns to these characteristics ( again the focus is on returns to education). It
is the decomposition of welfare between youth in 2001 (pre reform) and their
counterpart in 2018 (post reform cohort) that shed light on the effectiveness of
the large expansion of education. If a significant part of the differences in welfare
between the two youth cohorts can be attributed to the differences in educational
attainment between the cohorts, then we can argue that the program succeeded
to improve welfare through increasing educational attainment.
The baseline regression in this case is the standard household consumption
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model of the form:
lnCit = αSit + βXit + εit (5.1)
Where C is the household consumption to poverty line ratio (CPL) — our
preferred measure of welfare (described in detail in the next section); S a
vector of schooling of the household head and its square (in years); X is a
vector (including a constant) of individual/household characteristics; α and β are
regression parameters; ε is standard error term; and i and t index individual and
time, respectively. With exogeneity assumption, (5.1) is usually estimated using
OLS.
For any two groups, RIF decomposition uses the reweighted parameter
estimates from (5.1) to decompose the statistic of interest into two parts as
explained earlier in Chapter 4. As a recap, we briefly explain the decomposition
method here, and refer the reader to Chapter 4 Section 4.3 for the detailed
derivation.
For simplicity and mathematical convenience, rewrite (5.1) in the form
Y = X ′β + ε (5.2)
Where X here is a vector of covariates, including years of education and its
square. Suppose there is some categorical variable R or T such that the joint
distribution function of Y , X and R is given by f(Y,X,R)(y1, xi, Ri) and that of Y ,
X and T by f(Y,X,T )(y1, xi, Ti).
When there are only two groups in R and T , such that R ∈ [0, 1] and T ∈ [0, 1],












For simplicity of derivation and without loss of generalisation, we will stick to
one categorical variable, T . The joint distribution function between the measure
of welfare, the covariates and T for T=k ∈ [0, 1] is given as:
fkY,X(y, x) = f
k
Y |X(Y |X)fkX(X) (5.3)
and its its cumulative distribution function conditional on T as:
F kY (y) =
∫
fkY |X(Y |X)dF kX(X) (5.4)
The cumulative distribution of Y conditional on T can then be used to
decompose the difference in the distribution of statistic v between the two groups.
Accordingly,
∆v = v1 − v0 = v(f 1Y )− v(f 0Y ) (5.5)
With some counterfactual statistic vc, we can rewrite (5.5) as
∆v = v1 − vc + vc − v0
∆vS = v1 − vc is the difference attributed to the relationship between Y and X;
and
∆vX = vc − v0 the difference arising due to differences in characteristics, the Xs.
From v(FY ) = X ′β,
After estimating the counterfactual statistic from the data, the final decomposition
can then be rewritten as







The component ∆vpS + ∆v
e
S in (5.6) is called the
coefficients/explained/characteristics effect which constitutes of the
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pure(coefficients/explained/characteristics) effect (∆vpS) and the reweighting error




X is called the composition/unexplained/returns
effect and constitutes the pure(composition/unexplained/returns) effect (∆vpX)
and specification error (∆veX). The empirical estimation of the RIF decomposition
for the mean of log consumption to poverty line ratio is performed in Stata using
user-written command Oaxaca_rif (Rios-Avila, 2020b).
5.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
5.4.1 Data Source and Sample
Consumption and income remain the most popular measures of welfare in
economics. In developing countries where data on income from agricultural
and non-wage informal (self-employed) employment are rarely available, welfare
measures based on consumption are the most suitable Deaton (2018). Unlike
the labour force surveys that do not have information on consumption, HBS and
the Tanzania National Panel Survey (TNPS) collect information on household
consumption. However, TNPS are smaller surveys relative to HBS and only
available from 2008 – 2019 making them less suitable for our analysis since the
aim is to compare welfare of the youth before and after UPE reform. HBS on the
other hand are available from 1992/93 – 2018, and the 2001 and 2018 HBS allow
us to compare youth ‘pre and post treatment’.
As consumption in HBS is measured at household level, we assign it to the
head of the household and thus comparison is between groups of households
distinguished by the age of the head – youth (aged 15-35) who benefited from
UPE by 2018 and adults who didn’t. In addition, education in our case is the
household head’s level of education measured in years. Our analysis focuses on
the household head, considering the household head follows the literature given
the absence of suitable household-level measures of education, especially as we
wish to separate those who benefitted from UPE. A limitation of distinguishing
households based on the age of the head is that education may be endogenous to
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household formation by youth. Unfortunately, the HBS does not include suitable
data to model the formation of households (thus we do not pursue this in our
analysis).
This study, therefore, uses data from the Tanzanian Household Budget Surveys
for 2001 and 2018, which we obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics.
HBS is among the largest household surveys in Tanzania, covering all regions of
the Mainland6. Data collection for HBS 2001 took place from May 2000 to June
2001 and for HBS 2018 from December 2017 to November 2018. Both surveys
employed a multi-stage cluster sampling to obtain representative samples of 22,176
and 9,552 households in 2001 and 2018, respectively. Despite the sample for 2018
being significantly smaller than its 2001 counterpart, the sampling mechanism still
ensured representativeness at the national (Mainland) level (URT, 2019). A total
of 154 households in 2001 had missing information on assets ownership and were
excluded from the analysis, leaving us with a sample of 22,022 households. All
households in 2018 had complete information.
5.4.2 Definition of the Main Variables
Household characteristics
• CPL: As stated earlier, household consumption per adult equivalent is widely
used as a proxy of well-being. In this study we use the ratio of household
consumption per adult equivalent to the national poverty line (CPL). We
employ this approach to account for inflation between the survey period given
the absence of good price deflators. Its logarithm is used as the dependent
variable in the base OLS regression and used to construct the RIF for the
RIF decomposition.
• poor : a dummy variable = 1 for households below the basic needs poverty
line and 0 otherwise
6Tanzania (also the United Republic of Tanzania) includes the Tanzania Manland
(Tanganyika) and the islands of Zanzibar. The Mainland covers about 99% of the total area
and about 98% of the total population
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• rural : a dummy variable = 1 for households resides in rural area and 0
otherwise
• hhsize: Total number of usual members in the household
Household head characteristics
• education: years of schooling of the household head
• noeducation: a dummy variable = 1 if household head completed less than
three years of primary education and 0 otherwise
• someprimary : a dummy variable = 1 if household head completed at least
four and at most six years of primary education and 0 otherwise
• primary : a dummy variable = 1 if household head completed the seven years
of primary education and 0 otherwise
• somesecondary : a dummy variable = 1 if household head completed at least
two and at most three years of secondary education and 0 otherwise
• secondary : a dummy variable = 1 if household head completed the four years
of lower secondary education and 0 otherwise
• postsecondary : a dummy variable = 1 if household head has more than lower
secondary education and 0 otherwise
• age: age of the household head in years
• female: a dummy variable = 1 if the head of the household is female and 0
otherwise




Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the means for the continuous variables, and the percentages
of the respective group’s observations for the dummy variables, included in the
analysis. Table 5.1 shows the characteristics of youth and adult headed households
for each year. The share of households headed by a youth decreased by ten
percentage points from 36% in 2001 to 26% in 2018. Youth headed households
have significantly higher consumption and lower poverty rates than adult-headed
households in both years, although the differences are smaller in 2018.
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics for the Main Variables by Age Group and Year
(Within Year)
Variable Name 2001 2018
Youth Adult Difference Youth Adult Difference
Hh Characteristics
CPL 1.71 1.40 -0.31*** 2.12 1.85 -0.27***
poor 0.28 0.41 0.13*** 0.20 0.28 0.09***
rural 0.80 0.80 0.00 0.66 0.69 0.03**
hhsize 5.18 6.89 1.70*** 4.75 6.59 1.84***
Head Characteristics
education 6.04 4.24 -1.80*** 6.73 5.59 -1.14***
noeducation 0.18 0.42 0.24*** 0.19 0.27 0.08***
someprimary 0.05 0.18 0.13*** 0.08 0.10 0.02**
primary 0.71 0.33 -0.37*** 0.49 0.52 0.03*
somesecondary 0.01 0.00 -0.01*** 0.06 0.01 -0.05***
secondary 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.14 0.08 -0.07***
postsecondary 0.01 0.02 0.01*** 0.04 0.02 -0.01**
age 29.86 51.46 21.60*** 30.10 52.27 22.17***
female 0.18 0.20 0.02* 0.19 0.25 0.06***
married 0.85 0.80 -0.05*** 0.83 0.78 -0.06***
Observations 8,039 13,983 - 2,507 6,945 -
Source: Author’s calculations from HBS 2001 and 2018 data. Dummy variables are in
proportions. ’Difference’ is the mean for adult that heads household minus the corresponding
value for youth that heads household. Statistics are weighted using survey weights. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 based on Lincom’s test of mean differences.
Density plots in Figure 5.1 also show the differences in consumption between
the two age groups. In terms of education endowment, heads defined as youth
have more schooling than their adult counterparts in both years. The difference
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in post-primary education attainment between the two age groups significantly
increased between the years. These results reflect the benefits of the expansion of
secondary education in the mid and late 2000s.
Figure 5.1: Distribution of Household Consumption between Age Groups by Year
Table 5.2 presents exactly the same means but in this table compares the
characteristics of household heads between the years (for ease of reading the means
have been repeated). Table 5.2 shows that between 2001 and 2018, the youth’s
average household consumption increased, and poverty rates declined significantly.
The increase in youth consumption between the two periods is shown graphically
using a density plot by the left panel of Figure 2.
Table 5.2 further shows that youth education increased significantly, with the
most pronounced increase at post-primary education levels. The share of youth
with completed secondary education increased by about threefold, from 5% in
2001 to 14% in 2018, and the share with higher education by fourfold from 1% to
4%. There is a significant proportion of secondary school students who drop out
of school (6% of the youth in 2018). The national qualifying exam at the second
year of secondary school which requires students who fail to repeat the year may
be one of the main factors that explain this but further exploration is beyond this
essay’s scope.
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Table 5.2: Summary Statistics for the Main Variables by Age and Year (Between
Years)
Variable Name Youth Adults
2001 2018 Difference 2001 2018 Difference
Hh Characteristics
CPL 1.71 2.12 0.41*** 1.40 1.85 0.45***
Poor 0.28 0.20 -0.08*** 0.41 0.28 -0.13***
Rural 0.80 0.66 0.16*** 0.80 0.69 -0.11***
Hhsize 5.18 4.75 0.43*** 6.89 6.59 -0.30***
Head Characteristics
education 6.04 6.73 0.69*** 4.24 5.59 1.35***
noeducation 0.18 0.19 0.01 0.42 0.27 -0.15***
someprimary 0.05 0.08 0.03*** 0.18 0.10 -0.08***
primary 0.71 0.49 -0.22*** 0.33 0.52 0.19***
somesecondary 0.01 0.06 0.05*** 0.00 0.01 0.01***
secondary 0.05 0.14 0.09*** 0.05 0.08 0.03***
postsecondary 0.01 0.04 0.03*** 0.02 0.02 0.00
Age 29.86 30.10 0.24 51.46 52.27 0.81*
Female 0.18 0.19 0.01 0.20 0.25 0.05***
Married 0.85 0.83 -0.02 0.80 0.78 -0.02*
Observations 8,039 2,507 - 13,983 6,945 -
Source: Author’s calculations from HBS 2001 and 2018 data. Dummy variables are in
proportions. Difference is the mean for 2018 minus the corresponding value for 2001. Statistics
are weighted using survey weights. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 based on Lincom’s test
of mean differences.
A complication in the table for adult headed households is the fact that adults
in 2018 may have been in the youth category in 2001. For completeness the
mean difference is included in Table 5.2 but Table 5.3 provides a better and more
intuitive comparison for the adult households by grouping them into two. The
first group consists of those in the youth category in 2001 (aged 35 to 53 years
in 2018). The second group consists of those in the adult category in 2001 (aged
54 years and above in 2018). Table 5.3 shows how these two groups fare relative
to adult headed households in 2001. We know from Table 5.1 that the youth in
2001 had more educational attainment than their adult counterparts and so we
would expect adults aged 35 to 53 years in 2018 to have more education than
those aged 54 years and above, which happens to be the case. The right panel
of Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of consumption reported in Table 5.3. Both
groups of adult headed households in 2018 have significantly higher consumption
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than adult headed households in 2001. However, the 35 to 53 years age group
enjoys slightly higher consumption than their 54 years and above counterparts.
Table 5.3: Differences in the Means of the Variables between Survey Years for the
Youth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2001 2018 2018 Difference
Variable Name Age >35 35<Age<=53 Age>53 (1)-(3)
Hh Characteristics
CPL 1.40 1.86 1.83 0.43***
poor 0.41 0.29 0.28 -0.13***
rural 0.80 0.67 0.71 -0.09***
hhsize 6.89 6.56 6.64 -0.25**
Head Characteristics
education (years) 4.24 6.28 4.51 -0.27**
noeducation 0.42 0.18 0.40 -0.02*
someprimary 0.18 0.06 0.15 -0.03**
primary 0.33 0.64 0.35 -0.02
somesecondary 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01*
secondary 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.02**
postsecondary 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00
age 51.46 43.92 65.27 13.81**
female 0.20 0.22 0.31 0.11***
married 0.80 0.84 0.68 -0.12***
Observations 13,983 3,966 2,979 NA
Source: Author’s calculations from HBS 2001 and 2018 data. Dummy variables are in
proportions. Difference is the value in column (3) minus the corresponding value in (1) comparing
youth in 2001 to 2018 adults that were adult also in 2001. Statistics are weighted using survey
weights. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 based on Lincom’s test of mean differences.
Similarly, we investigated whether youth who are heads of households differ
significantly in characteristics from those who are not. Table 5.4 compares the
characteristics of these two groups of youth by year. In both years, youth who do
not head their household live in households with lower consumption and higher
poverty rates. However, the educational endowment in the two groups seems to
have changed between the years. Unlike 2001, youth who are not household heads
in 2018 have more schooling than household heads.
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Figure 5.2: Distribution of Household Consumption between Years by Age Group
Table 5.4: Characteristics of the Youth by Year and Headship Status
Var Name 2001 2018
Head Other Difference Heads Other Difference
Hh Characteristics
CPL 1.71 1.47 0.24*** 2.12 1.95 0.17***
poor 0.28 0.38 -0.10*** 0.20 0.25 -0.05***
rural 0.80 0.78 0.02*** 0.66 0.63 0.03***
hhsize 5.18 6.83 -1.65*** 4.75 6.51 -1.76***
Youth Characteristics
education 6.04 5.48 0.56*** 6.73 7.00 -0.27***
noeducation 0.18 0.22 -0.04*** 0.19 0.16 0.03***
someprimary 0.05 0.15 -0.10*** 0.08 0.08 0.00
primary 0.71 0.58 0.13*** 0.49 0.47 0.02***
somesecondary 0.01 0.02 -0.01*** 0.06 0.10 -0.04***
secondary 0.05 0.03 0.02*** 0.14 0.17 -0.03***
postsecondary 0.01 0.00 0.01*** 0.04 0.02 0.02***
age 29.86 22.74 7.12*** 30.10 22.38 7.72***
female 0.18 0.65 -0.47*** 0.19 0.62 -0.43***
married 0.85 0.46 0.39*** 0.83 0.38 0.45***
Observations 8,039 31,503 - 2,507 11,468 -
Source: Author’s calculations from HBS 2001 and 2018 data. Dummy variables are in
proportions. Difference is between youth headed households and other (youth who are not
household heads) in 2001 and 2018. Statistics are weighted using survey weights. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 based on Lincom’s test of mean differences.
The findings in 5.4 are consistent with the fact that the share of households
headed by youth decreased by ten percentage points between 2001 and 2018,
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implying that as post-primary school enrolment rose, more youth are spending
more years in education, and as a result, the youth who move out to establish
households (and become heads) at early ages are those with relatively low
education. As this might bring about a selection problem and affect our results,
we also examine how education affects youth’s likelihood to head their households.
The results for that analysis are included in Section 5.
5.5 Results and Discussion
5.5.1 Main Results and Discussion
The first part of our analysis explores whether welfare returns to education for
youth are different from that of adults; and whether they have changed between
2001 and 2018. For each year and by age group OLS regression estimates for
model (1) were obtained. Table 5.5 presents the regression results in each category.
In 2001 schooling is positively and significantly correlated with welfare for both
youth and adult heading households, but negatively correlated for 2018. The
coefficient of schooling squared is positive and highly statistically significant across
age groups and years, implying a strong convex relationship between education and
welfare—each extra year of schooling is associated with higher welfare than the
previous year. All other included regressors have the expected sign.
As the presence of the square term may complicate the interpretation of the
coefficients of schooling variables in Table 5.5, the predicted average marginal
effects of schooling is added in the table. In addition, we plot the implied welfare
returns to each year of education from the results in Table 5.5 in Figure 5.3
and focus the interpretation on it. The top panel of Figure 5.3 shows that
youth heading households in 2001 had higher returns to post-primary education
than adults heading households, but this advantage disappeared in 2018. The
bottom panel of Figure 5.3, on the other hand, shows that the welfare returns
to education for the youth declined significantly between 2001 and 2018. These
results may be attributed to the significant gains in schooling for the youth over
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this period—one would expect the returns to education to decline as education
attainment increases in the population.
Table 5.5: OLS Regression Estimates of Returns to Education by Age Group and
Year
2001 2018
Youth Adult Youth Adult
sch 0.026*** 0.034*** -0.011* -0.010***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004)
sch2 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age 0.059*** -0.011*** 0.030 0.002
(0.016) (0.003) (0.028) (0.003)
age2/100 -0.098*** 0.008*** -0.045 -0.002
(0.028) (0.002) (0.050) (0.003)
female 0.102*** 0.010 0.085*** 0.054***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.028) (0.018)
rural -0.131*** -0.147*** -0.160*** -0.183***
(0.014) (0.011) (0.025) (0.016)
married 0.103*** 0.071*** 0.049 0.052***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.030) (0.019)
lnhhsize -0.516*** -0.451*** -0.523*** -0.473***
(0.011) (0.008) (0.021) (0.011)
Constant -0.005 1.153*** 0.331 0.656***
(0.219) (0.082) (0.396) (0.099)
Others controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
AME(sch) 0.056*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.027***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Obs. 8,039 13,983 2,507 6,945
R2 0.41 0.40 0.50 0.44
Notes: AME(sch) is the marginal effects of schooling. Other controls included are livestock per
capita, dummies for region of residence and ownership of assets. Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure 5.3: Implied Returns to Education by Age Group and Year
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The second part focuses on the results from the Reweighted RIF
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition within the years. The difference in mean household
welfare between youth and adult headed households for each year is decomposed
into two parts as explained in section 5.3: the part due to differences in
characteristics/endowment (also called the explained part) and the part due to
differences in returns to these characteristics (also called the unexplained part).
Each of the two parts are then broken down into two subparts: the explained
part into pure explained and the specification error; and the unexplained part
into pure unexplained and reweighing error. A explained earlier in section 5.3,
for more robust results both the specification and the reweighing error should be
small and insignificant (Firpo et al., 2018; Rios-Avila, 2020b) implying that the
model is correctly specified and reweighed.
Table 5.6 presents the decomposition results by year. To simplify
interpretation, the coefficients of the education variables (sch and sch2 ) are
aggregated7 into one variable ‘education’; the coefficient of (age and age2 ) into
‘headage’; and ownership of assets, livestock per capita, and dummies for regions of
residence into ‘other controls’8. The top panel of Table 5.6 shows the contribution
of the explained and unexplained parts to the total difference in log welfare. Only
the explained component is significant in both years implying that it is only
the difference in characteristics/endowment that explains differences in welfare
between the two age groups. Both the specification and reweighing errors are
insignificant as expected.
The breakdown of the Pure_explained component in Table 5.6 reveals that
the coefficient on education in the explained component is positive and significant,
suggesting that the youths heading households have significantly better education
attainment than adults heading households, consistent with what we observed in
Table 5.1 in the previous section.
7The Stata command oaxaca_rif is calibrated for that option.
8This is common approach in Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition literature and fits with the
specification.
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Other controls -0.015 -0.024
constant -0.404 1.057
Specification error 0.002 0.002




‘Other controls’ is the aggregate effect of livestock per capita, dummies for region of residence
and ownership of assets. Dummy variables are normalized. N1 is sample size for youth, N2
sample size for adult and N total sample/observations (youth + adults). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01. The significance of coefficients on ’Youth’ and ’Adults’ implies that the mean for
each group is significantly different from their combine mean.
The findings in 5.6 show that a significant portion of the welfare difference
between youth and adult headed households is attributable to differences
in educational attainment between youths and adults that head households.
Precisely, of the pure_explained welfare differences of 0.251 and 0.151 in 2001 and
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2018 respectively, approximately 40% and 32%9 are attributed to differences in
educational attainment between youths heading households and adults heading
households. In other words, if an adult had the same level of educational
attainment as a youth heading a household, their welfare would have been about
40% higher in 2001 and 32% higher in 2018. The difference in returns to education,
however, does not have a significant effect on welfare. This is consistent with the
regression results in Table 5.5 and the top panel of Figure 5.3, which shows small
differences in returns to education between the two age groups.
The third part of our analysis focuses on the Reweighted RIF Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition results for the youth heading households between 2001 and 2018.
It is this part of the analysis, that is the decomposition of welfare between youth
in 2001 (pre reform) and their counterpart in 2018 (post reform cohort) that shed
light on the effectiveness of the large expansion of education. If a significant part
of the differences in welfare between the two youth cohorts can be attributed to
the differences in educational attainment between the cohorts, then we can argue
that the program succeeded to improve welfare through increasing educational
attainment.
To assess if there is heterogeneity of the association between the difference in
education and difference in welfare between the two periods, we perform the RIF
decomposition by gender and place of residence. Table 5.7 reports the estimated
coefficients of education for this decomposition. The results in Table 5.7 suggest
that the difference in welfare between the two periods is mainly attributed to
differences in characteristics10. Also, the results provide evidence of heterogeneity
of the effects of education across groups.
The results in column (1) of Table 5.7 suggest that if the youth in 2001 had the
same education endowment as their 2018 counterparts, their welfare would have
been about 20% higher. Therefore, it implies that other things equal, policies
that contributed to the increase in education attainment led to improved youth
9i.e., 0.101 out of 0.251 and 0.048 out of 0.151 in 2001 and 2018 respectively
10The covariates included in the baseline regression.
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welfare. The results in columns (2) and (3) suggest that although between 2001
and 2018 welfare increased more for males than females, the welfare increase
attributed to the increase in education was significantly higher for females than
males. Furthermore, results in columns (4) and (5) suggest that education played
a more significant role in increasing the rural youth’s welfare than their urban
counterparts.
5.5.2 Robustness Checks
Endogeneity of education from unobserved ability is one of the primary concerns of
our model. Another concern is the potential endogenous youth selection into the
households, whether the factors associated with higher welfare such as education
are also associated with a higher likelihood of the youth to head the household they
live in. Whereas the methods to address both issues are well documented in the
literature, the debate on how (if at all possible) to combine these methods with the
RIF decomposition methods remains inconclusive (Firpo et al., 2018; Rios-Avila,
2020a). This shortcoming notwithstanding, and without trying to include the
selection equation in the RIF decomposition model, we use a linear probability
model (LPM) to assess whether education increases/reduces youth’s likelihood to
head the household. While the problems of LPM are well documented in the
literature, we nonetheless, prefer it as it allows the inclusion of household fixed
effects.
Tables 5.8 shows that, after controlling for household fixed effects, more
educated youth are significantly more likely to be head of household. Precisely,
an extra year of education is associated with about 0.005 increase in youth’s
probability of heading the household in which they live. However, the results
in Table 5.9 reveals that after disaggregating the results by year, gender and place
of residence, more educated youth are less likely to be household heads in 2018
than in 2001 (an extra year increases the probability of being head by 0.003 and
0.006 in 2018 and 2001 respectively). Table 5.9 further reveals that the significant
association between education and headship in 2018 is generally driven by youths
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Table 5.7: Reweighted RIF Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition for Youth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled Female Male Rural Urban
Overall
2018 0.531*** 0.547*** 0.527*** 0.379*** 0.820***
Counterfactual 0.299*** 0.326*** 0.314*** 0.127*** 0.552***
2001 0.346*** 0.379*** 0.339*** 0.257*** 0.711***
Difference 0.185*** 0.168* 0.188*** 0.121*** 0.108
Explained 0.232*** 0.221** 0.212*** 0.251*** 0.268***
Unexplained -0.047 -0.053 -0.024 -0.130*** -0.160
Pure_explained 0.269*** 0.171* 0.271*** 0.225*** 0.349***
education 0.055*** 0.075*** 0.055*** 0.023** 0.094***
age 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003
female 0.000 -0.001 0.000
rural -0.001 0.001 -0.004
married 0.002 -0.005 0.001 0.003 -0.001
lnhhsize 0.016 0.006 -0.001 0.021 -0.032
Other controls 0.196*** 0.096 0.222*** 0.176*** 0.287***
Pure_Unexplained -0.100* -0.095 -0.108* -0.115*** -0.18
education -0.190 -0.305* -0.178 -0.261*** -0.181
age 0.490 0.657 0.096 0.991 -0.887
female -0.002 0.005 0.008
rural 0.006 -0.059 0.036
married -0.003 0.014 0.062 0.064 -0.034
lnhhsize 0.111 -0.046 -0.034 0.025 0.003
Other controls 0.168 -0.115 0.420* 0.384*** -0.017
constant -0.689 -0.248 -0.498 -1.289 0.943
Specification error -0.037 0.050 -0.059 0.027 -0.081
Reweight error 0.053 0.042 0.083 -0.015 0.020
N1 2,507 473 2,034 1,653 854
N2 8,039 1,920 6,119 2,687 5,352
N 10,546 2,393 8,153 4,340 6,206
‘Other controls’ is the aggregate effect of livestock per capita, dummies for region of residence
and ownership of assets. Dummy variables are normalized. N1 is sample size for 2018, N2 sample
size for 2001 and N total sample/observations (2001 + 2018). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01. The significance of coefficients on ’2018’ and ’2001’ implies that the mean for each group
is significantly different from their combine mean.
residing in rural areas.
Despite the significance of the coefficients of education in Tables 5.8 and 5.9
, their sizes are noteworthy. The coefficients of education that average at 0.005
suggest that the probability of becoming head of household increases by only 0.5%
for every year increase in schooling. Such a small estimated effect is less likely
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to significantly affect the estimated coefficients of education in our main results.
While this signals a potential selection problem, which we acknowledge that we do
not have a remedy for, we argue the low coefficient gives us cautious confidence in
the main results.
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Table 5.8: Pooled LPM Regression Results by Gender and Place of Residence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled Female Male Rural Urban
sch 0.005*** 0.003** 0.003 0.006*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
youth<26 -0.239*** -0.113*** -0.190*** -0.235*** -0.236***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.015) (0.008) (0.007)
female -0.316*** -0.368*** -0.269***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
married 0.085*** -0.030*** 0.317*** 0.108*** 0.071***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.018) (0.010) (0.009)
AGR -0.004 -0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.024***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007)
WAGE 0.183*** 0.099*** 0.069*** 0.164*** 0.191***
(0.009) (0.017) (0.022) (0.020) (0.010)
SELF 0.154*** 0.106*** 0.084*** 0.070*** 0.185***
(0.008) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.010)
Constant 0.410*** 0.130*** 0.298*** 0.426*** 0.390***
(0.008) (0.012) (0.019) (0.012) (0.012)
Obs. 53,517 29,231 24,286 23,206 30,311
R2 0.72 0.89 0.93 0.70 0.74
Note: AGR, WAGE and SELF are dummies for sectors of main employment, standing for
agriculture, wage employment and self-employment out of agriculture, respectively. <26 is an
age dummy =1 if aged less than 26 years and 0 otherwise.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 5.9: LPM Regression Results by Year, Gender and Place of Residence
2001 2018
All Female Male Rural Urban All Female Male Rural Urban
sch 0.006*** 0.003** 0.003 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.003** 0.001 0.001 0.004** 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
youth<26 -0.244*** -0.118*** -0.196*** -0.243*** -0.240*** -0.220*** -0.093*** -0.152*** -0.220*** -0.215***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.017) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.021) (0.027) (0.013) (0.021)
female -0.302*** -0.374*** -0.257*** -0.348*** -0.356*** -0.332***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.016)
married 0.082*** -0.033*** 0.351*** 0.117*** 0.069*** 0.091*** -0.021 0.220*** 0.095*** 0.086***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.022) (0.012) (0.009) (0.013) (0.018) (0.032) (0.015) (0.027)
AGR -0.019*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.017* -0.034*** 0.042*** 0.012 0.026 0.029** 0.081**
(0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.007) (0.012) (0.018) (0.021) (0.012) (0.035)
WAGE 0.182*** 0.109*** 0.070*** 0.172*** 0.189*** 0.163*** 0.051 0.062 0.152*** 0.179***
(0.010) (0.018) (0.025) (0.026) (0.011) (0.020) (0.044) (0.044) (0.032) (0.025)
SELF 0.156*** 0.109*** 0.097*** 0.045** 0.184*** 0.134*** 0.094*** 0.023 0.097*** 0.173***
(0.010) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.011) (0.016) (0.035) (0.034) (0.022) (0.023)
Constant 0.419*** 0.139*** 0.296*** 0.454*** 0.397*** 0.382*** 0.103*** 0.294*** 0.387*** 0.371***
(0.010) (0.014) (0.023) (0.016) (0.012) (0.017) (0.025) (0.036) (0.019) (0.033)
Obs. 39,542 21,873 17,669 13,486 26,056 13,975 7,358 6,617 9,720 4,255
R2 0.72 0.89 0.92 0.69 0.73 0.72 0.90 0.95 0.71 0.75
Note: AGR, WAGE and SELF are dummies for sectors of main employment, standing for agriculture, wage employment and self-employment out of
agriculture, respectively. <26 is an age dummy =1 if aged less than 26 years and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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5.6 Conclusion
In this essay, we examined how much of the welfare differences between youths
and adults, and between the youth in 2001 and their 2018 counterparts, can
be attributed to differences in educational attainment and differences in returns
to education. Samples of household heads from the 2001 and 2018 HBSs were
investigated using RIF decomposition of the mean.
We find evidence that youths, having more education than adults, enjoy higher
welfare levels than adults in both years. The difference in educational attainment
between the two groups significantly explains the differences in welfare, while
the difference in education returns does not. We also find, compared to their
2001 counterparts, the youth in 2018 have higher education and welfare levels.
The findings revealed that the difference in welfare is significantly attributed to
differences in educational attainment between 2001 and 2018. However, despite
the evidence of the substantial decline in returns to education between 2001 and
2018, we find no evidence that such a decline reduced welfare.
We did not control for endogeneity of education from ability bias in our
welfare decomposition as no good proxies for ability are available in the HBS data.
Combining IV strategy with RIF decomposition is not warranted either, even if
we had good instruments for education from the data. Moreover, the methods to
deal with sample selection problem in the context of RIF decomposition are not
explicit in the literature (Firpo et al., 2018; Rios-Avila, 2020a). Nonetheless, as a
robustness check, we investigate if education is associated with a young household
member’s likelihood to head the household and find that the strength of the
association is minimal. This finding leads us to believe that our results are robust
to selection.
Note that there are other methods are potentially available to determine
the effect of the UPE reform on both education attainment and welfare. A
difference-in-differences approach which compared young and old cohorts before
and after the reform, or a regression discontinuity which exploited the sharp cut-off
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This thesis employed different approaches in analysing the link between education
and the labour market in East Africa. The main contribution of the thesis is to
investigate if returns to education and the effect of education on the distribution
of earnings and gender wage gaps varies according to workers’ pay period. In
East Africa, workers report earnings over three main pay periods: daily, weekly, or
monthly. These periods are associated with the type and duration of employment
whereby workers paid monthly are more likely to work in formal and regular
employment while those paid daily and weekly are more likely to work in informal,
casual and piece-rate jobs. As pay periods may indicate distinct labour markets,
these three pay periods are used to categorise workers into three groups (with
separate analysis of ganyu workers in Malawi).
To address the well-known endogeneity concerns from ability bias and sample
selection in Chapter 3, Gaussian Copula (GC) and Heckman with Gaussian Copula
(HGC) estimators were employed. Gaussian Copula (Park and Gupta, 2012) is an
instrument free method for recovering estimates which are free from endogeneity
by directly modelling the correlation between the endogenous regressor and the
error term in the regression. By modelling the endogenous education within the
sample selection model (Heckman, 1979), the ability bias and selection problems
are simultaneously addressed. The GC and HGC estimators, therefore, offer a
valid method to address the concerns and the results appear robust.
The empirical evidence from the first essay suggests that pooling workers paid
over different periods as in previous studies for Africa leads to biased estimates of
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returns to education. Pooling/aggregating earnings to different common measures
(daily, monthly or annualised expressed monthly) produce different estimates of
returns. Estimating separately for each period, the findings reveal that returns
to education differ by pay period: for Malawi, daily has the highest, and weekly
has the lowest returns to education. For Tanzania and Uganda, the weekly has
the highest and monthly has the lowest returns to education. These results
hold regardless of the estimation strategy employed (OLS, GC and HGC) or
the earnings function specification (quadratic schooling or dummies for levels of
education). The evidence, therefore, suggests that estimating returns separately
for workers paid over different periods is a better strategy than pooling all
workers/periods together to capture the segment of workers not paid monthly
(or more generally to capture informal sector workers).
An extension provides a separate analysis of returns to education for the casual
and piece-rate labour market in Malawi, referred to as ganyu labour. In line with
the above analysis, this section explored how using different measures of earnings
affects the estimates of returns to education in ganyu labour. In line with earlier
results, the findings for ganyu show that, generally, converting to monthly yields
larger and inefficient estimates of returns to education than converting to daily or
annualised. Furthermore, like the pooled results, the difference between converting
to daily and converting to annualised estimates is small.
Recentered Influence Function (RIF) regression and decomposition techniques
remain among the modern econometric tools for analysing the effects of a change
in the distribution of a variable on the statistic of interest (Rios-Avila, 2020b).
The second essay employed RIF regression and decomposition strategies (Firpo
et al., 2009, 2018) to examine three essential aspects. Firstly, for each pay period,
it begins by showing how an increase in the population’s education by one year
would affect earnings at different points of the wage distribution. Secondly, it goes
further to investigate how such an increase in education would affect the earnings
gap between the high-wage and the low-wage earners. Lastly, it decomposes the
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gender wage and inequality differences to ascertain the proportion that can be
attributed to both gender differences in educational attainment and in returns to
education.
Evidence from the RIF regression (assuming linear schooling) suggests that
while estimates significantly differ within pay periods depending on the quantile
of earnings, they also differ across the pay periods. Only the weekly sample has a
consistent pattern within pay periods whereby returns increase monotonically by
quantile of earnings for all three countries. Across the pay periods, generally, the
effect of an additional year of education in the population on average earnings is
larger for workers reporting earnings monthly compared to their daily and weekly
counterparts. This suggests that returns to education (or skill) are more important
for formal sector workers.
The RIF regression for inequality shows that education can either increase
or reduce wage inequality depending on the period in which the worker is paid.
Education is associated with an increase in inequality for workers paid weekly
and reduced inequality for those paid daily and monthly. That is, conditional on
working and paid weekly, education is likely to benefit more those in high than in
low paying jobs, while for the other pay periods it benefits more those in low than
in high paying jobs.
Allowing for non-linearity in schooling, the results reiterate that an increase
in education in the population generates different earnings outcomes depending
on the pay period. However, this specification reveals that the outcomes differ
depending on the level of education. Precisely, the relationship between earnings
and education is concave for workers whose earnings are in the bottom 10% and
strongly convex for workers whose earnings are in the top 10% of the earnings
distribution. This suggests that, in all three countries, an increase in education in
the population is more likely to benefit the high-wage than the low-wage workers
and hence likely to increase inequality. For workers in the top 10% of the earnings
distribution quantiles, the effects of education are very small (even negative for
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Malawi) for early years of schooling but increase rapidly after about the 6th year,
regardless of the pay period.
The gender earnings gap was decomposed to assess how much of it can
be attributed to gender gaps in educational attainment as well as in returns
to education, again by pay period. Significant gender gaps in earnings were
found for Tanzania and Uganda but not for Malawi. Results from reweighted
RIF OB decomposition suggest that gender differences in educational attainment
significantly explain the gender wage gap for Tanzania and Uganda, implying that
policies that increase women’s educational attainment are vital in narrowing the
gender wage gap.
Chapter 4 also extended the analysis to include a section for ganyu labour in
Malawi. Examining the distributional effects of education on earnings for ganyu
workers, the findings reveal a pattern of results like those in the primary analysis.
An increase in the population’s average education by a year significantly increases
the mean wage of ganyu workers by an amount that varies depending on the
quantile of the earnings distribution. Reweighted RIF OB gender decomposition
results further show that a significant proportion of the wage gap in ganyu labour
can be attributed to the gender differences in educational attainment in both urban
and rural areas.
The third essay (Chapter 5) focuses on investigating how much of the welfare
difference between both youth-headed households in 2001 and 2018 and between
youth and adult-headed households in each of the years can be attributed to
differences in educational attainment and returns to education. The aim was to
assess the impact of increased participation in education, especially following the
Universal Primary Education (UPE) introduced in 2001, which mainly benefited
the youth aged 15 – 35 years in 2018. Contrasted with previous studies which
mainly examined the association between education and welfare at any given point
in time, this essay examined both how much of the welfare differences between 2001
and 2018 can be attributed to changes in the association between education and
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welfare over this period, and how much can be attributed to changes in educational
attainment between 2001 and 2018 (i.e., effects of change in education distribution
between the period).
Proxying welfare by household (per adult equivalent) consumption expenditure
relative to the national poverty line, the study used a reweighted RIF OB
decomposition, a similar methodological approach to that employed in Chapter
4, to decompose the welfare differences between youth in 2001 and their 2018
counterparts as well as between youth and adults in each year. As expected,
the analysis shows that youths, having more education than adults, enjoy higher
welfare levels than adults in both years. The difference in educational attainment
between the two groups significantly explains the differences in welfare, but
the difference in the returns to education does not. Comparing youth cohorts
across years, the youth in 2018 have higher education and welfare levels than
their 2001 counterparts. The findings revealed that the difference in welfare is
significantly attributed to differences in educational attainment between 2001 and
2018. Differences in returns to education explain the welfare gap only for young
women and youth residing in rural areas.
6.2 Policy Implications
The thesis’ findings provide some important policy implications. The findings of all
empirical chapters provide new evidence to justify that the returns to education in
East Africa are positive, and thus the efforts to increase both education attainment
and achievement should be upheld. The findings suggest that returns to education
in the region are convex, implying that higher education levels are becoming more
important. With all countries having UPE policies in place (and tuition-free
secondary education in Tanzania and Uganda), the governments of the respective
countries should ensure that school enrolment, completion and grade progression
rates remain high and ideally increase.
The findings from Chapter 4 also show that females still lie behind males in
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terms of educational attainment and raising female’s educational attainment can
significantly reduce the gender earnings gap. Education policies should therefore
be geared towards increasing girls’ enrolment into all levels of education.
We can also point out some policy implications with regards to the role of
the informal sector in inequality; the inequality between men and women; and
the inequality which arises due to education reform although these need further
analyses. First, the higher inequality amongganyu workers who are mainly in
informal employment compared to the other workers suggests that moving the
workers out of the informal employment may reduce earnings inequality in the
region. Second, there is a significant gender earnings gap for ganyu workers in
Malawi but not for the other category of workers. This suggests that women are
more disadvantaged while working in the informal sector and thus policies targeted
at moving women out of the informal employment may curb the gender earnings
gap. Third, the UPE reform that is found to have increased earnings and welfare
in Tanzania may be associated with increased earnings inequality between the pre
reform cohort and the post reform cohort. In designing policies to reduce earnings
inequality, policy makers should therefore take this reform into consideration.
6.3 Limitations of the Study
Due to limitations with the LSMS data, we lack variables that we could have
used as controls1 for unobservable ability or instruments for endogenous schooling.
Consequently, while the results appear robust we could not compare or check
robustness using common strategies such as two-stage least squares and control
functions. Furthermore, although data for Tanzania and Uganda have a panel
dimension, the proportion of workers observed more than once is relatively small.
Using panel data estimation strategies like fixed effects to address the endogeneity
would have created another sample selection bias problem.
In Chapters 4 and 5, no attempt was made to control for endogeneity of
1Such as IQ tests and standardized test grades or parental education.
236
education from the unobserved ability or endogenous selection to the different
pay periods, which is a limitation of the analyses. As stated earlier, the absence
of suitable instrumental variables from the data is one factor. Most importantly,
even with good instruments or instrument-free methods like GC, the debate on
the combination of RIF and the endogeneity control methods remains inconclusive
(Rios-Avila, 2020a; Firpo et al., 2018). In that regard, we leave that open to future
studies when such methods become widely available.
The analysis in Chapter 5 is based on comparisons of youth and adult
headed households, given the difficulty in measuring education and consumption
of individuals at the household level. While youth make the largest proportion of
the labour force, less than a third of them head the households they live in. As a
result, we could not analyse the welfare gain resulting from gains in schooling for
the youth who live in households headed by adult.
6.4 Future Research
This thesis is the first study in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to empirically show
that the pay period matters, and care should be taken when estimating returns to
education for workers paid over different pay periods. Building on the findings of
this thesis, further exploration on the topic could be carried out using data covering
more countries and with more detailed labour market information. This should
help to propose standard adjustment factors that could be used by all researchers
to convert earnings from one period to another or pooling for comparison, thereby
making studies across the region more comparable.
The findings from Chapter 3 point that moving the population to wage
employment (formal employment) with monthly payments may see greater returns
to education. Future research could extend the current analysis to investigate the
differences in returns to education between workers paid monthly who work in the
formal sector and those in the informal sector.
The findings from Chapter 4 show that education can significantly reduce the
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gender earnings gap. However, we lacked appropriate data that would be required
to investigate how policies geared towards increasing girls’ enrolment into all levels
of education, including free education and allowing pregnant girls back to school
should be enhanced, and to what extent the policies would bring about gender
equality in education and eventually labour market outcomes. Future research
could extend the current analysis if better household and individual data become
available.
As stated earlier, the analysis in Chapter 5 was based on comparisons of youth
(and adult) headed households, given the difficulty in measuring education and
consumption of individuals at the household level. Future studies could use other
surveys to analyse how the gains in schooling over this period affected the wage
earnings and their distribution, with analysis at the individual level.
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